(圖說：身為業餘攝影師，總會被各種光影給吸引，例如倒影。就說說那沒有下雨就遇不到的倒影，或說那些光影，或說那些暗物質，我們以為的看不到或摸不著，但也許一直都在。2016 出差晚餐前散步，攝於馬德里王宮。圖片來源：Ernest。)
【從美國運通搶走客戶的 Ramp 公司卡：如何從賣金融到賣時間，累積 AI 時代企業軟體的暗物質護城河】
前幾天整理【縱橫古時候與 AI 時代，來看 Keith Rabois 聊聊如何用三個不討喜，換來真心硬團隊】的時候，Keith 推薦可以聽聽 Ramp CEO Eric 的演講。加上他自己在 2019 年 5 月主導 Ramp 的種子輪、9 月就給 term sheet 提前鎖 A 輪，我想看這位讓 Keith 這麼早早下注的創辦人，是怎麼思考的。於是翻出 Eric Glyman 2026 年 2 月在 Stripe 頻道這集，摘錄三個小段落來感受一下。
⌬ 暗物質護城河：真心硬公司那一層
- Eric 借宇宙的暗物質比喻軟體公司的隱藏資產。
- 我們如果請 Claude Code 去復刻一個 Ramp，是能複製那層表面 UI，但複製不了冰山底下那九百萬個 edge cases。
- 舊金山前陣子大停電，Waymo 車隊在路上就撞到一個沒寫進程式的場景，總要出門走走才知道路上哪裡有絆腳石或電線桿。
- Eric 說技術債聽起來像某種不好的事，但真相反而是累積了公司踩過的每一個坑所留下來的防護邏輯。 .
- 他舉了一家名為 vLex 的 25 年西班牙老公司，創辦人 Alex 買下西班牙可追溯到 1492 年的法律文件，長年維持一年 2,000 萬美元的 SaaS，後來在一年內跳到一億。
- 原因是，當下的 ChatGPT 還做不出這件事，那些資料根本不在 LLM 訓練集裡頭。
- 另一家 DomainTools 每天定期記錄網路上的 WHOIS 歷史，這種由時間堆出來的資料集，在 AI 世代只會更值錢。
（是說我們團隊也在健身器材領域累積了一座冰山，然後準備累積下一座：）
⌬ 一塊錢省下來等於賺十二塊
- 美國企業平均利潤率約 8%，Eric 把算式攤開：
- 省下一塊錢的開支，等於賺進十二塊錢的營收。
- Ramp 幫客戶平均砍 5% 開支，客戶去年平均營收成長 16%，反觀全美國平均只有 5%。 .
- 傳統銀行用更低利率跟點數回饋搶生意，Eric 說那是 selling money，Ramp 他們要做的是 selling time。
- 客戶節省下來的時間拿去做核心業務，槓桿差太多了。
（我們陪電子廠跟傳產客戶重新探索 ERP 資料，真正省下來的通常也不是某一筆採購金額，反而是幫助客戶節省了人力時間。管理層盯的是財務報表，而真正有動起來的工作流程、可追蹤、可視覺化的正向流程，才能創造正向營收。）
⌬ 爭論的邊際成本歸零
- Eric 丟了一個例子：他太太用 ChatGPT 跟某家公司起爭執，對方也用 AI 回，一來一往他太太贏了。
- 這個畫面背後的抽象是，過去我們懶得為 5 塊、20 塊打電話跟客服周旋，不是因為錢不重要，是因為電話成本、情緒成本、時間成本加起來遠比爭回的錢還多。 .
- 但是 AI 時代讓某些過往認為是成本的成本趨近於零。
- 每一筆過去被放過的小價差，現在都有機會重新回收。
- 放到企業場景會更明顯：自動化的退款申訴、續約前 90 天丟進來一份競品報價、跨客戶比對出你付的 SaaS 單價比市場高 20%，都是同一個概念。 .
- Ramp 已經在做最後這件事，他們的資料收集池看得到每家客戶付給 Salesforce 的每個座位單價。
- 資訊不對稱一旦被撞破，議價結構可以重寫一次。
（。）
📷 圖說 👉 身為業餘攝影師，總會被各種光影給吸引，例如倒影。就說說那沒有下雨就遇不到的倒影，或說那些光影，或說那些暗物質，我們以為的看不到或摸不著，但也許一直都在。2016 出差晚餐前散步，攝於馬德里王宮。
每天路過按個「👍」或「❤️」，聽起來好像是很驚人的事，又好像是微不足道的小事。好似奇蹟，又好似理所當然。
#Ramp #FinTech #EricGlyman #KeithRabois
✳️ 延伸閱讀
- 縱橫古時候與 AI 時代，來看 Keith Rabois 聊聊如何用三個不討喜，換來真心硬團隊
- ElevenLabs 從 2 個人到 300 人的組織方法論：研發產品飛輪、沒有職稱、卓越證據
- 玩 Claude Managed Agents 之前，先拆解 Palantir 的五層框架
- 企業 AI 部署為什麼卡住？Mistral AI 的做法值得拆解
- 拆解家族辦公室收費模式：你付的那 1% 到底買到什麼？
✳️ 知識圖譜
(更多關於知識圖譜…)
✳️ 逐字稿與筆記
開場與初始提問
- I don’t know if we need, if we want to do this, but— I already look like that naturally, so.
我不知道我們需不需要、想不想做這個，但是，我本來看起來就這樣了。 - Oh, this is Kevin from “The Office.”
噢，這是《The Office》裡的 Kevin。 - Yeah, yeah.
對對。 - Eric Glyman is the co-founder and CEO of Ramp, the corporate card and finance automation platform.
Eric Glyman 是 Ramp 的共同創辦人兼 CEO，Ramp 是一家企業信用卡與財務自動化平台。 - Founded in 2019, Ramp has taken the industry by storm.
成立於 2019 年，Ramp 席捲了整個產業。 - Oh, cheers.
噢，乾杯。 - Cheers.
乾杯。 - Can you describe maybe a good framing, just the Ramp business today?
你能不能給一個比較好的框架，描述 Ramp 現在的業務樣貌？ - What’s the biggest part of the business in terms of where you make money?
就營收來源而言，業務中最大的部分是什麼？ - What are the new growth lines?
有什麼新的成長業務線？ - Any metrics you can share on the scale?
規模上可以分享什麼數字嗎？ - Alex and I have a million questions, but maybe you can start by just framing it up for us.
我跟 Alex 有一堆問題想問，也許你可以先幫我們勾勒出整體輪廓。
Ramp 業務概覽與演變
- Yeah, of course.
好的，當然。 - So, first, just the pace that this has come together has been pretty remarkable.
首先，這一切成形的速度其實相當驚人。 - Seven years, yeah.
七年了，對。 - You know?
你知道嗎？ - I think by the time we were, six years and change, the company had passed over a billion a year in revenue.
我想在我們成立六年多的時候，公司的年營收就已經突破十億美元。 - The largest portion of that is card.
其中最大的部分是信用卡業務。 - And so, that might be a classic kind of interchange-based model.
這可以算是典型的以交換費為基礎的商業模式。 - But behind it— So this is people, in their business they have spend cards, everyone walking around the company has a Ramp card.
但背後這些人在他們的公司裡有支出卡，公司裡每個人都拿著一張 Ramp 卡走來走去。 - And you run interchange on those.
你在那些卡上跑交換費。 - That’s right.
沒錯。 - Next, you can think about bill payments and software.
接著，可以想想帳單支付和軟體業務。 - Software, it’s a two-something-year-old business line, just about two years and some months.
軟體是兩年多一點的業務線，差不多兩年又幾個月。 - That’s over 100 million a year business line in and of itself.
它本身就已經是年收超過一億美元的業務線。 - And that can be advanced functionality to maybe manage lots of entities, to automate aspects of accounting, maybe aspects of procurement, bill payments.
這可以是更進階的功能，管理多個法人實體、自動化會計流程、採購、帳單支付。 - So, this can be sending checks, wires, ACH and that’s predominantly a float as well in some cases foreign exchange transaction business.
所以這可能是寄支票、電匯、ACH，這主要也是一種浮存收益，有時也會有外匯交易業務。 - Treasury.
金庫（Treasury）。 - That’s a product that is about a year old, several billion dollars of deposits.
那是一個大約一歲的產品，已經有數十億美元的存款。 - Some of that is checking-like products.
其中一部分是類似活期帳戶的產品。 - Some of that is more of an investment and money ladder type product.
一部分比較像是投資和債券梯（money ladder）類型的產品。 - And then the last, the other ones are procurement and then travel, which is a bit of an in-kind.
最後還有採購和商務旅行業務，商務旅行比較像是實物服務。 - And what’s been so interesting is that if you break down and look towards maybe let’s say contribution profit, gross profit of the business, a few years ago it would’ve been 90 plus percent card.
有趣的是，如果你拆解看業務的邊際貢獻利潤或毛利，幾年前大概有九成以上都來自信用卡。 - I think by the end of this year, the second, third, fourth, fifth lines of business will comprise and aggregate the majority of Ramp’s business.
我想到今年底，第二、第三、第四、第五條業務線加總起來，將會構成 Ramp 業務的主體。 - And so, it’s evolved into this platform by which if you’re trying to operate your company, it’s just a lot more efficient.
所以它演變成一個平台，如果你想要經營你的公司，會變得高效得多。 - You spend less.
花費變少。 - I think people know Ramp for, we help the average company cut their expenses by about 5% per year.
我想大家認識 Ramp 是因為我們平均每年幫客戶砍掉 5% 左右的開支。 - The thing that’s been really fascinating is people are starting to use these products in aggregate.
真正有趣的是，客戶開始把這些產品綜合起來使用。 - Not only are they not paying for five, six sets of point solutions, but they’re also not wasting time.
他們不只省掉了五、六個點狀解決方案的花費，也不再浪費時間。 - They’re growing faster.
他們成長得更快。 - The average customer last year on Ramp grew their revenue by, I think it was 16%, which compared to, in the United States, the average business— Much higher than that.
去年 Ramp 的平均客戶營收成長大概 16%，相較於全美平均，高很多。 - Yeah, I think it’s 5% in the US.
對，我記得全美平均是 5%。 - And so, in some sense, what we’re trying to do is be not just a better platform, but a better, almost kind of digital brain for organizations to allocate resources and make sure spend is not wasted.
某種意義上，我們想做的不只是一個更好的平台，而是一個更好的、像是企業的數位大腦，去分配資源並確保花費不被浪費。 - Yeah.
對。 - So, you start by selling, say, spend cards into a business.
所以你們一開始是把支出卡賣進企業。
Ramp 的多產品切入點
- The CFO likes it, the employees like it, and then that gives you permission to go sell some of this other functionality.
CFO 喜歡、員工喜歡，這就給了你賣其他功能的機會。 - And so, it’s kind of a classic multi-product cross-sell.
這算是一種典型的多產品交叉銷售。 - Is it always starting with spend cards or do you now have multiple front doors into the business?
是不是都從支出卡開始？還是你們現在有多個進入企業的入口？ - It’s been the big story of the past year.
這是過去一年的大故事。 - I think there were, over the last quarter, thousands of businesses that came in just for bill payments.
我想上一季有好幾千家企業是單純為了帳單支付而來的。 - There’s accounting firms that are becoming into, they say, “We’re a Ramp shop here if you want to work with us.
有會計師事務所會說「我們是 Ramp shop，想跟我們合作就來。」 - We’ll bring in bill payments, treasury…” We use Ramp to go power that and they can manage 10, 100, 200 clients all through one platform.
我們會帶入帳單支付、金庫……」他們用 Ramp 來驅動服務，可以在單一平台上管理 10 家、100 家、200 家客戶。 - And we’re excited.
我們很興奮。 - I mean, probably the fastest growing line of business is procurement.
我是說，成長最快的業務線大概是採購。 - Or, they’re single clients that are looking to kind of bring in and do full-scale purchase orders across, whether it’s single or a dozen plus entities, all the way through.
或者是單一客戶想把端到端的採購訂單做起來，從一個法人實體到十幾個法人實體都有。 - And so, that’s been the really fun story of the past year.
這是過去一年真正有趣的故事。
AI 驅動的費用政策執行
- Do you have a view on what the right policy is for employee spend within a business?
你對企業內員工支出政策的看法是什麼？ - I love that you ask this, yeah.
我很喜歡你問這個問題。 - 37signals or someone will say, “Companies are so lame.
37signals 或某些人會說「公司真的很廢。 - You just give everyone a credit card and trust people and it’s fine.”
你就直接每人發一張信用卡、信任員工就好了。」 - And then meanwhile, large companies are like, “Well, this hotel is in a Tier 2 city and therefore there’s this dollar limit and it must be booked 14 days in advance.”
然後另一方面大公司會說「這家飯店在二線城市，所以有一個美元上限，而且必須提前 14 天訂房。」 - And so, you see companies operate at really two ends of the spectrum in terms of how much flexibility they give people.
所以你會看到公司在給員工的彈性上處於光譜的兩極。 - What is correct for a company, or does it just vary by size?
對一家公司來說什麼才是對的？還是說這只是因公司規模而異？ - I love this question.
我很喜歡這個問題。 - And the interesting part, if you really kind of dig into Ramp’s businesses, we have ways of back-testing and actually understanding based on how strict your policy is, how things are running.
有趣的是，如果你深入看 Ramp 的業務，我們有辦法回溯測試、真的根據你政策的嚴格程度去理解事情的運作狀況。 - Does that have an impact on how much time your employees are, let’s say doing expenses, how quickly you’re growing?
這會不會影響你員工花多少時間在報帳、你成長得多快？ - And you can start to actually compare based off of the operating hygiene of the company… What are end margins?
然後你可以開始根據公司的經營體質做比較，最終毛利率是多少？ - What is a pace of growth that occurs at the company?
公司的成長步調是怎樣？ - And I bring this back to what— So you can do a correlational study between expense policies and company growth.
我把這個拉回到，所以你可以做費用政策與公司成長的相關性研究。 - And look, it’s pretty interesting.
結果滿有意思的。 - I mean, the first, there’s an aspect of, in most companies, particularly high-growth companies, it tends to resemble something closer to the “no rules rules” Netflix approach of, we’re going to trust but verify and shine a light on it.
首先，在多數公司、特別是高成長公司，比較像是 Netflix 那套「不設規則的規則」，我們會信任但查驗，並把所有花費攤在陽光下。 - Spend tends to be reasonably permissive.
支出傾向相對寬鬆。 - But then part of the breakthrough of the past year is you could basically take an expense policy, let’s say it’s written in plain English.
然後過去一年的突破之一是，你基本上可以把一份用自然英文寫的費用政策丟進來。 - “If the flight is more than five hours, you can take business.
「如果飛行時間超過五小時，你可以搭商務艙。 - If it’s under…” Things that would’ve been horrible to go and have your managers go and verify this stuff, now you can run that through an LLM.
如果低於⋯⋯」這些以前要主管去查核的事情，現在你可以丟進 LLM 處理。 - I think that we’re processing over 100,000 expenses a day that are being reviewed agentically.
我想我們每天用 agent 自主審核超過 10 萬筆費用。 - This is a very fast-growing subset of the business.
這是成長非常快速的業務子集。 - So you give the Ramp agent this company’s expense policy, and then it applies it to the transactions that are coming through.
所以你把公司的費用政策給 Ramp 的 agent，它就會套用在流進來的交易上。 - Exactly.
完全正確。 - And so you can start to do things like, I think about the episode you’d had with Susan Li.
然後你可以做像我想起你跟 Susan Li 那集一樣的事。 - It was incredibly instructive where, she sort of says, it would feel so silly and it’s not a great use of my time in some sense to be a very expensive machine learning algorithm to do, to review expenses.
