董事會不是用來解釋的:Capital One 共同創辦人的 2x2 決策框架

董事會不是用來解釋的:Capital One 共同創辦人的 2x2 決策框架 (📷 圖說 👉 攝於 2025 AWS re:Invent CEO Keynote Matt 上台前,心裡感謝 2008 年的 Ernest 還在台積 PIE 的忙碌人生,還願意充滿好奇地動手開始玩 EC2 和 S3。就像今天可以開始安裝 Claude 那般,也許十年後也會充滿感謝。圖片來源:Ernest。)

✳️ 董事會不是用來解釋的:Capital One 共同創辦人的 2x2 決策框架

每次陪著創業朋友進董事會或股東會之前,可以體會創辦人面對市場、手上資金與現金流、以及各種利害關係人之間的糾結,今天這篇也算是 縱橫古時候與 AI 時代,來看 Keith Rabois 聊聊如何用三個不討喜,換來真心硬團隊 的延伸閱讀,Keith 推薦可以聽聽 Ramp CEO Eric 的演講,然後 Eric 又推薦了 Capital One 幾百年前的創辦歷史。(最近時間感已經錯亂,就先這樣吧。)

Nigel Morris(Capital One 共同創辦人、QED Investors 共同創辦人,管理資產超過 40 億美元、QED 在 17 年間做了 200 多筆投資)在 Miguel Armaza 訪談裡,把他在 Capital One 當營運者、在 QED 當「偽裝成投資人的營運者」累積起來的整套判斷框架,摘要出四個可以做看看的招式。重點在於:董事會當天要花的不是「解釋時間」,是「決策時間」。

1️⃣ 2x2 框架:一張紙,四個問題,不能看筆記

  • Nigel 給優秀 CEO 的測試:
  • 對下面這四個問題得要能脫口而出,不需要兩天時間寫報告,更不能一問三不知。(是說這也是我今年練習日更的出發點之一)

.

  • 什麼事情進展得很好?
  • 什麼事情進展不好?
  • 什麼事情讓你晚上睡不著?(這與「進展不好」不一定是同一件事)
  • 今天必須做出哪個決定?

.

  • 如果 CEO 需要兩天才答得出來,照 Nigel 的話說,就是沒有跟公司在同一個頻道上。(超譯:收訊不好啦!)

.

  • 他還補了一個觀察:晚期公司的董事會常常變成儀式,董事們最後只會丟出「增加營收、降低成本」這種空洞建議。
  • 這個四題框架可以用來鞏固防守、確保回防,讓每一次董事會都被迫回去專注真正重要的事。

(特別對於第三個問題,我們在 Kyklosify 陪決策者做季度或年度回顧的時候,很幸運都能聽到創辦人可以脫口而出,馬上可以描述情境與限制條件,我們可以一起進一步探索幾種可能性並開始做拆解與比較。)

2️⃣ 董事會前的一對一預溝通

  • Nigel 的規則是:任何有爭議的決定,例如公司要 pivot 方向這種,都要在正式會議前跟關鍵董事 1:1 走過一遍,把意見消化掉。
  • 「永遠不要在董事會上給董事驚喜。」

.

  • 這樣做的效果,是把董事會當天從「解釋事情」變成「做決定」。
  • 不是為了搞政治,是為了讓那 90 分鐘被好好使用。
  • 材料也要提前發送,讓董事進會議室時已經讀過。

(至於遭遇禿鷹襲擊又是另一種故事了…)

3️⃣ Ghostbusters 效應:成為叉路口上第一個被想到的人

  • Nigel 形容 QED 想成為創辦人「遇到困境時第一個想打電話求助」的對象。
  • 他說很多人在勝利的時候很愛溝通,但真正需要你的,是叉路口、是壓力點,是那種已經不好意思再找別人的時刻。
  • 他自稱 QED 是「偽裝成投資人的營運者」,意思是他們自己是從現場營運現場出身,不是站在岸上評論。

.

  • 往自己身上套的話,是要給同事、共同創辦人、重要客戶這種訊號:你出事的時候可以先打給我,我不會先指責,我們一起想辦法。
  • 信號不是靠宣稱,是靠歷次實際這樣做累積出來的。

(前幾天才在跟朋友聊到我還滿常擔任各種救火隊,那時候腦海裡想到的畫面也是 Ghostbusters 的那個消防局。感謝每一位找得到我、且信任我可以陪你一起想辦法的大家。)

4️⃣ 找搭檔看互補超能力,而且要耐得住時間考驗

  • Nigel 與 Richard Fairbank 合作 18 年,
  • 與 Frank Rotman 合作到第 32 年。

.

  • 他分享的框架是:
  • 一位偏策略、外向、對願景有熱情(站在前面的那一位),
  • 一位偏技術與分析、把能耐撐在後面(在後面把東西做出來的那一位)。
  • 兩邊加起來的能力與才能,要超過兩個人分開的總和。

.

  • 他另外加了一個壓力測試:不只看兩人現在合得來,還要能預期 6 個月、甚至兩年後還合得來。
  • 關係要經得起不同階段的考驗。

(這點我們每次在與潛在客戶訪談時,或是在看案子時觀察團隊成員組成與互動氣氛。相對穩的版本是團隊成員每個人都願意承認自己缺哪一塊,願意直接溝通。不然我們真的進駐的時候,可能我們雙方都會遭遇慘不忍睹。)

📷 圖說 👉 攝於 2025 AWS re:Invent CEO Keynote Matt 上台前,心裡感謝 2008 年的 Ernest 還在台積 PIE 的忙碌人生,還願意充滿好奇地動手開始玩 EC2 和 S3。就像今天可以開始安裝 Claude 那般,也許十年後也會充滿感謝。

就如前前篇 Keith 說的,保持前進的節奏那般,每天微不足道地輕輕按個「👍」或「❤️」。或如 Ernest 超譯的,不要留時間給猶豫,隨時出門探索世界,隨時動手做些微不足道的小事,刻意地累積之後,好似奇蹟,又好似理所當然,又好似聽到那首演奏給自己的交響樂,感受到音符輕輕跳動的節奏,而開心著。


✳️ 延伸閱讀


✳️ 知識圖譜

(更多關於知識圖譜…)

graph LR
    %% Concept classes - Orange
    classDef concept fill:#FF8000,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff;
    %% Instances - Blue
    classDef instance fill:#0080FF,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff;

    Empirical_Analysis["Empirical Analysis"]:::concept
    Risk_Based_Pricing["Risk-Based Pricing"]:::concept
    Teaser_Rates["Teaser Rates and Balance Transfer"]:::concept
    Unbundling["Unbundling"]:::concept
    Rebundling["Rebundling"]:::concept
    Hyper_Personalization["Hyper-Personalization N=1"]:::concept
    Unit_Economics["Unit Economics and NPV"]:::concept
    Financial_Inclusion["Financial Inclusion"]:::concept
    Operator_VC["Operator-Style VC"]:::concept
    Board_Effectiveness["Board Effectiveness"]:::concept
    Co_Founder_Fit["Co-Founder Complementarity"]:::concept
    Ghostbusters_Effect["Ghostbusters Effect"]:::concept

    Capital_One["Capital One"]:::instance
    Signet_Bank["Signet Bank"]:::instance
    Nubank["Nubank"]:::instance
    QED_Investors["QED Investors"]:::instance
    Richard_Fairbank["Richard Fairbank"]:::instance
    Frank_Rotman["Frank Rotman"]:::instance
    Nigel_Morris["Nigel Morris"]:::instance

    Empirical_Analysis -- enables --> Risk_Based_Pricing
    Risk_Based_Pricing -- pioneered_by --> Capital_One
    Teaser_Rates -- pioneered_by --> Capital_One
    Capital_One -- spun_off_from --> Signet_Bank
    Capital_One -- prioritizes --> Unit_Economics
    Unbundling -- entry_strategy_for --> Nubank
    Nubank -- earns_permission_for --> Rebundling
    Hyper_Personalization -- improves --> Unit_Economics
    QED_Investors -- invests_in --> Financial_Inclusion
    Nubank -- drives --> Financial_Inclusion
    QED_Investors -- practices --> Operator_VC
    Operator_VC -- manifests_as --> Ghostbusters_Effect
    Operator_VC -- demands --> Board_Effectiveness
    Co_Founder_Fit -- basis_of --> Nigel_Morris
    Richard_Fairbank -- co_founded --> Capital_One
    Nigel_Morris -- co_founded --> Capital_One
    Nigel_Morris -- co_founded --> QED_Investors
    Frank_Rotman -- co_founded --> QED_Investors
graph TD
    A["Identify High-Friction Traditional Bank Service"] --> B["Unbundle: Launch Single Niche Product"]
    B -->|"Lending or Debit"| C{"Does it solve the pain point?"}
    C -->|"Yes"| D["Achieve High NPS e.g. 90+"]
    C -->|"No"| E["Iterate and Hypothesis Testing"]
    E --> B
    D --> F["Lower Customer Acquisition Cost"]
    F --> G["Prequalify Customers for New Products"]
    G --> H["Rebundle: Launch Second Product Frictionless"]
    H --> I["Evolve into Super App"]
sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant CEO as Portfolio Company CEO
    participant Board as Board Members
    participant Nigel as Nigel Morris (QED)