那集很有啟發性，她說身為一個昂貴的機器學習演算法去審核費用，感覺很蠢、不是好的時間運用。 - But yet, somehow, a lot of people in companies are reduced to that, thanks to Sarbanes-Oxley and the rules around it.
但因為薩班斯-奧克斯利法案及相關規則，很多公司裡的人都被迫淪落到做這件事。 - Now you can have an agent functionally that does that, that takes that aspect of the job.
現在你可以用一個 agent 來做這件事，把這部分工作接過去。 - And so, it has access to the full set of data that you would, all the transaction-related metadata, the receipt data, the timing data, the policy data.
它能存取你所能存取的完整資料集，所有交易相關的中繼資料、收據資料、時間資料、政策資料。 - It then can go in real-time review.
它可以即時審核。 - Was this in or out?
這筆算合規還是不合規？ - Can have the full audit trail explaining its reasoning.
可以附上解釋推理過程的完整稽核軌跡。 - And today, it’s over 99% accurate, which turns out it’s much more accurate than people are.
而且現在準確率超過 99%，比人類準確多了。
植入道德準則的挑戰
- So, people don’t know the expense policy and expenses are pretty automated.
所以員工不清楚費用政策，但費用審核幾乎完全自動化了。 - And I find this thing super interesting, in part because I don’t think it should be anyone’s job to go and review people’s expenses, but somehow, while it’s in no one’s JD, the law kind of requires everyone to waste an hour of their time every month, if you’re a manager.
我覺得這件事超級有趣，部分是因為我不認為該有人專門去審核別人的報帳，但不知怎麼的，這不在任何人的 JD（職務說明書）裡，法律又要求每位主管每個月浪費一小時在這件事上。 - And does the law allow for it to be reviewed agentically and then just signed off on by the human?
那法律允許由 agent 自主審核，然後由人類簽核就好嗎？ - It does, yeah.
允許，對。 - The goal of this is separation of duties.
這件事的目的是職責分離。 - That you yourself are not reviewing your own expenses.
你不能審核自己的費用。 - There needs to be a set of procedures that govern and actually are effective through the action of, okay, the rule says this.
需要有一組流程來規範，並且透過行動真的發揮作用，好，規則是這樣寫的。 - Did you take some steps to do this?
你有採取步驟去落實嗎？ - It can be a system— Yeah, you can’t self-certify.
可以是一個系統，對，你不能自我簽核。 - The funny thing is that, I mean, one way of doing this, actually, we used to do this, is why not just post your expense reports in the public eye, right?
有趣的是，其中一種做法，我們以前也這樣做，就是為什麼不直接把你的費用報告公開給所有人看？ - So, and the reason to do this is actually it could go wrong.
這樣做的理由，其實也可能出錯。 - You could say, “I’m going to spend, you stay at the Four Seasons, I’m going to stay at the Five Seasons.”
你可能會說「我要花、你住四季酒店，那我要住五季酒店」。 - You could go that direction.
可能會往那個方向走。 - But what you actually want is a moral code.
但你真正想要的是一套道德準則。
平衡信任、查核與文化
- It’s like, if you were the owner of the business, it is your own money.
就像如果你是公司老闆，那就是你自己的錢。 - Yes.
對。 - So, if you were staying at the Five Seasons, I’ve just made that hotel chain up, it’s like, you’re— Sounds pretty nice.
所以如果你住五季酒店，這連鎖品牌是我剛瞎掰的，那就像你是，聽起來滿不錯的。 - You’re stealing from yourself.
你是在偷自己的錢。 - Why would you do that?
你為什麼要這樣做？ - The problem is that once you get to tens of thousands of people, how do you impose that moral code?
問題是一旦公司規模到幾萬人，你要怎麼貫徹那套道德準則？ - And actually, like the two tent poles that you just mentioned, they’re both bad.
而你剛提到的兩個極端，其實兩個都不好。 - Because if you have to stay at a crappy hotel, and you’re about to sign a two million dollar contract and you didn’t get any sleep, it’s the Motel 6, and you take a two-hour taxi.
因為如果你必須住很爛的飯店、你要簽一筆 200 萬美元的合約結果沒睡好、還住 Motel 6、又搭兩小時計程車。 - It’s like, all right, you saved the company money.
那就像是，好吧你幫公司省了錢。 - That does not make sense.
這不合理。 - Stay at the Four Seasons.
去住四季酒店吧。 - But you can’t really embody that in, “if this, then that.”
但你很難用「如果⋯⋯那就⋯⋯」的規則去具體化這件事。 - Because what you want is this moral code.
因為你想要的是這套道德準則。 - Like, that’s what you want.
對，你想要的就是這個。 - And like, how do you actually instill that?
那你要怎麼把它植入？ - And there’s almost a behavioral psychology way, which is like, we’ll just show what people are spending.
有一種偏行為心理學的做法就是，我們就把大家的花費公開。 - If you’re at the top of the leaderboard, we might trust but verify, and verify a lot more.
如果你排在花費排行榜的最上面，我們就會信任但查驗，而且會查驗得更嚴。
把公司文化植入政策中
- But that’s the hard thing to do and actually preserve as the company goes from the founder to the founder plus the founder’s brother to many, many more people.
但當公司從創辦人到創辦人加上他弟弟、再到非常非常多人，要維持這件事很困難。 - How do you keep that same esprit de corps or this informal code?
你要怎麼保持同樣的團體精神、那種非正式的準則？ - I think it comes back to… What was the name of the movie?
我想這回到⋯⋯那部電影叫什麼？ - “12 Angry Men,” I think it was, where, as you’re watching the film, you get some level of detail and someone seems very guilty.
我記得是《十二怒漢》，你看片的時候會得到一些細節，某人看起來罪證確鑿。 - It’s a dead shut case.
是個鐵案。 - And as more evidence emerges, you realize actually, this may be different.
但隨著更多證據出現，你會發現事情可能不是這樣。 - And you need more context in order to arrive at maybe a moral conclusion.
你需要更多上下文才能得出合乎道德的結論。 - Did it relate to closing a project?
這筆花費是不是跟結案有關？ - How does it relate to an outcome that maybe you’ll see emerge one month, two months after you stayed at the Five Seasons and closed the deal that changed the company, whatever the example is.
它跟一個你住完五季酒店、談成改變公司的交易之後、一兩個月才顯現出來的結果，有什麼關聯，不論舉例是什麼。 - I would argue in favor of tools that have more context, that do more jobs of work.
我會支持擁有更多上下文、做更多工作的工具。 - Because not only can you do the narrow job better, but you can start to get at the answer of what actually is right for shareholders.
因為你不只能把狹義的工作做得更好，還能開始逼近「對股東真正有利的是什麼」這個答案。 - Where should we be allocating capital?
我們應該把資本分配到哪裡？ - It’s so interesting to hear, because every company approaches this differently.
聽你這樣講很有意思，因為每家公司處理這件事的方式都不一樣。 - Like, I’m on the board of Wise, and you know, Kristo flies coach everywhere, everybody flies.
像我是 Wise 的董事，你知道 Kristo 到哪都搭經濟艙，大家都搭經濟艙。 - That’s just the policy, but it might be penny-wise, pound-foolish.
那就是他們的政策，但這可能是因小失大。 - Again, not for me to say, but I also really admire the corporate code.
再說一次，這不是我來評論的，但我也很欣賞他們的公司準則。 - It’s just like, you, actually, that is cultural.
就像，你會發現這其實是文化。 - It’s kind of weird to say expenses are cultural, but they are.
說費用是文化的一部分有點奇怪，但真的是。 - For sure.
絕對是。 - Yeah.
對。 - It’s shared— Shared belief system.
這是共享的，共享的信念體系。 - It’s a shared belief system.
是一套共享的信念體系。 - It’s like, what is the culture of the company?
就是，這家公司的文化是什麼？
老舊的帳單支付系統
- You talked about your expansion into Bill Pay.
你談到了你們擴張到 Bill Pay。 - It seems like bill payment has proven, over the past 40 years, uniquely resistant to automation and modernization.
過去 40 年來，帳單支付對自動化和現代化出奇地具有抗性。 - If you look at how a typical business pays their rent, or if you order a keg of Guinness, you’ll get a PDF emailed to you by some person who has a relationship with you.
如果你看一間典型企業怎麼付房租，或你訂一桶健力士啤酒，你會收到某個跟你有往來關係的人寄來的 PDF。 - And there will be bank account details which hopefully are correct.
上面會有銀行帳戶資訊，希望是對的。 - And you send a payment to those.
然後你就匯款過去。 - And even bill payment products, you guys have a bunch of technology here, but it’s like, we scan the PDF in an automated way, or we ensure that the bank account details weren’t mistyped or something.
而且即便是帳單支付產品，你們在這個領域也有一堆技術，但就像，我們自動掃描 PDF、確保銀行帳戶資訊沒有打錯之類的。 - But it’s kind of “putting a little bit of lipstick on the pig” of the whole system being super antiquated.
但整個系統極度老舊，我們只是在豬身上擦一點口紅。 - Why is the system so antiquated when it comes to bill payment in particular?
為什麼帳單支付這一塊會這麼老舊？ - I think this is some of what Alex was bringing up.
我想這跟 Alex 剛才提到的部分有關。 - It’s the constraints of programming things in an “if this, then that” kind of world are very heavy.
在那種「如果這樣就那樣」的世界裡寫程式，限制非常大。
支出決策的複雜性
- There’s a lot of complexity.
複雜度很高。 - And when you think about the nuance and algorithms that govern why do companies spend money under some circumstances, how hard it can be to record.
當你想到在某些情境下公司為什麼會花錢的微妙差別和演算法，記錄這件事有多困難。 - I wouldn’t overlook…
我不會輕忽⋯⋯ - Let’s say that you’re a manufacturer and you’re buying some asset which you’re going to use for five years and it’s going to depreciate.
假設你是製造商，買一個要用五年、會折舊的資產。 - It’s a very different accounting treatment versus I’m buying a pay-as-you-go SaaS app.
那跟我買一個用多少付多少的 SaaS 應用，會計處理上非常不同。 - All the complexities around that might govern whether or not you decide to spend.
圍繞這些的所有複雜度都會影響你要不要花錢。 - And then finally, once you get all this detail, how do you review this and decide where to allocate your next marginal dollar is very complicated.
最後，當你拿到這些細節，要怎麼審核這些東西、決定你下一塊錢該花到哪裡，這非常複雜。 - But many systems are in place upgraded despite the fact that that’s pretty complex.
但即便如此複雜，很多系統仍然就地升級了。
支付系統的歷史升級
- So credit cards started with no real-time authorization system, which is crazy.
所以信用卡一開始完全沒有即時授權系統，這很瘋狂。 - And you just hoped that they were good for— Carbon copy.
你只能祈禱對方付得起，複寫紙。 - Exactly.
正是。 - The machine with the pleasing sound.
那台聲音很悅耳的機器。 - They’d do great in the current ASMR environment.
在現在的 ASMR 風潮裡會很吃香。 - That’s true.
確實。 - But then they added, you could call up and get an authorization and then they obviously added to the current systems we know where— The modem, you forgot the modem.
後來他們加上可以打電話取得授權，然後當然再升級到我們現在熟知的系統，你忘了數據機。 - Exactly.
沒錯。 - And then the modem.
然後是數據機。 - And so, in place credit cards were upgraded with much better capabilities.
所以信用卡就地升級，擁有了強很多的能力。 - And similarly, if you look at checks and how they work, even though we think of checks as antiquated, it used to be the case that physical checks had to be flown all around the country to be physically settled.
同樣地，如果你看支票怎麼運作，雖然我們覺得支票很老舊，以前實體支票得靠飛機運到全國各地才能完成實體結算。 - And then there was the Check 21 Act in, what was it, the year 2000?
然後 Check 21 法案通過，大概是 2000 年？ - Where they said a scan of a check is good enough and so they could be digitized by the banks and then shredded.
法案說支票掃描圖像就可以了，所以銀行可以把它數位化之後碎掉。 - And then there was the, you can take a photo of a check with your phone.
再之後你可以用手機拍支票。 - And so we’ve managed to take this super old-timey check system and despite the fact it’s super old-timey, in some ways it has actually been meaningfully upgraded.
所以我們確實把這套超級老派的支票系統，在它老派的外殼下，做了實質的升級。
需要集中化的支付網路
- And if you looked at the bill pay system from the outside, you would say we should have DNS for companies.
如果你從外部看帳單支付系統，你會說我們應該要有企業版的 DNS。 - So rather than a company like sending you their bank account details, you should look them up in some central clearinghouse.
不要讓公司直接傳他們的銀行帳戶資料給你，應該是你在某個中央結算所去查詢。 - And that way you confirm that you’re not being phished.
這樣你就能確認自己沒被釣魚。 - A lot of spear-phishing attacks work that way.
很多魚叉式釣魚攻擊就是這樣進行的。 - Although you referenced this.
雖然你剛才也提到這件事。 - So there’s actually an indifference point that you can graph.
這其實有個可以畫出來的不偏好均衡點。 - If interest rates go up high enough, if I send you a check, which is like a paper mail check and that takes five days and hopefully the USPS goes on strike for two more weeks so I’ve got the postmark.
如果利率夠高，我寄給你一張紙本支票，要花五天送達，最好再加上美國郵政罷工兩週，我就只需要郵戳日期算付款。 - I actually benefit… It’s actually cheaper for me.
我其實是賺到的⋯⋯對我來說比較便宜。 - You legally paid, right?
你在法律上已經付款，對吧？ - It’s crazy.
瘋了。 - No, it’s crazy.
真的瘋了。 - This is the problem.
這就是問題所在。
應收應付帳款的對抗本質
- Like credit cards, everybody…
像信用卡，每個人⋯⋯ - I am in the store, I want the TV.
我在店裡，我想要那台電視。 - You want to sell me the TV.
你想賣我那台電視。 - We both want this done right away.
我們雙方都想立刻成交。 - And in the knuckle-crunching, ASMR, carbon-copy days, they might not have been willing to sell that to me because they didn’t know if I was good for the money.
在那個敲敲響、像 ASMR 的複寫紙時代，他們可能不願意賣給我，因為他們不知道我付不付得起。 - They’d never seen me before.
他們沒見過我。 - And the interesting thing is that AR and AP are almost an adversarial process.
有趣的是應收帳款和應付帳款幾乎是一個對抗性的過程。 - You mentioned this.
你剛提到這個。 - What do you want to do as a controller?
身為財務主管你想做什麼？ - Well, you want to pay as late as possible and you want to collect as early as possible.
你想盡可能晚付款、盡可能早收款。 - And then you have this weird thing where checks, it’s not just an accident that they stick around for a long time.
然後就有這個奇怪的現象，支票能留存這麼久不是意外。 - It’s like there’s a financial incentive for one party.
而是其中一方有財務誘因。 - So that’s true on payment timing, I agree with that but there are some things that are just a dead weight loss, like the ability to fat-finger a bank account.
在付款時間上確實如此，我同意，但有些事情就是純粹的無謂損失，像是有人會把銀行帳號打錯。 - No one benefits from that.
沒人從中得利。 - Everyone has a horrible time if that happens.
一旦發生大家都會很痛苦。 - No, that Nigerian guy.
不，那個奈及利亞人會。 - There’s some people that benefit.
是有些人會得利。 - Nigerian princes.
奈及利亞王子們。 - Let’s think of everyone.
我們想想每個人。 - I will posit that many networks have been upgraded in place.
我會主張許多網路都已經就地升級了。 - But somehow the loose network of businesses paying each other via PDF invoices has proven very resistant to in-place upgrades.