    CEO->>Nigel: 1. Send 70-page deck in advance
    CEO->>Nigel: 2. Send One-Pager (2x2 box) covering four answers
    Nigel->>CEO: 3. Read materials, flag controversial items
    CEO->>Board: 4. Pre-meeting 1:1 with key board members
    Board-->>CEO: 5. Digest objections, align before meeting
    CEO->>Board: 6. Board meeting becomes decision time, not readout
    Board-->>CEO: 7. Make real decisions on the fourth box
    CEO->>Nigel: 8. Call first when stuck at next fork in the road
    Nigel-->>CEO: 9. Ghostbusters effect kicks in, co-navigate

✳️ 逐字稿與筆記

開場預告與介紹

2x2 一頁紙框架

  • I have a 2 by 2 box that I have with my portfolio companies where I ask the CEO, on top of the often 70-page deck that’s sent out, lines and boxes and graphs, is a one-pager that says, what’s going really well, what’s not going well, what’s keeping you up at night, which might be different to what’s not going well, and what decisions do we have to make today?
    我跟我投資組合公司之間有一個 2x2 的格子框架,會要求 CEO 在那份動輒 70 頁、滿是線條、方塊與圖表的簡報之外,另外給我一頁紙,寫清楚:什麼事情進展得很好?什麼事情進展不好?什麼事情讓你晚上睡不著(這件事跟「進展不好」不一定是同一件)?以及我們今天必須做出哪個決定?

巴西與墨西哥的市場機會

  • When we invested in Nubank 7 [music] 8 years ago, we didn’t fully internalize how big an opportunity Brazil would be [music] and then coming out of Brazil, how big an opportunity Mexico would be.
    當我們在 7、8 年前投資 Nubank 的時候,其實並沒有完全意識到巴西這個機會有多大,更沒想到走出巴西之後,墨西哥的機會又會是多大。
  • Banks constantly confuse loyalty and inertia.
    銀行經常把忠誠度與慣性混為一談
  • Very different.
    這兩件事非常不同。
  • You can have lots of stickiness, particularly in a non-open banking world, where people can’t be bothered or it’s too difficult to switch and particularly to bring your historic data over to a new provider.
    在一個非開放銀行的世界裡,你可以擁有很高的黏著度,因為人們懶得換,或轉換成本太高,尤其是要把歷史資料轉到新服務商那邊真的很麻煩
  • So, they stick around and people assume, incumbents assume that’s because they’re dearly loved.
    所以客戶就留下來了,既有業者便誤以為這是因為客戶深愛他們
  • But yet, they’ll have a Net Promoter Score that’s 12.
    但他們的淨推薦值(NPS)其實只有 12。

Fintech Leaders Podcast 開場介紹

  • » Welcome to Fintech Leaders.
    » 歡迎收聽 Fintech Leaders。
  • I’m Miguel Armaza, and I’m fascinated by the companies reshaping financial services [music], which is why I co-founded Gilgamesh Ventures, a fintech fund where we have backed almost 50 fintech companies worldwide.
    我是 Miguel Armaza,我對正在重塑金融服務的公司非常著迷,所以我共同創辦了 Gilgamesh Ventures,這是一支 fintech 基金,我們在全球投資了將近 50 家 fintech 公司。
  • And over the last 5 years, I’ve recorded over 350 conversations with the top leaders in fintech to extract how they think, what they’ve learned, and insights that can be helpful to builders in fintech.
    過去 5 年,我與 fintech 界頂尖領導者進行了超過 350 次對談,目的是萃取他們的思考方式、學到的教訓,以及對 fintech 打造者有幫助的洞察。
  • Today’s conversation was actually recorded about a year ago, in October 2024 [music], but I wanted to republish it because it’s full of timeless and highly relevant learnings.
    今天這一集其實是大約一年前、2024 年 10 月錄的,但我想重新發佈,因為它充滿了跨越時間、且與現在高度相關的學習。