但不知為何，企業彼此用 PDF 發票付款的這張鬆散網路，對就地升級展現了極強的抗性。 - Also, I love your notion of DNS for payments or for expenses.
另外，我很喜歡你提的「支付版 DNS」或「費用版 DNS」的想法。 - So, I don’t know if you saw this, Google wanted to issue a 100-year bond.
我不知道你有沒有看到，Google 想發行 100 年期的債券。
Google 百年期債券與融資
- Yes.
有。 - So, why is that interesting?
為什麼這件事有趣？ - Imagine that I am owed money by Google.
想像一下 Google 欠我錢。 - I am one of the small businesses that you reference.
我是你剛提到的那種小企業。 - Their job is to pay me as late as possible.
他們的工作就是盡可能晚付我錢。 - They can borrow money for a hundred years at like 3% or whatever it is, cheaper than the US government probably.
他們可以用大概 3% 之類的利率借 100 年期的錢，可能比美國政府還便宜。 - T plus a hundred, yeah.
T 加一百（基準利率加一個百分點），對。 - I mean it’s a little more expensive than the US government, but they are borrowing…
意思是比美國政府稍貴一點，但他們借的是⋯⋯ - That’s crazy.
很瘋狂。 - I can borrow money at 20%, but why do I need to borrow money?
我借錢要付 20%，但我為什麼得借錢？ - Because Google’s paying me late.
因為 Google 拖著不付我。 - Those jerks.
那些混蛋。（Ernest：突然吃了誠實豆沙！XDD - So, I should be able to borrow money kind of at the rate at which Google is borrowing money because my AR…
所以我應該可以用 Google 借錢的利率去借錢，因為我的應收帳款⋯⋯ - My AR is their AP.
我的應收就是他們的應付。 - But the problem is, unless you put all this together, you would just look at me and you’re like, “Well, you’re just a little schmuck.
但問題是，除非你把這些資訊串起來，否則你看我就會想「你就是個小傢伙。 - I’m going to charge you 18%.”
我要跟你收 18%。」 - It’s like, yeah, but it’s Google.
就像，對啊，但這筆是 Google 欠的。 - They could borrow money at T plus whatever, you know, SOFR plus a hundred.
他們可以用 T 加上一點點、SOFR 加 1% 左右的利率借錢。 - 100%.
沒錯。 - That’s not fair.
這不公平。 - But the only way to really solve that is with more data and actually entangling…
但要真的解決這件事，唯一的辦法就是更多資料、並且把這些⋯⋯ - Not entangling, but just kind of connecting these things together.
不是糾纏，而是把這些東西連結起來。
軟體開發版圖的轉移
- What’s your vision for once AI is doing a lot of software engineering, what does that look like in three or four years time?
當 AI 已經在做大量軟體工程工作，你對三、四年後的想像是什麼？ - Is the competitive equilibrium similar, but the expectations for the amount of software and functionality businesses are shipping is much higher?
競爭均衡還是類似，只是對企業送出軟體量和功能量的期待大大提高？ - Are software teams similar looking, different looking?
軟體團隊看起來會一樣還是不一樣？ - Again, you’re doing a lot of AI engineering.
再說一次，你們在做很多 AI 工程。 - What does the future hold?
未來會是什麼樣子？ - It’s all blurring.
一切都在模糊化。 - It’s totally crazy.
完全瘋狂。 - There’s a designer shipping code.
有設計師在寫並推出程式碼。 - Marketing at Ramp reports into our CTO Karim, my co-founder who’s doing some of like the best marketing I’ve ever experienced and seen.
Ramp 的行銷部門是向我們 CTO 也是共同創辦人 Karim 回報，他做出我見過最棒的一些行銷。 - We have customer support agents like shipping code to production too.
我們的客服人員也會把程式碼送上正式環境。 - I just think that the half-life of you see a problem to how long it takes for you to go fix it and do something about it is shrinking immensely.
我覺得從看到問題到動手修掉它、做出改變的半衰期正在大幅縮短。 - Or if you want to change a color of a button, you can just say, “Hey at Ramp Inspect, can you change the color of this button?”
或者如果你想改某個按鈕的顏色，你就可以說「嘿 Ramp Inspect，可以幫我改這顆按鈕的顏色嗎？」 - And it goes and spins it up and it does it within minutes.
它就會跑起來、幾分鐘內把它做完。 - It verifies and validates it.
它會驗證與確認。 - And so, I actually think in some sense, these classic barriers that software businesses had are clearly going to erode.
所以某種意義上，我認為軟體公司那些經典的進入障礙顯然會被侵蝕。 - Yes but, there’s the old joke of “It’s much more fun to write code than read code,” which explains a lot of software engineer’s behavior.
對，但有個老笑話說「寫程式比讀程式好玩多了」，這解釋了很多軟體工程師的行為。 - And it becomes easier to change the button.
改個按鈕變得更容易。 - Is that another instance of it being more fun to write code than read code?
這是不是又一個「寫程式比讀程式好玩」的例子？ - Where lines of code are a liability and not an asset because they’re something you have to reckon with.
程式碼行數變成負債而不是資產，因為那是你得去應對的東西。 - And so, are companies at some level incurring some tech debt now where they’re adding a bunch of code, which will maybe be harder to reason with later?
所以某種程度上，企業現在是不是正在累積技術債？他們加了一堆程式碼，日後反而更難推理？ - Or do you just get bailed out by the models getting better?
還是說模型愈來愈強就會幫你解套？ - It’s really interesting.
真的很有意思。
AI 驅動的程式碼生成與重寫
- And by the way, one of the other interesting sub-conversations I’m hearing a lot, too, is when you think about where tech debt comes from, there’s a set of conditions and trade-offs you make, you write things in a discreet and deterministic way.
另外我還聽到一個有趣的延伸討論，當你想技術債從哪裡來，你做了一組條件和取捨，用離散且決定性的方式把事情寫下來。 - Under these circumstances, follow this code path.
在這些情境下，走這條程式路徑。 - Under this circumstance, follow this other one.
在那個情境下，走另一條。 - In a world where there’s LLMs and the models themselves are improving, I think it’s entirely possible that the way that code is written is you say, “Here’s what I’m solving for.
在有 LLM、模型本身又持續進步的世界，我認為完全有可能程式碼的寫法變成「我要解的問題是這個。 - Under these kinds of conditions, here’s what I want to occur.
在這些條件下，我希望發生的結果是這個。 - Go write the code that drives this outcome.”
去寫出能驅動這個結果的程式碼。」 - And maybe with the models such as they are today can get it done in sort of a spaghetti code written fashion.
以今天的模型來說，可能會以義大利麵條式的寫法完成。 - But it kind of works even though it’s some kind of Rube Goldberg machine underneath the hood.
但它還是可以運作，儘管底下是某種魯布·戈德堡機。 - But as these models get much smarter, you might write your code base in such a way where you say, “Every year, rewrite the underlying code, but here’s the outcome I can drive.”
但等模型變得更聰明，你可能會用這種方式寫你的程式碼庫「每年把底層程式碼重寫一次，這是我能驅動的結果。」 - And today you accomplish my outcome 90% of the time, 95, 98, 99, 100.
今天你達成我想要結果的比例是 90%，然後 95、98、99、100。 - And do you just have kind of self-healing and writing code all the way through?
這會不會變成一路上都在自我修復並自動寫程式？ - And this notion of like underlying code does goes away because we’re writing things in this different manner.
底層程式碼這個概念就此消失，因為我們用完全不同的方式在寫東西。
對認知工作與基礎設施的衝擊
- Obviously, there’s real conditions in which that’s not going to…
很顯然有些實際情況下這不會⋯⋯ - That won’t occur.
不會發生。 - Like, if you’re writing code that needs to have four nines of accuracy and uptime, like that’s probably not the methods you’re using.
像是你在寫那種需要四個九準確率與正常執行時間的程式，你大概不會用這種方法。 - But if you’re like a growth engineering team, that’s probably what you’re doing today if you’re kind of on the leading edge of this stuff.
但如果你是成長工程團隊，而且又走在前沿，今天你大概就是這樣在做。 - And so, I find this stuff very fascinating.
所以我覺得這些東西非常有意思。 - And when I think about the deeper implications of this stuff, I think that if you are completing this small amount of cognitive work…
當我思考這件事更深層的含意，如果你做的是這種很小量的認知工作⋯⋯ - Let’s say you are an expense app.
假設你是一個費用 app。 - The spend has occurred, it needs to go get the…
消費已經發生，需要去取得⋯⋯ - write it down somewhere and get someone’s approval.
把它寫在某個地方、拿到某個人的核准。 - And that’s all the knowledge work that you’re doing.
那就是你全部的知識工作。 - That’s very few tokens in order to accomplish that, both to create the infrastructure in order to facilitate it, like that probably evaporates.
這只需要很少的 token 就能完成，連為此建構基礎設施的成本也會蒸發。 - Anyone can probably custom write that kind of app.
任何人大概都能客製寫出這種 app。 - Whereas if you’re doing much deeper kind of work, such to underwrite a company, provide financing, automate areas of accounting, I think the fitness function for companies becomes, can you actually do things in such a way where even if you could spend tokens on it, it would take more tokens to create the thing or do that work than the system maybe that you’ve built to kind of drive that outcome.
但如果你做的是更深層的工作，像是為一家公司核保、提供融資、自動化會計領域，我認為公司的適應性函數就會變成你能不能把事情做到這樣：即便你願意花 token，把那件事或工作產生出來所需的 token，都比你所打造、用來驅動那個結果的系統還要多。 - I just think the rules of what it means to be a software company are changing.
我就是覺得「軟體公司」這個定義的規則正在改變。
護城河與 AI 工程團隊
- I think network effects and what you’re building is more important than ever.
我認為網路效應和你正在打造的東西，比過去任何時候都更重要。 - Like, if you think about the classic set of moats that are there, I think that this question of where are their moats in a world where…
如果你想經典的那組護城河，在⋯⋯這樣的世界裡它們還在哪，這個問題很關鍵。 - I like Dario’s way of putting this.
我很喜歡 Dario 的描述方式。 - If you have a country of geniuses, data center, yeah, living somewhere and they’re writing code and they’re incentivized to compete with you, too.
如果你有一個由天才組成的國家、一座資料中心，他們住在某個地方寫程式，而且也被激勵來跟你競爭。 - If you’re not really following what are the classic four moats and building towards that, like, I think life gets a lot harder.
如果你沒在遵循經典的四大護城河並朝那個方向建構，我覺得日子會難過得多。 - Do you guys have a house view on the new competitive equilibrium with a lot of AI engineering really working?
你們對於大量 AI 工程實際發揮作用的新競爭均衡，有沒有一套公司觀點？ - Well, I think there are a couple things.
我覺得有幾件事。 - I think Marc talked about this a little while ago, but what is an EPD team?
我想 Marc 不久前談過這個，什麼是 EPD 團隊？ - Engineering, product, design team.
工程、產品、設計團隊。 - Product development team.
產品開發團隊。 - You normally have one product manager, maybe you have five to eight engineers and one designer.
通常一個產品經理，可能五到八個工程師，加上一個設計師。 - And now everybody has Cursor and Claude Code.
現在每個人都有 Cursor 和 Claude Code。 - So the designer is like, “I don’t need any of these bozos.”
所以設計師會說「這些笨蛋我都不需要。」 - The product manager says, “I don’t need any of those bozos.”
產品經理說「那些笨蛋我都不需要。」 - Each of the engineers are like, “I don’t need any of these bozos.”
每個工程師都說「這些笨蛋我都不需要。」 - And they’re all— it’s like the start of The Dark Knight.
然後他們，就像《黑暗騎士》的開場。 - And they’re all right.
而且他們說得都對。 - It really is.
真的就是這樣。 - It’s… Exactly.
就是⋯⋯正是如此。 - It’s like they’re all wearing the Joker mask.
就像他們都戴著小丑面具。
演進中的護城河與競爭版圖
- Or, the Joker mask is Claude Code or Cursor.
或者說，那張小丑面具就是 Claude Code 或 Cursor。 - But the problem is, because I was talking to one of my CEOs, this is a pretty scaled company, lots of revenue.
但問題是，我跟我旗下一位 CEO 在聊，這是一家頗具規模、營收不少的公司。 - And they use all these tools, they’re not more efficient.
他們用了所有這些工具，但效率並沒有提升。 - And he is like, “Why aren’t we more efficient?”
他說「我們為什麼沒變得更高效？」 - And it’s two things.
其實有兩個原因。 - Number one, it’s a real company, they have real customers.
第一，這是家真實的公司，有真實的客戶。 - They can’t just push things and hope for the best.
他們沒辦法隨便把東西推上去、然後祈禱一切順利。 - But it’s like you actually have an HR problem.
但其實你是有人資問題。 - In that if you’re building from scratch, granted you have nothing, you have no tech debt, you don’t really have to worry about customers, you don’t have any, but you wouldn’t have an eight-person EPD team.
如果你從零開始打造，當然你什麼都沒有、沒有技術債、也不用擔心客戶，因為你根本沒有客戶，但你也不會有一個八人的 EPD 團隊。 - You would probably just have each person…
你大概會讓每個人⋯⋯ - we have eight different product managers, slash engineers, slash whatever.
我們會有八個產品經理、工程師、不管叫什麼的混合體。 - Each one is a pod unto themselves.
每個人自己就是一個 pod。 - So that’s one thing.
這是其中一點。 - I totally agree on the data moats where that has become more important.
我完全同意資料護城河變得更重要。 - I’ll tell you a story that you might like.
我跟你講個你可能會喜歡的故事。 - I met this company, vLex.
我認識一家公司叫 vLex。 - It’s a 25-year-old company.
25 歲的公司。 - This guy Alex bought up every legal record in Spain, like probably going back to 1492.
這個叫 Alex 的人把西班牙所有的法律紀錄買下來，大概可以回溯到 1492 年。 - Buys the Ferdinand and Isabella…
買下費迪南和伊莎貝拉時代的文件⋯⋯ - Here’s the document, I’m going to take a picture of that, I’ll sell it to every law firm.
這份文件我拍下來，賣給每一家律師事務所。 - And he built like a $20 million a year SaaS business, bootstrapped for 25 years.
他靠這樣打造了一家年營收 2000 萬美元的 SaaS，自有資金撐了 25 年。 - And then it went to like a hundred million in one year.
然後一年內跳到一億美元。 - Now why is that?
為什麼？ - Because he used to sell this document or he used to sell a subscription to Kirkland & Ellis and Latham & Watkins and all these big law firms.
因為他以前是賣文件或訂閱給 Kirkland & Ellis、Latham & Watkins 這些大型律師事務所。 - And a paralegal would take that, they would turn it into a document.
然後一個法務助理會拿那份資料，轉成一份文件。 - They’d charge the client $10,000 and ChatGPT can’t do that.
他們跟客戶收 1 萬美元，而 ChatGPT 做不到這件事。 - GenAI can’t do that.
生成式 AI 做不到。 - But you know who can do that is vLex.
但你知道誰能做嗎？就是 vLex。 - Another good example of this, of who has proprietary data?
另一個關於誰擁有專屬資料的好例子。 - A lot of times, the data’s free.
很多時候那些資料是免費的。 - This is the really cool thing.
這就是真的酷的地方。 - Or it’s sitting, I wouldn’t call your data free, but it’s not like for-sale data sets.
或是它就擺在那，我不會說你的資料免費，但也不是那種拿來賣的資料集。 - Do you know domaintools.com?
你知道 domaintools.com 嗎？ - It’s my favorite business.
那是我最喜歡的生意。 - So DomainTools runs a cron job every day on every single internet website.
DomainTools 每天對網路上的每一個網站跑一個 cron job。 - They do a WHOIS lookup every single day.
他們每天做 WHOIS 查詢。 - And they build a historical record of that which no one has.
然後建立一份沒人有的歷史紀錄。 - So if you want to see who owned stripe.com in 1999, well, it was free in 1999.
所以如果你想知道 1999 年 stripe.com 是誰擁有的，1999 年當下這是免費的。 - If you invented time machine, go run that WHOIS query in your terminal but you can’t do that.
如果你發明了時光機，去你的終端機跑 WHOIS 查詢，但你做不到。 - So you have to pay them.
所以你只能付錢給他們。 - But all that data is free or FlightAware with ADS-B data.
但那些資料都是免費的，像 FlightAware 的 ADS-B 資料也是。 - So you have a lot of these weird businesses.
所以有一堆這種奇怪的生意。 - And of course this is not a new idea, like FactSet, Bloomberg…
當然這不是新概念，像 FactSet、Bloomberg⋯⋯ - You have aggregators of data, but that becomes so much more valuable.
你會有資料聚合者，但這變得遠比以前有價值。 - Totally.
完全是。 - Because your 10,000 geniuses cannot do that.
因為你那一萬個天才也做不到這件事。 - You always experience this if you hire someone extraordinarily talented, like top of the class at MIT and you say, “All right, join the engineering team and go ship the code.”
如果你請過極有天賦的人，像是 MIT 班上第一名，然後跟他說「好，加入工程團隊去寫程式碼上線」，你會一直看到這個現象。 - And they ship something kind of crazy on the first day.
他們第一天就能交出一些很狂的東西。 - And it’s sort of slow.
但速度其實有點慢。 - And it’s like, you can have someone who is intellectually an absolute giant, but learning kind of how a company does things the way it does.
你可以有一個智力上的絕對巨人，但去學習公司特有的做事方式。 - Learning the procedures and nuances of an organization takes time.
學組織的流程和細微差別需要時間。 - It’s part of what makes working with interns or junior engineers fun.
這也是跟實習生或資淺工程師一起工作有趣的一部分。 - I think the learning curve is obviously immensely steep.
我覺得這個學習曲線顯然極為陡峭。 - And I think that the speed at which, with sufficient access to the data and the procedures of a company, they’re going to get there very, very fast.
我也覺得，只要能充分存取公司的資料和流程，他們到位的速度會非常非常快。 - But these moats are real, you know?
但這些護城河是真實存在的，你懂嗎？
暗物質護城河與技術債的價值
- Well, the other moat I would argue is the dark-mattered moat.
我會說另一條護城河是暗物質護城河。 - Yes.
對。 - And what I mean is you know, like the Milky Way, nobody could figure out why the mass is the mass because it’s like all the observed stars and planets and everything else.
我的意思是，你知道銀河系，沒人搞得清楚它的質量為什麼是這個數字，因為加總所有觀測到的恆星、行星都對不上。 - It’s, no, actually the vast majority of the matter, or energy, because they’re the same thing, is dark matter, dark energy.
實際上，宇宙中絕大多數的物質或能量，因為兩者本質上是一樣的，是暗物質、暗能量。 - And what does that mean?
那代表什麼？ - Nobody the hell knows.
鬼才知道。 - But it’s just like, we don’t know it.
就是我們不知道。 - And for products, it’s like you built, if I tell Claude, “Go clone Ramp.”
對產品來說，就像你打造了，如果我叫 Claude「去複製一個 Ramp」。 - Because this is the SaaSpocalypse that’s happening right now.
因為現在正在發生的就是所謂的 SaaSpocalypse（SaaS 末日潮）。 - It’s like, oh, of course.
感覺就像「噢當然」。 - Well, I just went to the website and now I have a website that looks like Ramp.
「我只是逛了一下網站，現在就有個看起來像 Ramp 的網站。」 - No, no, no.
不不不。 - There are like nine million edge cases.
這裡面有將近九百萬個邊緣案例。 - The tech debt sounds bad because it’s a pejorative, debt = bad.
技術債聽起來不好，因為它是貶義詞，債 = 不好。 - But actually it’s good because what you’ve done is you’ve uncovered every single problem that can go wrong.
但其實它是好的，因為你做到的，是把所有可能出錯的問題都挖出來了。 - The fact that, I mean, a great example, remember when the power went out in San Francisco a month and a half ago?
一個很好的例子，還記得一個半月前舊金山大停電嗎？ - So we have this amazing thing called Waymo.
我們有一個很神奇的東西叫 Waymo。 - Waymo had not figured out this corner case of what if the power goes out?
Waymo 還沒搞清楚「如果停電了怎麼辦」這個邊角案例。 - It was a thundering herd problem with the customer, or the human overrides, yeah.
那是客戶端或人工覆寫的 thundering herd 問題，對。 - But they had no idea.
他們根本沒想到。 - And it’s actually great that that happened.
這件事發生其實很棒。 - You need these problems to happen.
你需要這些問題真的發生。 - And just because my background, I used to write shareware, this try-before-you-buy software.
因為我的背景，我以前寫共享軟體（shareware），就是那種先試用再付款的軟體。 - Shareware was a big thing.
Shareware 曾經很紅。 - That’s a blast from the past.
這是來自過去的回憶。 - It’s a blast from the past.
真是懷舊。 - So there’s a website that’s part of CNET— That might come back, you know?
有個 CNET 旗下的網站。那個時代可能會回來，你懂嗎？ - Well, but it’s freemium.
對啊，但那叫 freemium。 - This is where I’m going with this story and you’ll like this.
這就是我故事要講到的地方，你會喜歡這個。 - So Download.com was the preeminent site for downloading shareware.
Download.com 是當年下載共享軟體的首選網站。 - It was like…
就像⋯⋯ - CNET was one of the most popular properties in 1999, 2000.
1999、2000 年 CNET 是最熱門的網站之一。 - So, all of the top downloadable software products were there— Download.com sounds like a company that had a Super Bowl ad.
所以所有熱門的可下載軟體產品都在那裡。Download.com 聽起來像是那種會上超級盃廣告的公司。 - They would’ve.
他們應該會上。 - I bet they did, actually.
我猜他們真的上過。 - They probably had two.
搞不好上了兩次。 - I’d be shocked.
會讓我驚訝的。 - They probably had five.
他們可能上了五次。 - Right between Pets.com and something else.
就夾在 Pets.com 和其他什麼的之間。 - So Download.com had all the popular products and then this site called Elance shows up and Elance is now called Upwork.
所以 Download.com 上面有所有熱門產品，然後有個叫 Elance 的網站出現，現在叫 Upwork。 - This connected you with work that you would want done by very smart people, basically in the developing world.
它把你連到那些你想找很聰明、主要在開發中國家的人去做的工作。 - So I want a software product built.
我想要做一個軟體產品。 - Here’s everybody in Romania and Russia and India.
這裡有羅馬尼亞、俄羅斯、印度的每個人。 - I want translation, I want graphics.
我想要翻譯、想要圖片設計。 - So what ended up happening is people would look at the Download.com top list because before it was a very cottage industry of who wrote shareware and it was very profitable.
所以後來發生的事情是，大家會去看 Download.com 的下載榜，因為以前寫共享軟體是個很家庭作坊的產業，但非常賺錢。 - Like ID software shareware company, McAfee shareware company.
像是 ID software 是共享軟體公司，McAfee 也是共享軟體公司。 - Actually Cybersource started off processing payments for shareware companies.
其實 Cybersource 一開始是幫共享軟體公司處理支付。 - That’s how they got McAfee.
他們就是這樣拿下 McAfee 的。 - That’s funny.
很好笑。 - Very interesting history to this we can talk about some other time, but basically what happened is people found Elance, like, “Oh, I could pay anybody $500 to clone anything on this list.
這段歷史很有趣我們改天再聊，但基本上發生的事情是，人們發現 Elance，就想「噢我可以花 500 美元請任何人複製榜上任何產品。 - Everything on this list makes tens of millions of dollars a year.
這榜上每個產品年營收都是幾千萬美元。 - Let’s go.”
我們來做吧。」 - And the cloning never worked.
可是那些複製從來沒成功。 - It functionally worked.
功能上是有， - Because if I say “I’m going to clone Eric.”
因為如果我說「我要克隆 Eric」。 - I might not know that you have a pancreas.
我可能不知道你有個胰臟。 - Right?
對吧？ - I’m sure you do.
我相信你有。 - I might not know that you have two kidneys.
我可能不知道你有兩顆腎臟。 - So the problem is that cloning just, it goes skin deep and like that’s the embedded advantage of these companies.
所以問題是，克隆就是只有皮毛那麼深，那就是這些公司內嵌的優勢。 - Do you then think the SaaSpocalypse is kind of irrational?
那你覺得這波 SaaSpocalypse 是不是有點不理性？ - I think it depends.
我覺得要看。
SaaSpocalypse 的合理性與企業軟體
- I think some of it is very rational.
我覺得其中一部分非常理性。 - Because if I want, if I have a feature that became a company, and I know this sounds like a very negative thing to say, but I want to get paged if my server goes down.
因為如果我想要一個功能變成公司那種，我知道這聽起來很負面，但我想要伺服器當機時收到 page。 - It’s a very logical reason to build a company called PagerDuty.
這是建立一家叫 PagerDuty 公司的合理理由。 - That now has a lot of stuff around it but I might just say, “Hey, whenever my servers…” There are corner cases, there is the proverbial the power goes out in San Francisco, do something differently.
現在這家公司周邊有很多東西，但我可能會說「嘿，只要我的伺服器⋯⋯」會有邊角案例，會有那種舊金山大停電的經典情境，要做不一樣的處理。 - That’s very, very different than NetSuite, which is, I have a saying that I like, which is the best companies have hostages, not customers, at least in enterprise software.
這跟 NetSuite 非常不一樣，我有一句很喜歡的話「最好的企業軟體公司擁有的是人質，不是客戶」。 - Not for you because you actually have INPS.
對你來說不是這樣，因為你們是淨推薦分數（INPS）高的那種。 - But that they’re much harder to go rip that out and a lot of it is like the “Goldilocks zone” that you operate in.
但要把那套拔掉困難得多，很大一部分是因為你處在「金髮女孩區塊」。 - If you’re too expensive, of course I’m going to try to rip that thing out.
如果你太貴，我當然會想把它拔掉。 - If it’s so cheap then I forgot nobody even used it.
如果太便宜，我會忘記它、根本沒人在用。 - So you have to be in this Goldilocks zone, you have to have enough complexity.
所以你得處在這個金髮女孩區塊，你得有足夠的複雜度。 - And ideally the front end is different than the back end.
理想狀況下前端跟後端要有區隔。 - So, Workday I think is…
所以 Workday 我覺得⋯⋯ - Nobody’s going to get rid of Workday.
沒人會把 Workday 拔掉。 - And I actually credit David Ricardo with this.
這件事我要歸功於 David Ricardo。 - Like, comparative advantage.
就是比較優勢理論。 - Sure, you could grow your own food.
當然你可以自己種食物。 - You could plumb your own plumbing.
你可以自己接自己的水管。 - But you’re not going to do that.
但你不會這樣做。 - And somebody could do your own HR system.
有人可以幫你做自家的 HR 系統。 - The one maybe pitch for Stripe and others that I would say here is, I do think that that is right.
我這裡想幫 Stripe 和其他公司說的一句話是，我的確認為這個想法是對的。 - And there is a lot of complexity and local tax law for payments and things that make Workday an extraordinary business.
支付和各地稅法有很多複雜度，這些讓 Workday 成為一門非凡生意。 - There was this overarching macro question of how does work get done?
這背後有一個總體性的大哉問：工作是怎麼完成的？ - If you believe that.
如果你相信這件事。 - You know, work can get done through tokens and models.
你知道，工作可以透過 token 和模型完成。 - And presumably it doesn’t go through payroll, probably goes through a credit card or check to these types of companies.
這部分可能不會走薪資體系，大概是透過信用卡或支票付給這類公司。 - And so, the share of, it’s almost this sort of simple math that if you X-rayed the P&L of most companies, the majority of it classically, at least for asset-light firms, is payroll.
所以，這幾乎是個簡單的算術：如果你 X 光照一下多數公司的損益表，傳統上，尤其是輕資產公司，大部分成本是薪資。 - You’re paying for people to do things and SaaS is maybe a small percentage of a company’s income or a company’s cost base.
你付錢請人做事，SaaS 大概只占公司收入或成本結構的一小部分。 - Does suddenly that share grow to high single digits, low double digits, significant double digits?
那個佔比會不會突然跳到高個位數、低雙位數、甚至顯著的雙位數？ - And does the share actually move where, the payroll economy itself, even though maybe it grows, becomes less relevant?
那個佔比是不是真的會移動到讓薪資經濟本身，就算還在成長，變得相對不重要？ - I think this is the really funny part of even as this has been going on.
我覺得這就是這一切發展中最有趣的部分。 - What do I know as a private company other than seeing our own payment data?
身為一家私人公司，除了看我們自己的支付資料，我還能知道什麼？ - But you start to see these companies beating their earnings in a way they never have before, where the terminal value perhaps is falling out.
但你會看到這些公司以從未有過的方式擊敗自家財測，雖然終端價值（terminal value）可能正在消失。 - But they’re saying, “Shareholders, we’re reaccelerating.
他們卻在說「股東們，我們在重新加速。 - We haven’t seen this since 2021.
自 2021 年以來沒見過這種狀況。 - We’re going faster and you’re going to have multiple progressive quarters of this actually occurring for certain types of businesses.”
我們正在加速，某些類型的企業將會連續好幾季都真的持續發生這件事。」 - And so, it’s a really interesting time to… I very violently agree with your view is like, yeah, it depends.
所以現在是一個很有趣的時機⋯⋯我非常強烈同意你的觀點，就是要看。 - But it’s doing really well.
但整體表現真的很好。 - That’s my brilliant comment.
這就是我精彩的評論。 - It depends.
要看。
Ramp 全球支出管理結合 Stablecoin
- Yeah, you mentioned… Very Howard Marks of you.
對，你提到⋯⋯你講話真像 Howard Marks。 - As you’re hearing from Eric, Ramp has become the default way a lot of American companies manage spend.
正如你從 Eric 這邊聽到的，Ramp 已經變成很多美國公司管理支出的預設方式。 - Stablecoins allowed that functionality to work in many countries all at once.
Stablecoin（穩定幣）讓這個功能可以在許多國家同時運作。 - With Ramp’s stablecoin-backed corporate cards, businesses can fund a balance with stablecoins, issue cards against those balances instantly, and allow employees to spend anywhere cards are accepted without the business having to think about stablecoins all the time.
透過 Ramp 以 stablecoin 為後盾的企業卡，企業可以用 stablecoin 儲值，即時發行對應餘額的卡片，讓員工在任何接受該卡的地方消費，企業本身不必一直想著 stablecoin。 - Same card experience, same controls, just a much more global set of rails underneath.
同樣的卡片體驗、同樣的控制機制，只是底下換成一套更全球化的軌道。 - This is one of the many practical ways we’re seeing businesses on Stripe use stablecoins by launching card programs in many more countries and doing so in much less time than it would’ve taken otherwise.
這是我們看到 Stripe 上的企業實際使用 stablecoin 的眾多方式之一：在更多國家推出卡片計畫，而且用比原本少得多的時間完成。 - If you’re thinking about using stablecoins to expand, Stripe can help.
如果你正在考慮用 stablecoin 擴張事業，Stripe 可以幫得上忙。
經濟強度與 AI 採用
- You mentioned your spend data.
你提到你們的支出資料。 - What does the spend data that Ramp sees tell us about the economy?
Ramp 看到的支出資料告訴我們經濟是什麼樣子？ - I think it is stronger than many people understand in lots of ways.
我認為在很多方面都比大眾以為的還要強勁。 - I mean, first, I’ll go back to one of the things that perplexed our team for a long time.
首先我先回到一件困惑我們團隊很久的事。 - Our economists on the team saw this data even as recently as last year, where the Census Bureau would do these periodic surveys.
我們團隊的經濟學家就連去年還在看這份資料，美國人口普查局會定期做這些調查。 - They’d go out and ask, “How much is your business using AI to produce goods or services?”
他們會去問「你公司有多大程度在用 AI 生產商品或服務？」 - A very refined economic way of wording the questions.
非常精緻的經濟學式提問。 - And they would come back with these pronouncements saying a single digit percent of businesses in the US have adopted AI.
然後他們會發布宣告，說全美只有個位數百分比的企業採用了 AI。 - And we looked at our data and we support over 55,000 businesses.
但我們看自家資料，我們服務超過 55,000 家企業。 - We lean a little bit towards tech, but not heavily.
我們偏向科技業一點點，但不算嚴重偏。 - It kind of resembles the distribution of businesses you would see in the States.
結構上跟全美企業分布相當接近。 - And well, the majority of businesses have used AI.
結果是，多數企業都已經用過 AI。 - You look at businesses whether they’re paying for— As in they subscribe to ChatGPT or Anthropic or something like that?
你看那些有付費的企業，比如訂閱 ChatGPT 或 Anthropic 之類？ - Exactly.
正是。 - Or maybe a business that is a true agentic… Cognition or a Cursor, something like that, where this is kind of a vertical application.
或是真正 agent 自主型的應用⋯⋯Cognition、Cursor 那種垂直應用。 - And so, one, there is this disconnect between the use of tools if you look at how quickly businesses are adopting and responding to these new tools versus what maybe people report on.
所以第一，當你看企業採用並回應這些新工具的速度，跟人們在報告的數字之間，有明顯落差。 - Next: growth.
接著是成長。
美國經濟再加速與企業精明度
- I think it’s been clear over the last few quarters is the US itself is reaccelerating.
我覺得過去幾季很清楚了，美國本身正在重新加速。 - GDP growth has gone from maybe the one to 2% area to four to five.
GDP 成長從大概 1 至 2% 區間，跳到 4 至 5%。 - And you could argue how much of this is, a little artificial with subsidies, but it’s been pretty significant.
你可以爭論其中有多少是補貼造成的人為效應，但量級相當可觀。 - But subsidized by what?
由什麼補貼的？ - Some of the Big Beautiful Bill as well as some of the tariffs.
部分是 Big Beautiful Bill，也有一部分來自關稅。 - And where that’s been reallocated, I think some people, I would argue on the whole, maybe unfairly said this.
關於這些資源的重新配置，我覺得有些人整體上可能做了不太公允的評論。 - I think that there’s more durable growth inside of the businesses.
我認為企業內部有更持久的成長動能。 - But I would say overall business health is much stronger.
整體而言企業體質更健康了。 - And I think that the really interesting thing and again, some of this is specific to the data that we see, but I think that businesses are generally getting more and more savvy about finding tools that help them be more efficient.
真正有趣的是，雖然某些觀察是基於我們看到的資料，但我認為整體來看，企業在找能提升效率的工具這件事上，愈來愈精明。 - And I think what skews our data is maybe the savings we drive for people.
而讓我們的資料看起來偏樂觀的，或許是我們幫客戶省下的錢。 - Seems the way of explaining it is like, people know the… Ben Franklin would say this phrase of “a penny saved is a penny earned.”
解釋方式大概是，大家都熟 Ben Franklin 講的「省一分錢就是賺一分錢」。 - And this is an awesome aphorism, but the average American business has an 8% profit margin.
這是很棒的格言，但美國企業平均利潤率是 8%。 - And so mathematically speaking, a penny saved is equivalent to 12 pennies of revenue earned.
所以用數學算，省下一分錢等於賺進 12 分錢的營收。 - And so if you save businesses a lot, you end up with these outcomes of the average Ramp bases materially outgrowing the regular US average.
所以如果你幫企業省很多，你就會出現 Ramp 客戶平均大幅跑贏全美平均的結果。 - And we can clearly see this and demonstrate this for our own set of customers.
我們清楚看到這一點，而且可以在自家客戶群身上印證。 - I suspect these types of things are occurring at businesses adopting these new sets of technologies, I would argue probably faster, very clearly, than what the US is maybe, the classic sources are seeing.
我猜這些事情正在那些採用這批新技術的企業身上發生，而且很明顯地，比傳統資料來源看到的美國平均更快。 - So I think it’s much healthier.
所以我認為實際狀況健康得多。
成本節省與營運效率
- When a business saves money on Ramp, what happens?
當一家企業透過 Ramp 省下錢，會發生什麼事？ - The CFO comes in and says, “Oh my god, we’re spending— confetti.
CFO 跑來說「天啊，我們花太多錢在彩帶上。 - Way too much money, on confetti.
花在彩帶上的錢太多了。 - We don’t need this much confetti.”
我們不需要這麼多彩帶。」 - Who’s buying the confetti?
誰在買彩帶？ - “We have huge stockpiles that we don’t need.”
「我們有一堆根本用不到的庫存。」 - What happens when a business saves 5%?
一家企業省下 5% 會怎樣？ - What are they actually cutting?
他們實際上砍掉的是什麼？ - So there’s two pieces of it primarily.
主要有兩塊。 - One is like these hard-dollar cost savings and then some of this is time, and I’ll start with the time because it’s the squishy one, but I think that it’s, in some cases, actually much more important.
一種是實在的美元節省，另一種是時間，我先從時間講起，因為它比較模糊，但我覺得在某些情況下反而更重要。 - Oh, sure.
好。 - They save time on their expense reconciliation.
他們在費用對帳上省下時間。 - That makes sense.
有道理。 - So they’re no longer going through line by line and therefore there’s one person who is freed up to go do something else.
他們不再一條一條比對，於是就有一個人被釋放出來去做其他事。 - And I think one of the classic biases that people forget is people chronically undervalue their own time.
我認為大家會忘記一個典型偏誤，人們長期嚴重低估自己的時間價值。 - As a principle of business, everyone has an hourly rate.
在商業原則上，每個人都有一個時薪。 - Within a business, human time is incredibly expensive.
在企業內，人的時間非常昂貴。 - I think the lean companies got this right and eliminated the bottlenecks there.
我認為精實的公司把這件事做對了，消除了這些瓶頸。 - So, okay, that’s one form.
這是其中一種。 - What else?
還有呢？ - Next, all right, when you start to have these fine-tuned kind of controls.
接下來，當你開始有這種細緻的控制。 - This part has been I think probably the biggest lion’s share of this.
我認為這部分可能佔了最大比重。 - Let’s go back to one of the earlier conversations of why do people use checks, this horrible system and purchase orders?
我們回到剛才的對話，為什麼大家還在用支票這種可怕系統和紙本採購單？ - Well, one of the advantages of checks is unless you mail it to someone and you sign it, no money can leave your company.
支票的一個優點是，除非你簽名寄給某人，否則沒有錢會離開你的公司。 - And what every person knows who’s ever had a credit card and gone to a gym once and had a good New Year’s resolution.
每個辦過信用卡、下定決心新年要健身、只去了幾次健身房的人都知道這種感覺。 - But is you go a couple times and you’re like, “Goddammit, this gym is charging me.”
你去了幾次就會想「可惡，這家健身房還在扣我錢。」 - The difficulty of sending a check is a feature, not a bug.
寄支票的困難是一個功能，不是 bug。 - Yeah, exactly.
對，完全是。 - But it’s part of what Ramp was the first to build.
但這也是 Ramp 最早打造的功能之一。 - One-time use cards.
一次性卡片。 - Single-use cards, but also more than that, merchant blocking.
一次性卡片，不只如此，還有商家封鎖。 - So you can, whether it’s on one card or 10,000 cards at once, build in a kill switch to say, “Okay, we’ve signed this new deal with this merchant.
所以不管是一張卡或同時一萬張卡，你都可以內建一個 kill switch 說「好，我們剛跟這家商家簽了新合約。 - We are only on Uber, we are no longer taking Lyfts.
我們只搭 Uber，不再搭 Lyft。 - And anytime someone goes and tries to go on merchant A or B, you can do this.”
任何人試圖在 A 商家或 B 商家刷卡時，你都可以這樣做。」 - Or you sign a new contract and you say, “I’m gonna spend $10,000 only with Salesforce and on the $10,001st dollar they try to charge you, it declines.”
或者你簽新合約時說「我只要在 Salesforce 花 1 萬美元，他們第 10,001 塊試著扣款就會被拒絕。」 - And what gets to happen, you get to have a conversation with their sales team who really wants to make their budget.
然後會發生什麼？你就有機會跟他們很想達標的業務團隊對話。 - And if you look at this mathematically, for most companies that come over a low end, maybe a very hygienic company that is giving out a few cards and the old world could durably cut their expenses about 2% a year by doing this.
如果你看數字，多數剛接觸的公司，也許是管理很嚴格、只發幾張卡的公司，過去這種做法每年能持續砍掉大約 2% 的開支。 - Some of these very laissez-faire businesses are saving just 10%, just through these things.
有些管理非常放任的公司，光靠這些做法就能省下 10%。 - Next, you start ending up with these more fine-tuned kind of controls where you can say under these circumstances I want to go and have kind of charges occur.
接下來你會用到更細緻的控制，你可以說在這些情境下我允許產生這類扣款。 - Maybe you have an engineer stay till 8:00 PM at night, you can go and buy a meal.
比方說一個工程師加班到晚上八點，你可以買一餐。 - But if you take an Uber on a Saturday, that should turn off.
但如果是週六搭 Uber，那該關閉。 - And so you have the cards, if it’s like an Uber on a Saturday auto-decline, but you can text and say actually it’s for work.
所以卡片會自動拒絕週六搭 Uber，但你可以回傳訊息說其實是公務。 - You send back a yes, it turns on.
你回個「是」，它就打開。 - And so it’s all these little tiny paper cuts that actually start to go into run.
就是這些許許多多小小的紙割（paper cuts），開始累積成實質效益。 - Next, it’s vendor data.
接下來是供應商資料。 - One of the unique assets of Ramp is anytime you spend money, you upload a receipt, maybe you upload an invoice or an MSA.
Ramp 獨有的資產之一是，每次你消費就會上傳收據，也許上傳發票或主服務協議。 - This takes us back to the Paribus days.
這把我們帶回 Paribus 時期。 - We know across hundreds of millions of purchases every year, not just that you spent money at a software vendor, but what did you spend per seat?
我們從每年數億筆採購中知道的，不只是你有在某家軟體商花錢，還有你每個帳號單價多少。 - And so if you’re a customer on Ramp and you’re about to go and pay this large bill on a random SaaS vendor, we can show you in real-time before you send the funds, you are paying 20% more than the rest of the market.
所以如果你是 Ramp 客戶，正要付一大筆錢給某家 SaaS 廠商，我們可以在你付款前即時顯示你付的比其他人多 20%。 - Here’s kind of the cost curve of what others are paying.
這是其他人付的價格分佈曲線。 - And actually by going and empowering your procurement team— do you have enough data to do that?
然後這樣去賦予你採購團隊能力，你有足夠資料去做這件事嗎？ - Because my AWS bill is not like your AWS bill.
因為我的 AWS 帳單跟你的 AWS 帳單不一樣。 - And so, don’t you need to know how many instances we’re running to know if this is a good deal or not?
所以你不需要知道我們跑了多少個 instance 才能判斷這是不是好價錢嗎？ - You can, but you can still kind of get down to the level of, is there a bulk discount or not?
你可以，但你還是可以下探到「有沒有大量折扣」的層級。 - And start to know of, is there a negotiated aspect?
開始知道「有沒有議價空間」。 - There’s other types of things where I’d argue maybe a lot of classic software-as-a-service ends up in this way.
還有其他類型，我會說很多典型的 SaaS 都會變成這樣。 - It’s like your pricing is really dependent on, you know, did you sign that deal on January 1st or on December 31st when the sales team really needs to hit the quota?
像是你的定價其實很看你是 1 月 1 日簽約，還是 12 月 31 日業務為了達標而簽。 - And you can actually see down to the seat level, you’re paying $30 per seat.
你其實可以細到每個座位的層級，你付的是每個座位 30 美元。 - It’s a great time to be signing a Salesforce contract.
這是簽 Salesforce 合約的絕佳時機。 - And so you can actually get down to the seat level and say, okay, you’re about to auto-renew.
所以你可以細到每個座位去說「好，你快要自動續約了。」 - The market price has actually moved for the set of service.
這類服務的市場價格其實已經變了。 - And so it can be very, very useful to procurement teams to know where they compare with the market.
所以對採購團隊來說，知道自己跟市場比在哪裡很有用。 - That was actually my question for you, which is, so if you remember Groupon?
這其實是我想問你的問題，你還記得 Groupon 嗎？ - Yes.
記得。 - The much beleaguered Groupon, but Groupon started off as a site called ThePoint.com/groupon because originally it was like, “I don’t like the fact that Starbucks uses paper cups.
那個處境艱難的 Groupon，它一開始是個叫做 ThePoint.com/groupon 的網站，因為最早的想法是「我不喜歡星巴克用紙杯。 - If I get 10,000 other people to donate a dollar, we’ll fly a plane in front of Howard Schultz’s house,” which also emits carbon, a bad example.
如果我找 1 萬個人每人捐 1 美元，我們就飛一架飛機到 Howard Schultz 家門口」，雖然那也會排碳，舉例不太好。 - But you only want, it’s a collective action thing.
但概念是集體行動。 - So, and then because I met Andrew Mason and Brad Keywell when they were first starting this business, it was like eight people.
我認識 Andrew Mason 和 Brad Keywell 的時候，他們剛開始這個生意，大概八個人。 - It was ThePoint and downstairs there was a pizza restaurant or something like, “Oh, if I get like 50 people to agree to buy pizza, maybe they’ll give us a lower price.”
當時還叫 ThePoint，樓下有家披薩店之類的，他們想「如果我找 50 個人同意買披薩，也許他們會給我們比較便宜的價格。」 - The cause became discounts.
初衷從公益行動變成了折扣。 - Yes.
對。
集體議價力與折扣
- And then, but then the thing is, Groupon wasn’t known for this, “it has to tip” because they always had the demand.
但重點是，Groupon 並不以「必須達到門檻」聞名，因為他們永遠有需求。 - So they never had to worry about it, because before it’s like you’ve got supply, you’ve got demand.
所以他們從來不用擔心這個，因為在此之前，有供給也有需求。 - I guess my question for you is, can you be the arbiter of pricing?
我想問你的是，你們能不能成為定價的仲裁者？ - Can you aggregate the demand?
你們能聚合需求嗎？ - And the same way that like Costco, who shops at Costco?
就像 Costco 那樣，誰在 Costco 消費？ - Every small restaurant shops at Costco.
每家小餐廳都在 Costco 買東西。 - And Costco uses that collective bargaining power, if you will, to say, “Hey Coca-Cola, give us a very, very low price.”
Costco 利用那種集體議價力，跟「嘿 Coca-Cola，給我們一個非常非常低的價格。」 - They take very, very little of that because right now I’m using Ramp to buy stuff.
他們自己取很少的一部分，因為現在我用 Ramp 買東西。 - But I would imagine if you could say, “Hey, I have $100 billion.”
但我可以想像，如果你能說「嘿，我手上有 1,000 億美元。」 - I didn’t know it was that high, that’s amazing.
我不知道有這麼高，太驚人了。 - “I have a hundred billion dollars of spend.
「我手上有 1,000 億美元的支出。 - I can hopefully direct it this way or that way.
我有望把它導向這邊或那邊。 - Please give me a 20% discount.”
請給我 20% 折扣。」 - Can you do that?
你們做得到嗎？ - Or is that further in the funnel of the purchase process?
還是說這是採購流程更後段的事？
團購組織與需求聚合
- There is this large swath of businesses that I’ve been fascinated by called group purchasing organizations.
有一大塊生意我一直很著迷，叫做團體採購組織（GPO）。 - A lot of these came out of the healthcare world where it’s a very small set of— APMs?
很多源自醫療產業，裡面供應商很集中，APMs？ - Yeah.
對。 - Yeah, exactly, supplier.
對，正是，供應商。 - But if you can go and aggregate demand, you could say, okay, for these type of purchases, you’re going to offer this procedure at this account for this type of equipment, you’re going to give this level bulk kind of discount.
如果你能聚合需求，你就能說「好，對這類採購，你們對這個帳戶提供這種處理、對這類設備給這種大量折扣。」 - And you’ve gone and you’ve done that.
然後你真的就這樣做了。 - And I think these are very popular now in the private equity world.
我覺得這在私募股權界現在非常流行。 - Even when I look at Ramp data today, there are dozens of, and more and more every year, of merchants where, you know, we were sending billions of dollars.
即便看今天的 Ramp 資料，也有數十家、每年愈來愈多的商家，我們每年幫客戶匯進去幾十億美元。 - It is truly, it is the client’s money, they are going where they’re going.
真的是客戶的錢，他們本來就要花那些錢。 - But we have a sense of actually, okay, where is this actually going?
但我們能看到「好，這些錢實際流向哪裡」。 - And can you go and say, you know, across the Ramp buyer base over the next 12 months, this is how many dollars will go towards you.
然後你可以跟對方說「Ramp 買家群未來 12 個月會有這麼多錢流向你們。 - Can we negotiate a discount?
我們可以談一個折扣嗎？」 - The other way which maybe starts to…
另一種做法可能開始⋯⋯ - Sometimes these businesses veer closer to advertising, but where it gets really interesting is we see the fastest-growing businesses.
有時候這些生意靠近廣告的範疇，但真正有趣的是我們看得到成長最快的企業。 - What are the businesses that people are getting really excited and are adopting really quickly?
哪些企業是大家正在瘋狂採用、快速擁抱的？ - And we might have a signal of these are actually good businesses and good tools and actually most businesses should move towards that.
我們可能就能提示說這些其實是好生意、好工具，多數企業其實該往這邊走。 - Could you go and actually start to say, “Hey, your renewal is coming up in 90 days.
你可以真的開始跟客戶說「嘿，你 90 天後要續約。 - Have you considered this other business who has provided a 20% complimentary welcome lower price to you?”
你有沒有考慮過這家公司？他們願意給你 20% 的見面禮折扣。」 - And so, there’s multiple forms that can take place.
所以可以有多種形式。 - But the short version of it is, I think one, it’s yes, I think you can offer a bulk discount.
簡短版本是，第一，對，我認為你們可以提供大量折扣。 - But two, you end up almost getting closer to, back to this other theme of can you start to go and maybe show businesses that directing their next marginal dollar will lead to this outcome.
第二，你會逐漸接近另一個主題，你能不能開始向企業展示，把下一塊邊際資金導向這邊會帶來這種結果。 - Well, it feels like there’s even like a third thing.
我覺得好像還有第三件事。
商家專屬餘額與供應商忠誠
- Which is, I would call it merchant-specific balance.
我會稱之為商家專屬餘額（merchant-specific balance）。 - So imagine that it’s December 31st, I’m buying something at Whole Foods.
想像 12 月 31 日，我在 Whole Foods 買東西。 - And then I see an offer, not donate a dollar to the, you know, whatever charity they’re pushing.
然後我看到一個活動，不是那種捐一美元給他們主打的慈善。 - But it’s like, why don’t you commit $2,000 of spend for 2026 for $1,800?
而是「為什麼不用 1,800 美元預訂 2026 年 2,000 美元的消費額度？」 - And the nice thing there is that they lock in that spend for me.
好處是他們幫我把那筆消費鎖住了。 - They actually collect it.
他們也真的先收到錢。 - I mean I know there’s a stupid law and all this complicated stuff.
我知道有一些很蠢的法規跟複雜的東西。 - But the key thing is it’s almost a risk management and a loyalty play for them at once.
但重點是，這對他們來說幾乎同時是風險管理和忠誠度計畫。 - Because the problem is that they don’t know how much celery to buy.
因為問題是他們不知道要買多少芹菜。 - They don’t know how many…
他們不知道該買多少⋯⋯ - So, it kind goes back to the AR/AP thing that we were talking about earlier.
所以這也回到我們剛才聊的 AR/AP 議題。 - You nailed it, yeah.
你完全抓到重點，對。 - Because the other thing is not just saying, “Hey, I’m going to group bargain on behalf of all the different customers that I work with.”
另一件事不只是「嘿，我替我合作的各種客戶集體議價。」 - But it’s an ancillary thing, which is you might want to just pre-commit your spend to a particular vendor.
而是一個配套：你可能會想對特定供應商預先承諾消費。 - And that vendor would love to have that spend pre-committed, even if they’re Amazon and their cost of capital is very low.
即便對方是 Amazon、資金成本很低，他們也樂見這種預承諾消費。 - Because they know they don’t have to worry when they’re planning their budget for the next year.
因為他們在做明年預算規劃時不用擔心。 - That you’re going to churn in month nine.
擔心你會在第 9 個月流失。 - And that seems like another, like the closest that you can get to that is gift cards.
這看起來是另一件事，能達到類似效果的最接近方式就是禮品卡。 - Strangely enough which I’m sure you know well from your— It’s gift cards for business.
說來奇怪，我相信你很熟，這是企業版的禮品卡。 - Yeah because it’s like you go to Costco, this is actually a big business at Costco.
對，就像你去 Costco，這其實是 Costco 很大一塊生意。 - You go to Costco, they sell gift cards.
你去 Costco，他們賣禮品卡。 - We were just talking about this.
我們剛才還在聊這個。 - So they sell gift cards.
他們賣禮品卡。 - You can buy $100 of Starbucks gift cards for 80 bucks.
你可以用 80 美元買到價值 100 美元的星巴克禮品卡。 - Is Starbucks dumb?
星巴克笨嗎？ - Like why are they, if they’re worth $100?
如果那值 100 美元，他們為什麼這樣做？ - No, because they basically have, in the ecosystem, money that is going to be spent at Starbucks.
不笨，因為他們基本上在整個生態系中鎖住了一筆必定會花在星巴克的錢。 - And yeah, there’s breakage and other stuff, but it’s actually a quite, it’s quite a valuable value proposition for the receiving merchant because they know that you’re going to spend your money with them.
對，會有折損、兌換差額等等，但對收單商家而言其實是一個很有價值的主張，因為他們知道你會把錢花在他們身上。 - But I want to go back to your previous idea where McDonald’s every five years or whatever does a big bake-off between Coke and Pepsi and they always renew with Coke and they have a long-time… Maybe a movie theater chain is better example.
我想回到你前面的想法，麥當勞每五年左右會辦一場 Coke 和 Pepsi 的大評比，結果通常還是跟 Coke 續約，他們長期⋯⋯連鎖電影院可能是更好的例子。 - All the big chains, like they don’t serve Coke and Pepsi, they only serve one and they do a big bake-off between the brands every five years.
所有大型連鎖店都不同時賣 Coke 和 Pepsi，只賣一個，每五年辦一場品牌評比。 - And you have lots of small businesses that are buying from Coke or buying from Pepsi.
然後有很多小企業在跟 Coke 或 Pepsi 採購。 - And so, it feels like you could just do a bake-off between them saying Ramp is going to have a preferred vendor and you can obviously use a Ramp card on either, it’ll work, but we have preferred rates with Pepsi.
所以感覺你們可以辦一場評比，說 Ramp 要有一個優先供應商，Ramp 卡刷哪邊都能用，但我們跟 Pepsi 有優惠價。 - Is that a thing Ramp should do?
這是 Ramp 該做的事嗎？ - It’s a really interesting question.
是個很有趣的問題。 - The short is I think over the long duration of time.
簡短答案是，拉長時間看⋯⋯ - Like I’m kind of bit of a crazy person.
我算是個有點瘋的人。 - We should try everything is my actual answer.
我的真實答案是我們應該什麼都試。 - Claude Code.
Claude Code。 - Yeah, Claude Code.
對，Claude Code。 - Let’s go, let’s do it, build it.
來吧，做吧，建起來。 - Pepsi.
Pepsi。 - Make money from Pepsi.
從 Pepsi 賺錢。 - Go and negotiate.
去談。 - The cost of a phone call, a negotiation has never been lower, but… And there’s this almost philosophical question of like, all right, where is the differentiation?
一通電話、一次談判的成本從未如此低，但⋯⋯然後有個近乎哲學性的問題是，好，那差異化到底在哪裡？
Ramp 的差異化：賣時間而非賣錢
- What makes Ramp different?
什麼讓 Ramp 與眾不同？ - But isn’t that increasingly the scale?
但差異化不是愈來愈等於規模嗎？ - It is, and I think that you’re right in that at the very beginning of the company, the answer was very easy of like, look, our cost of capital is nowhere close to a bank’s.
是的，我覺得你說得對，公司最早的時候答案很簡單「我們的資金成本跟銀行差太多了。 - The interchange that we could make is nowhere close to it.
我們能賺的交換費也差很遠。」 - We have all the disadvantages of scale and kind of the only thing that we could do to compete with these people was we could… Everything was slow at the bank that I worked at before, it was hard to ship things.
我們有所有規模劣勢，唯一能跟他們競爭的武器是⋯⋯我之前工作的銀行什麼都很慢，很難把東西推上線。 - We need to move fast.
我們必須動得快。 - We need to kind of have this emphasis around velocity to ship product and just kind of blitzkrieg faster than maybe others could respond.
我們必須把產出產品的速度當核心，像閃電戰一樣比別人能反應的還快。 - What it’s evolved into and I think is today probably the largest point of differentiation at the meta level between Ramp and maybe the financial service providers that we compete with is they sell money and we sell time.
它演變到今天，Ramp 跟我們競爭的金融服務商之間最大的 meta 層次差異是：他們賣錢，我們賣時間。 - They’ll sell you a lower, like a loan at a lower cost of capital, rewards at wherever they set it.
他們賣你比較低利率的貸款、他們設定的點數回饋。 - We will sell your expenses, done.
我們賣你「費用」，搞定。 - And so, are you naturally skeptical of this idea because it’s selling money rather than selling time?
那你天生就對這個「賣錢而非賣時間」的想法持懷疑態度嗎？ - I wouldn’t say I’m naturally skeptical.
我不會說我天生懷疑。 - I would say that— It’s okay.
我會說，沒關係。 - We’re not precious.
我們不玻璃心。 - We have lots more ideas.
我們還有很多點子。 - No, no, no.
不不不。 - It’s good.
很好。 - There is this question of, I think back to our roots, like, I don’t know.
這個問題是，我回想公司初衷，怎麼說⋯⋯ - How do you build a product that is 10 times better than other folks?
你怎麼打造一個比別人好 10 倍的產品？ - And I think when you get really large, actually just a line drive is good and a 2x or a 3x is better kind of thing is actually good.
我覺得當你變得夠大，其實「直線球」就很好，好兩倍或三倍其實就很棒。 - But how do you find these sets of things that other your product offering is so different than what you can find elsewhere?
但你要怎麼找到那些讓你產品跟別處差異巨大的東西？ - And I think that we can conceivably, and I know this, you can negotiate with the large logistics companies.
我覺得我們完全可以、我也知道，跟大型物流公司談判。 - A deal with FedEx that would be better than what most companies are paying and I think that that’s interesting.
跟 FedEx 談到一個比多數公司付的還好的價格，我覺得很有趣。 - Then you have all the sublevels of how do you get people to know about the offer, to sign in to the offer, to deal with all these sub things.
然後你還得處理下面所有的層級：怎麼讓人們知道這個優惠、怎麼註冊、怎麼處理各種子事項。 - Or you could just go and spend that next marginal hour to go and say like, let’s just automate all of accounting for these customers.
或你可以把那一個邊際小時拿去說「我們來幫這些客戶自動化整個會計流程」。 - Let’s go and start doing financial work for these customers.
幫這些客戶做財務工作。 - No financial institution is able to compete on that kind of vector.
沒有金融機構能在這個面向競爭。 - And so, I would say it in the fullness of time, we want to do both.
所以我會說，長期來看兩件都要做。 - Like I think that you want to save people the maximum amount of time, the maximum amount of money that you can, but I think part of what makes us so different in this kind of world that we operate in is we have this obsession of sources of drag of the things that slow down purchases that lead you to overspend versus other companies.
我覺得你想盡可能幫人省最多時間和最多錢，但我認為讓我們在這個世界運作中顯得特別的，是我們對那些拖慢採購、害你多花錢的阻力源頭有一種執著，這跟其他公司很不一樣。 - But just to push on that, I feel like the differentiation for companies often has to change as time goes on because they start in one competitive equilibrium.
但再追問一下，我覺得公司的差異化經常必須隨時間改變，因為他們是從一個競爭均衡開始的。
競爭優勢的演進
- And then as time goes on, they’re in another competitive equilibrium because it’s dynamic.
隨著時間過去，他們處在另一個競爭均衡，因為這是動態的。 - That’s fair.
有道理。 - And it feels to me that Ramp got its start with very fast product velocity and having this great product experience.
我感覺 Ramp 當初是靠非常快的產品速度和優秀的產品體驗起家。 - And as you grow up, you can just build a scale into the product and scale… Scale-derived product advantages.
等你長大以後，你可以把規模做進產品⋯⋯由規模衍生的產品優勢。 - Not just like we’re big, but like Costco, the advantage comes from the scale and they really passed it on to the customer.
不是「我們很大」，而是像 Costco，優勢來自規模，而且他們真的把好處傳遞給客戶。 - And it feels like there could be a second stage to this rocket where you get going with faster product velocity.
感覺這枚火箭可能有第二節推進，你可以靠更快的產品速度起飛。 - But then there’s actually a pretty different set of product differentiations as you scale up.
但當你規模長大後，產品差異化會變成另一組東西。 - I think it’s true.
我覺得這是對的。 - I think it’s well said.
說得好。 - And there’s this almost question of like, in every line of business that we’re building, where are we in the S-curve?
我們幾乎會問，我們打造的每條業務線，在 S 曲線的哪個位置？ - How far are we?
我們走多遠了？ - Is this a product that is serving these tinkerers, early adopters?
這個產品服務的是玩家、早期採用者嗎？ - Are we in the early majority?
我們進入早期多數嗎？ - Are we in the late, where we need to shift the business to kind of harvesting contribution, optimize price, not quantity in it, or towards the end?
我們在晚期嗎？需要把業務轉向獲利了結邊際貢獻、優化價格而非數量，或接近終點？ - And the thing which is so shocking and I think maybe as part of why I love this business, and I think even, I think about Stripe and many of the great businesses in payments that have been built.
讓我震撼的，或許也是我熱愛這門生意的一部分，也包括我想到 Stripe 以及其他偉大的支付公司。 - I believe today Ramp powers more than 2% of all corporate and small business card transactions in the United States.
我相信今天 Ramp 支撐了全美企業和小型企業卡交易量超過 2%。 - Which is amazing for a business that, the product, you couldn’t even sign up for it six years ago.
對一家六年前連註冊都還不行的產品來說，這很驚人。 - And yet that’s a really fancy way of saying 98% of spend is not on us.
但這種講法背後其實是說 98% 的支出不在我們手上。 - On Ramp?
不在 Ramp 上？ - Yeah.
對。 - And let’s say we do it again.
假設我們再做一次。
差異化的演進與 S 曲線
- We grew faster last year than we did the year before.
去年我們成長得比前年更快。 - I feel very good about the way this year is starting off and maybe it’s closer to four.
我對今年的開局感覺很好，可能更接近 4%。 - 96% is still big.
96% 還是很大。 - 92% is still big.
92% 也很大。 - It is so large.
市場非常大。 - And by the way, there’s more ways to buy things than just cards.
順帶一提，買東西的方式不只有卡。 - You think about bill payments.
還有帳單支付。 - And so, I think that there is an aspect of, for most people, there’s so much drudgery around, I think people are doing artisanal expense reports.
我覺得對多數人來說，這件事充滿了繁瑣，我認為人們在做「手工藝式的費用報告」。 - You know, it’s fun to be like a hipster and spend an hour making coffee, but like, it’s a little crazy that this is the Blue Bottle of expense reports.
當一個文青花一小時沖咖啡是很好玩，但把費用報告弄成像 Blue Bottle 咖啡一樣精工細活，有點瘋。 - You know, but unfortunately, you’re in Concur and you have like this spinning wheel.
但不幸的是，你用 Concur，畫面上有個轉圈圈的讀取圖示。 - It’s a pour-over expense report.
是一個手沖咖啡式的費用報告。 - It’s a pour, we love it that way.
是手沖，我們就是愛這種方式。 - Single origin.
單品莊園。 - You try it.
你試試看。 - It’s the experience.
就是這種體驗。 - You’re the Nespresso.
你們是 Nespresso。 - It’s much more efficient.
效率高得多。 - But like, what I would say is this aspect of time is most people have not experienced this thing, you know, is just a fact of life for building a business that’s been hard doesn’t need to be hard.
但我想說的是，在時間這個面向上，大多數人還沒體會到，有些原本被當成做生意的「必然困難」其實不需要困難。 - Doing your books doesn’t need to be hard.
記帳不必困難。 - And so, I still think in some sense, in where we are on the S-curves of our business, I lean that way.
所以某種意義上，就我們業務在 S 曲線上的位置，我偏這個看法。 - But you’re totally right when you’re at this level where in the not too distant future, I mean, you’re there processing trillions of dollars per year in economic activity.
但你說得完全對，在這樣的量級，在不遠的未來你會來到每年處理數兆美元經濟活動的位置。 - And we aspire to be there in the not too distant future.
我們也希望在不遠的將來達到那個位置。 - Sounds like you’ll be there pretty soon.
聽起來你們很快就會到。 - We’re working our hardest.
我們卯足全力。 - Exponential growth is a powerful thing.
指數成長是非常強大的東西。 - Yes, it’s definitely given me good things to think about and work towards.
對，它給了我很多值得思考和努力的方向。
AI 對議價與成本的衝擊
- So I was thinking about when we met, when you were running Paribus.
我在想我們認識那時候，你在經營 Paribus。 - And it kind of feels like one of the first or second or third order effects of AI is the marginal cost of arguing has gone down to zero.
感覺 AI 的一階或二階或三階效應之一是「爭論的邊際成本已經降到零」。 - I’m serious.
我是認真的。 - It’s true.
真的是。 - It’s just like, I mean, my wife got into an argument with some company and it’s like she used ChatGPT to argue with them, they used it to argue back with her.
比方說，我老婆跟某家公司有爭執，她用 ChatGPT 跟他們吵，他們也用 AI 回她。 - And it’s like, I just saw the future.
感覺我剛看到了未來。 - This is incredible.
太不可思議了。 - And like, we won, which is great.
而且我們贏了，很好。 - Your agent will talk to my agent, yeah.
你的 agent 會跟我的 agent 對話，對。 - But you think about this from a chargeback where it’s like, “Hey, this price went down.”
但你從退款申訴的角度想「嘿，這個東西降價了。」 - I mean, this is how we, I remember like, this is such a good idea.
我記得這是個非常好的想法。 - It’s like the price went down, you have these breakage models that the card networks had.
就像東西降價，卡組織有這些 breakage（未兌現權益）模型。 - And Best Buy has to write you a check, or Visa has to write you a check because that TV fell by 20%.
Best Buy 或 Visa 因為那台電視降了 20% 必須開支票給你。 - But nobody does that.
但沒人會真的去申請。 - And now everybody’s going to do that.
現在每個人都會去做了。 - Or it’s like, you do a chargeback for $5, it’s just not worth it.
或像是，為 5 美元去申請退款根本不值得。 - I thought it was Pepsi that I was buying at McDonald’s.
我以為我在麥當勞買的是 Pepsi。 - It was Coke.
結果是 Coke。 - Chargeback, right?
退款申訴，對吧？ - Nobody’s going to dispute that because the cost is too high, but now the cost goes to zero.
沒人會為這個爭執，因為成本太高，但現在成本降到零。 - So I’m just, what do you think?
所以我就想，你怎麼看？ - I mean, it’s hard to picture five years from now what the actual full effects of this are.
要想像五年後這件事的完整影響很難。 - But if you kind of think about that as the macro abstraction of it’s like marginal cost of arguing goes to zero.
但如果你把「爭論邊際成本歸零」當成總體抽象。 - What changes?
什麼會改變？ - I think to be really explicit, I think what’s happening is the marginal cost of time, of knowledge.
我想更精準地說，真正在發生的是時間、知識的邊際成本。 - Yes.
對。 - That is a much better abstraction.
那是個好得多的抽象。 - Is what’s going down so rapidly.
正在快速下降的是這些。 - And I think about our customer base.
我想我們的客戶群。 - Most of our customers don’t have a single software engineer, let alone a software engineer for their finance team.
大多數客戶連一個軟體工程師都沒有，更別提有專職財務團隊的工程師了。 - And if what we are very good at doing is selling functionally sets of work, maybe it’s embedded in a financial operating platform, but expenses done, accounting done, some type of knowledge work done, and you can deliver that.
如果我們很擅長的是打包賣「一組組工作」，也許包在財務營運平台裡，但費用搞定、會計搞定、某種知識工作搞定，而且你能把這件事送到客戶手上。 - That is immense high-leverage value for these customers.
這對這些客戶是巨大的高槓桿價值。 - Let’s say it costs $5 before, they didn’t do it, now they can get $5 of value.
假設以前要花 5 美元但沒人做，現在他們能得到 5 美元的價值。 - But maybe the cost of… It’s a software type cost, maybe it’s pennies of tokens to actually go and do that.
但成本是⋯⋯軟體型成本，實際做這件事也許只需要幾分錢的 token。 - That is a great business to be in because it’s very high customer value.
這是很棒的生意，因為客戶價值非常高。 - We can capture just a small amount of that and build this business.
我們只需要抓住其中一小部分就能打造這門生意。 - And when you go back to kind of the original insight of Ramp, we entered into this industry where it was very profitable, but not only was it misaligned, but people were fighting over like basis points.
回到 Ramp 最初的洞察，我們進入的這個產業很賺錢，但不只是激勵不對齊，大家還在為零點幾個百分點爭來爭去。 - Every last dollar that went into rewards could have meant like tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in profit for the business, for them.
每一塊投入點數回饋的錢，對業者來說可能是幾千萬甚至幾億美元的利潤差異。 - But if you think about for a customer, let’s say that in order to make one extra basis point as a business, you would try to incent them to spend a hundred more dollars.
但從客戶角度想，假設為了多賺 0.01% 的點數回饋，你會誘使他們多花 100 美元。 - For that customer and let’s say they buy something that gym membership they didn’t need, or that subscription keeps going, they have lost $100, it’s gone out the door and maybe they go to the gym, maybe they don’t.
對那個客戶來說，假設他買了一張不需要的健身房會員，或一個持續續訂的訂閱，他損失了 100 美元，錢出去了，他可能去健身、也可能沒去。 - But that is out of their bank account.
但那筆錢就這樣從他帳戶裡出去了。 - And if you just try to say, I’m going to have a better rewards program, sure, maybe you can get that customer a dollar or $1.10 back or some amount.
如果你只是說「我要推一個更好的點數回饋方案」，也許你能讓那個客戶拿回 1 美元或 1.10 美元什麼的。 - That pales in comparison to helping them just not spend that $100, cancel the subscription.
這跟直接幫他省下那 100 美元、取消訂閱相比根本微不足道。 - The economic leverage of that activity is much higher.
後者的經濟槓桿高得多。 - You sold your last business Paribus to Capital One.
你上一間公司 Paribus 是賣給 Capital One。
Capital One 創立的啟示
- Capital One is one of the biggest founder-run financial firms that people in Silicon Valley don’t talk about.
Capital One 是矽谷很少在談、規模最大的創辦人主導的金融公司之一。 - What should we all be…
我們應該從⋯⋯ - And has been extraordinarily successful.
而且非常成功。 - What should we all be learning from Capital One in their success?
我們該從 Capital One 的成功學什麼？ - Actually, I should say, how did they?
其實我該問的是，他們是怎麼做到的？ - What product really broke out for them?
真正讓他們突破的產品是什麼？ - Just what is Capital One success?
Capital One 的成功到底是什麼？ - I think there’s a lot that makes them amazing as a company.
我覺得有很多事讓他們成為一家很棒的公司。 - Both the founders are excellent.
兩位創辦人都很優秀。 - Rich Fairbank, Nigel Morris.
Rich Fairbank、Nigel Morris。 - I think it’s worth people reading up on their stories.
我覺得值得大家去讀他們的故事。 - It was founded in ’90s, is that right?
是 90 年代成立的，對嗎？ - So, not quite.
其實不完全是。 - From a legal standpoint— I’m very wooly on my Capital One history.
從法律上來說，我對 Capital One 的歷史不太熟。 - I think that legally the incorporation in some sense for Capital One, it was, I think it was in 1994, but the actual start traces back to the ’80s.
Capital One 的法律設立大概是在 1994 年，但實際起點可以追溯到 80 年代。 - At the time Rich and Nigel had met, they were consultants and they had this insight that the business of credit cards was… While it was lucrative, was not serving most of the country.
Rich 和 Nigel 認識的時候是顧問，他們有一個洞察，信用卡這門生意雖然有利可圖，但並沒有服務到國內大多數人。 - The way you could kind of think about credit cards back then, you know Diners Club, maybe others have heard of it.
當時你可以這樣想信用卡，你知道 Diners Club，大家可能也聽過。 - It was was a way for rich business people to get together and have lunch.
那是有錢商人聚餐用的方式。 - And like they put the card down and the restaurant would pick up the tab and they could go and pay the restaurant back later.
他們把卡放下，餐廳先付帳，他們之後再還給餐廳。 - And they had kind of navigated that and the simplification is if you had a very high credit score, you could get one of these cards with the benefits that it had.
他們把這一套玩起來，簡化版本是如果你信用分數很高，就能辦這種卡並享有相關好處。 - And if you didn’t have a credit score that met that, you could have a debit card.
如果你信用分數不到標準，你可以辦簽帳金融卡。 - And that was basically it.
基本上就這樣。 - It was a very linear cutoff.
是一個非常線性的切點。 - And what Rich and Nigel… The insight that they had had is there must be some curve.
Rich 和 Nigel 的洞察是：一定有某種曲線。 - We should be able to test this.
我們應該能測試這件事。 - Maybe we give people cards that have above an 800 credit score or something like that then.
也許我們給 800 分以上信用分數的人辦卡之類的。 - But what about 790?
那 790 呢？ - There might be people there that can go and pay for this.
那群人裡可能就有付得起的。 - If and the way we could go and take on the cost of this, maybe we charge them a somewhat higher interest rate until they prove their efficacy.
為了承擔這個風險，我們可以收他們高一點的利率，直到他們證明自己的還款能力。 - If 790 works, let’s go to 780.
如果 790 分可行，我們就往下測 780。 - So, it’s kind of the BNPL of its day.
所以這是那個年代的 BNPL（先買後付）。 - There is a population who are, for whatever reason, just below the threshold where banks are giving them good access to credit, where you can actually very profitably lend to them.
有一群人，不管什麼原因，就是剛好低於銀行給他們好信貸的門檻，但其實你可以非常有利可圖地放貸給他們。 - This is right.
完全正確。 - Exactly.
沒錯。 - And so, they, in the ’80s, were functionally pitching all these different banks to say, “We should go on this exploration.
所以在 80 年代，他們實質上向各家銀行提案「我們應該做這件探索。 - We’ll even run this for you.
我們甚至可以幫你跑。 - Let us go and run this.”
讓我們去做這件事。」 - And they went door to door to door to door to door.
他們挨家挨戶去敲門。 - The banks didn’t buy it.
銀行不買單。 - They didn’t buy it.
他們沒買單。
Capital One 的成長與策略演進
- And then finally, there was a bank in Virginia, Signet Bank, that said, “Fine, we’ll let you run it.
最後維吉尼亞州有一家銀行 Signet Bank 說「好吧，我們讓你們跑這個計畫。 - You can come join.
你們可以加入。 - We’ll give you this group and some resources to go build this.”
我們會給你們一個小組和一些資源來做這件事。」 - So, they built this as this division inside of it.
所以他們在銀行內部建了這個部門。 - And it started to work.
結果開始奏效。 - As this was going on, the computer revolution was taking off and it was sort of an unfortunate acronym, but they called it IBS.
進行的同時電腦革命正在起飛，他們取了一個不太幸運的縮寫叫 IBS。 - Irritable something something.
腸躁症那類的縮寫。 - No, it’s Information-Based Strategy.
其實是 Information-Based Strategy（基於資訊的策略）。 - And they said, “We could use different pockets of data and run these.”
他們說「我們可以運用不同批次的資料去跑這些測試。」 - It was before there was big data, there was this kind of data of we could go and test.
那是在大數據之前，已經有這類可供測試的資料。 - You know, maybe this person has a balance of $8,000 at this bank.
比如這個人在某家銀行有 8,000 美元餘額。 - We could send them an offer at this interest rate or this kind of, you don’t need to pay back interest for six months or 12 months.
我們可以用這個利率寄出方案、或是半年或 12 個月不用還利息這類的。 - And they could start to go and see the mathematical return against this.
他們可以開始看這套做法的數學回報。 - And this division started really working and it got so profitable it became a problem for the business and they convinced them to spin it out.
這個部門真的開始運轉，獲利高到變成銀行的問題，他們說服銀行把它切出來。 - And so, in 1994, that is the founding as people know Capital One today.
所以 1994 年是大家認識今天 Capital One 的正式起點。 - But it actually was, I think, almost a decade in building to actually go and do this.
但真正的建構其實花了將近十年。 - I think that there was a lot that they got really right.
我覺得他們做對了很多事。 - One, I think that they took much more of a first-principles view of the business.
第一，他們用更接近第一性原理的方式看這門生意。 - Whereas others said, “This is a profitable product.
別人都說「這是個賺錢的產品。 - I’m going to do it like the other person and use scale and distribution advantages.”
我要照別人的做法做，靠規模和通路優勢取勝。」 - They said, “Well, let’s think about the product nature itself.”
他們卻說「我們來想想產品本質本身。」 - There’s different, everyone’s making money on interchange.
大家都在靠交換費賺錢。 - Maybe there’s lending could work and you could kind of have different strategies for different types of populations.
但也許放貸能走通，你可以針對不同客群設計不同策略。 - They did this so large where I think at one point they were the largest customer of the US Postal Service.
他們把這件事做得很大，我記得有一度他們是美國郵政的最大客戶。 - They would send out so many offers, I think until Amazon took them over.
他們寄出海量的行銷信件，一直到 Amazon 把他們超過為止。 - There was a period of time that they did this.
有一段時間他們確實是這樣。 - So, it’s incredibly experimental.
所以他們極具實驗精神。 - They kind of carved the path and showed how do you go from credit facilities for fintech founders, eventually maybe you become a bank or buy a bank and carve that path.
他們開闢了一條路，示範了你怎麼從提供金融科技創辦人信貸額度，一路走到最後成為銀行、或收購一家銀行、開闢那條路。 - So, there’s some tactical lessons.
有一些戰術層面的教訓。 - I also think they’ve done a great job of building a great and durable brand.
我也覺得他們把一個好而持久的品牌建立得很好。 - One of the things that Capital One has done very, very well, I think, has focused on like, what is the consistent visual message?
我覺得 Capital One 做得非常好的一件事，是專注在「一致的視覺訊息是什麼」。 - What is the aesthetic and how do you stand out in this busy and different world?
美學是什麼？在這個混亂多變的世界要怎麼脫穎而出？ - And so, there’s a lot of pieces to what’s made that company work, but— And they’ve also remained focused, which a lot of banks haven’t.
所以讓這家公司成功的因素有很多，而且他們保持專注，這是很多銀行做不到的。 - I would say so.
我同意。 - Well, I think that is a rewrite of history.
不過我覺得那是事後才改寫的歷史。 - They were doing like cell-phone financing, healthcare financing.
他們做過手機融資、醫療融資。 - They were a part of this thing.
他們涉入過很多這類事。 - They have come back to focus after wandering in the woods.
他們是迷路以後才回到專注。 - They had some JV, it was like America One, I think it was called, to compete with Amazon.
他們有過一個合資公司，好像叫 America One，想跟 Amazon 競爭。 - They were actually the most experimental business ever in a lot of ways.
他們其實在很多方面是最愛實驗的公司。 - In, I think it was Hibernia Bank in Louisiana.
我記得是路易斯安那州的 Hibernia 銀行。 - And this was after Hurricane Katrina.
那是在卡崔娜颶風之後。 - I think it was maybe during it or just after they were able to buy.
可能是颶風期間或之後他們才得以收購。 - And it was like, it was an existential question for them.
對他們來說那是存亡攸關的問題。 - And I think that many people worried about, you knew this like, well, too from the BNPL businesses where if you’re kind of a lending-based business, and it’s fine when interest rates are low, but if there’s a crisis and people don’t want to lend to you, it can just break your business.
很多人擔心，你也知道，從 BNPL 生意的經驗可以看到，如果你是放貸型生意，利率低的時候沒事，但一旦遇上危機、沒人願意借錢給你，生意就會斷掉。 - And so they had these kind of scares, and they said, “We need a stable kind of cost base.”
所以他們有過這種驚險時刻，說「我們需要一個穩定的成本基礎。」 - Eventually, they bought a bank, which was, in a lot of ways, very good.
最後他們收購了一家銀行，這在很多方面都很棒。 - They had, kind of, the deposits as this durable, stable, low-cost or consistent capital base.
他們有了存款作為持久、穩定、低成本或一致的資本基礎。 - But the flip side of buying it was they had to reconcile their culture of like, crazy experimentation of trying everything, to, “We’re a regulated bank now.
但買下來的副作用是他們必須把那種「瘋狂實驗、什麼都試」的文化，和「我們現在是受監管的銀行」調和起來。 - We’ve got to be bank people.”
我們得變成銀行人了。 - And it’s more than just an attitude thing.
這不只是態度問題。 - If you are a nationally chartered bank, it’s real strictures, yeah.
如果你是國家特許銀行，會受到很實在的約束。 - You know, look, it’s to a level of, let’s say, the bank fails on Monday night.
看，嚴重到週一晚上你的銀行倒了。 - There is personnel.
會有人員過來。 - These guys in windbreakers in your office the next day.
隔天辦公室就會出現穿風衣的那些人。 - And they’ve probably been working there for some time before.
而且他們之前可能就在你公司待一段時間了。 - You know, and so it’s… I think there was a change.
所以⋯⋯我覺得是有一個轉變。 - In some sense, there is experimentation, I think, within certain constraints, would be how I would describe the Capital One post-buying a bank versus before, would be my read of it.
某種意義上，我會用「在特定約束下的實驗」來形容收購銀行之後的 Capital One，和之前有差異。 - But when you look at them in the ’90s and 2000s, it was like them, and in some ways, like, name the high-flying tech company.
但你看 90 年代和 2000 年代的他們，在某些方面跟那些高飛的科技公司沒兩樣。
人才池與招募哲學
- They were right up there in terms of share price growth.
他們在股價成長上就是在那個行列。 - They started re-achieving it, I think, in the late 2010s.
他們好像是在 2010 年代後期又重新達到高點。 - But it’s a fascinating company.
但是家很迷人的公司。 - I mean, I think the talent pool.
我覺得是人才庫。 - So at Affirm, our first, like, really good risk person, but this is true for every fintech company.
在 Affirm，我們第一個真的很強的風險主管，這在每家金融科技公司都成立。 - It’s just like, “Actually, this is kind of cool.”
像是「其實這滿酷的。」 - Billy Alvarado, our first COO, grew up at Capital One.
Billy Alvarado，我們第一任 COO，是在 Capital One 成長起來的。 - I had played the piano, and my teacher was taught by somebody who was taught by somebody.
我以前彈鋼琴，我的老師是某人教的、那人又是某人教的。 - There was actually a chart.
其實有一張圖。 - You can look this up.
你可以查。 - Czerny and Beethoven taught everybody who ever taught anybody.
Czerny 和貝多芬教了所有曾經教別人的人。 - So like Lang Lang or Yuja Wang, like, pick any famous pianist today.
像郎朗或王羽佳，挑任何一個今天出名的鋼琴家。 - They can always trace their lineage 100% of the time to Czerny, Carl Czerny or Beethoven.
他們的師承百分之百都能追溯到 Czerny、Carl Czerny 或貝多芬。 - Capital One is like the Czerny.
Capital One 就像 Czerny。 - Our Head of Risk, Srinath Srinivasan, he’s amazing, came from Capital.
我們的風險主管 Srinath Srinivasan 很厲害，來自 Capital One。 - We had the same boss 10 years apart, actually, in some sense.
某種意義上我們兩個相隔十年有過同一個老闆。 - And all the heads of risk for all modern fintechs came from Capital One.
所有現代金融科技公司的風險主管幾乎都來自 Capital One。 - Well, because it’s one of these things where you know that you don’t want to just hire for intercept, you want to hire for slope.
那是因為你知道，招人時不能只看「截距」，要看「斜率」。 - And this is the problem.
這就是問題所在。 - It’s like, you find, not to pick on Bank of America or Chase or somebody, but it’s like, “All right, this person clearly knows how to do their job.
不是要針對美國銀行或 Chase，但像是「好，這個人顯然很會做他的工作。 - The bank that they work in is worth a lot of money.”
他們工作的銀行也很值錢。」 - But they don’t necessarily have, how do I put this delicately, the slope.
但他們不一定有，我怎麼委婉地說，那個斜率。 - They won’t know what that means because they don’t know what slope means.
他們不會懂這是什麼意思，因為他們不懂什麼叫斜率。 - But seriously, the guy that we hired, just so… He was very, very smart.
認真說，我們請的那個人，真的非常非常聰明。 - And that was the key thing about Capital One, is that they didn’t hire banking people, they just hired smart people.
Capital One 的關鍵是他們不招銀行業的人，他們只招聰明人。 - And it became known as the place where smart people went.
他們因此成為「聰明人會去的地方」。 - And actually, the fact that companies would poach people from Capital One actually added to the allure.
其實公司會從 Capital One 挖角這件事，反而增加了它的吸引力。 - It’s like, “I want to work at McKinsey because at the end of McKinsey, I’m going to get a better job somewhere else.”
像是「我想進麥肯錫，因為從麥肯錫出來以後我可以找到更好的工作。」 - Capital One job market.
Capital One 就業市場。 - Capital One actually had, it did have that imprimatur.
Capital One 真的有那種招牌。 - And I think part of it is it’s the only founder-led institution.
我覺得部分原因是它是唯一還由創辦人領導的金融機構。
企業金庫與銀行業的未來
- Last question, Eric.
最後一個問題，Eric。 - We’re talking about banking here.
我們在談銀行業。 - You have a treasury product.
你們有一個金庫產品（treasury product）。 - In five years, where do businesses keep their money?
五年後企業會把錢放在哪？ - Is it with, I mean, statistically mostly, you mentioned 2% on Ramp, it’s even higher today in traditional banks like a Chase or a Bank of America?
從統計上看多數會在⋯⋯你剛提到 Ramp 佔 2%，Chase、美國銀行這類傳統銀行今天佔比更高？ - There’s also neobanks, you know, I mean, kind of bank-like entities like Mercury or Revolut or Monzo or things like that.
還有新型銀行，像是 Mercury、Revolut、Monzo 那些類銀行機構。 - There are companies like Ramp where you started in spend cards, but maybe moving more into treasury.
有像 Ramp 這種從支出卡起家、但愈來愈往金庫發展的公司。 - How do you think that shakes out as a market?
你認為這個市場會怎麼洗牌？ - So, as a macro point, I think there is an incredible amount of money made by institutions who are enjoying the profit pool and sharing very little with their end customers.
從總體觀點看，有一大批金融機構正坐享利潤池，卻幾乎不跟終端客戶分享，這讓他們賺進難以想像的錢。 - You know, if you think about the implications of like the federal overnight funds rate.
如果你想聯邦隔夜拆款利率的意義。 - This is basically saying, hey, if you want to go and— Just it’s insane that there’s so little yield sharing in the current market.
基本上是說嘿，如果你要去，目前市場幾乎不把收益分給客戶，這很瘋狂。 - I think that the national average for businesses, right, these are sophisticated entities with personnel.
企業的全美平均，這些是有人力配置的成熟實體。 - They’re supposed to be able to manage and put their funds in some place that’s more high yield.
他們理論上應該要能把資金放到比較高收益率的地方。 - I think the national average on checking accounts is 0.07% in the US.
但美國企業支票帳戶的全美平均收益率大概只有 0.07%。 - And so I’m guessing you don’t believe that Bank of America and JP Morgan and all these folks will wake up more altruistic one day.
我猜你不覺得美國銀行、JP Morgan 那些公司有天會突然變得比較利他。 - And so, what is the competitive process by which you think we’ll get there?
那你認為我們會透過怎樣的競爭過程走到那一步？ - I think that new businesses, whether it’s they have their own charter or they work with banks too that, this is not a monopoly.
我覺得新興企業，不論他們自己有銀行執照、或跟銀行合作，這不是壟斷市場。 - Like they have, everyone has competitors and it is a market that evolves.
每個人都有競爭對手，這是一個會演化的市場。 - I think that that rate will go up, that the easier it is for people to, whether it’s to create depository institutions, create accounts at these institutions, or create stores of value maybe even outside of these systems, maybe in a stable currency.
我認為那個收益率會上升，因為建立存款機構、在這些機構開戶、或甚至在體制外的地方（例如某種穩定幣）建立價值儲存工具，會變得愈來愈容易。 - And so, I think that rate goes up.
所以我認為收益率會上升。 - I think part of what’s driven the extremely rapid growth of Ramp Treasury is it’s just a vastly better deal for customers.
我認為 Ramp Treasury 成長極快的原因之一，就是對客戶來說是個好非常多的條件。 - Maybe you keep three months of just walking around money in your checking account, but if you know the funds you’re going to receive and what you’re paying out, well, we can move funds on the day payroll is coming due into that account and then every other day make sure the funds are earning the highest rate possible.
也許你在支票帳戶只留三個月的零用金，但如果你知道即將收到多少錢、要付出多少，我們可以在發薪日當天把資金移到支票帳戶，其他每一天都確保資金拿到最高可能的收益率。 - And so, I think from a macro perspective, these things tend to go up in terms of the relative yield.
所以從總體觀點看，這些收益率的相對水準會往上升。 - I think there’s another question of slack in the system.
我認為還有一個問題是系統裡的閒置資金。 - If you have more and more…
如果你有愈來愈多⋯⋯ - Money can think, right?
錢會思考，對吧？ - If the dollars in your company have some level of intelligence like it’s able to kind of determine when can it be spent, under what circumstances?
如果你公司裡的每一塊美元具備某種程度的智慧，能判斷什麼時候可以被花掉、在什麼條件下。 - It’s increasingly recorded in real time and there’s some reasoning around this, some ability to kind of opine of where should the next marginal dollar go?
這些資訊愈來愈會即時被記錄，還會有一些推理，去判斷下一塊邊際資金該去哪。 - And you have systems that are able to think infinitely about these things even at 3:00 AM in the morning when most of your team is asleep.
你有系統可以無限思考這些事，即便是凌晨三點你團隊大多在睡覺。 - Well, once you determine, like maybe you’ll determine I should keep the funds in some level in like a 2% or a 4% yielding account.
一旦你決定「我應該把一部分資金放在 2% 或 4% 收益的帳戶」。 - But I think more of those dollars will go in flight actually to go spend to, if you have a business that makes an 8% profit margin a year, that’s a lot higher than what you can earn in the overnight rate.
我認為更多錢會真的「起飛」去被花掉，如果你的生意一年有 8% 利潤率，那比隔夜拆款利率高得多。 - And so in some sense, I think you have the dual effect.
某種意義上會有雙重效應。 - Smarter capital allocation.
更聰明的資本配置。 - I think more dollars will be put to work.
我認為更多錢會被投入實際運用。 - I agree with Alex’s macro point of if you kind of understand counterparties, you understand more information.
我同意 Alex 的總體觀點：如果你了解交易對手、掌握更多資訊。 - I think that one, the cost of financing should go down and I think more dollars should be in the system in some sense.
我覺得一方面融資成本會下降，另一方面某種意義上會有更多錢進到系統裡。 - It’s actually a waste for everyone to have your dollars just sitting in a bank account.
讓每個人的錢都躺在銀行帳戶裡其實是一種浪費。 - Who does that benefit?
這讓誰受益？ - But it goes back to your time point.
這也回到你的「時間論」。 - And it’s like the reason why I got mad at Chase a while ago, and I still have a Chase account.
就像我前一陣子對 Chase 很生氣，我現在還是有 Chase 帳戶。 - And like why is that?
為什麼？ - It’s like I have a life insurance policy.
因為我有一份人壽保險。 - I don’t remember the login for it.
我忘記登入密碼。 - It’s just too much work.
要處理太麻煩了。 - I wrote, this is a true story.
我寫了，這是真實故事。 - Isn’t this an issue if you die?
如果你死了這不會出問題嗎？ - Yeah, I mean.
對，我是說。 - Well, but they’ll pay my wife.
他們會付給我老婆。 - I just don’t know how to log in and change the bank account.
我只是不知道怎麼登入、改銀行帳戶。 - So, they’ll send her a nice letter I’m sure, some flowers.
他們會寄一封客氣的信給她，加上花束。 - But, you know, why…
但你知道，為什麼⋯⋯ - Well actually, this is a true story.
對了，這是真實故事。 - I wrote a check for somebody’s bar mitzvah.
我為某人的成年禮寫了一張支票。 - Mazel tov.
恭喜啊。 - Has not been deposited.
還沒存進去。 - Do I want to be the schmuck who has the bounced check?
我想當那個跳票的笨蛋嗎？ - No, I don’t.
不想。 - So it’s like I have to— This kid is keeping you at Chase.
所以我得。那個小朋友讓你被 Chase 綁住了。 - Well, great to see you.
很開心見到你。 - You too.
我也是。 - Eric, thank you.
Eric，謝謝你。 - Thanks for the Guinness.
謝謝這杯健力士。 - It was a great time.
這是一段美好的時光。