嘉賓介紹:Nigel Morris

  • [music] I sat down with Nigel Morris, co-founder of QED and Capital One.
    我這次訪問的是 Nigel Morris,QED 與 Capital One 的共同創辦人
  • QED is a global fintech venture capital firm managing over 4 billion in [music] assets under management, has backed numerous amazing companies including Credit Karma, Nubank [music], Avant, SoFi, CLA, and many more.
    QED 是一間全球性的 fintech 創投公司,管理超過 40 億美元資產,投過很多精彩的公司,包括 Credit Karma、Nubank、Avant、SoFi、CLA 等等
  • Prior to QED, Nigel co-founded [music] Capital One in 1994.
    在 QED 之前,Nigel 於 1994 年共同創辦了 Capital One
  • And the bank today is the sixth [music] largest bank in the US, and also one of the most innovative financial institutions has inspired [music] countless of entrepreneurs worldwide.
    今天 Capital One 是美國第六大銀行,也是最具創新力的金融機構之一,啟發了全球無數創業者

訪談邀約致謝

  • First of all, thank you.
    首先,謝謝你。
  • I know we’ve been trying, at least I’ve been trying to get this recorded [music] for close to 2 years.
    我知道我們(至少是我)已經為了錄這一集嘗試了將近兩年。
  • We both have busy schedules, but especially you, and I’m very grateful that you’ve taken the time and you’ve welcomed me in your office here in Virginia, close to DC.
    我們兩人都很忙,特別是你,我非常感謝你抽出時間,還邀請我來到你維吉尼亞州、鄰近華盛頓特區的辦公室。

反向致謝

  • » Miguel, that’s not true.
    » Miguel,這可不是事實。
  • I’ve been trying to get on your podcast for the last two years.
    是我這兩年一直想上你的 podcast。
  • I had all my people knocking on your door.
    我找了我身邊所有人去敲你的門。
  • You had Frank Rotman do this.
    你已經訪過 Frank Rotman。
  • I think you had a Myers Garity and now you have to go for the B team, right?
    我記得你訪過 Myers Garity 這位,現在輪到你找 B 咖了,對吧?
  • » You do what you can.
    » 大家各盡所能啦。
  • But Nigel, a lot of people have heard about your story.
    不過 Nigel,很多人都聽過你的故事。

早年塑造與啟蒙

塑造早年生涯的影響

  • I want to hear early on what shaped you in your 20s and 30s.
    我想聽你早年 20 多歲、30 多歲時是被什麼塑造的。
  • If you go back and you remember what was driving you back then, what was shaping you when you think back?
    如果回到當時,那時候驅動你的是什麼?回頭看,是什麼在塑造你?

早年生活與家庭背景

  • » I think I have to take a little half step back on that a little bit.
    » 我想我得先稍微往後退一步談這件事。
  • So, I grew up in a very working-class family from Snowdonia in North Wales.
    我生長在北威爾斯 Snowdonia 的一個非常藍領的家庭
  • English was her second language.
    英文是她的第二語言。
  • She never really was that great at English.
    她英文其實一直不太好。
  • Welsh, » huh?
    說的是威爾斯語,嗯?
  • » Did you learn Welsh?
    » 你有學威爾斯語嗎?
  • » No, she, she actually really sadly did not speak Welsh around me, which I now there’s a full circle of now me feeling this gravitational pull back to that part of the world.
    » 沒有,很遺憾她沒有在我身邊說威爾斯語,現在我反而有一種被那片土地牽引回去的感覺。
  • I feel inadequate that I didn’t learn that language.
    我覺得沒學會威爾斯語是一種遺憾。
  • I was subjected to 5 years of Latin growing up in English schools.
    我在英國學校念書時被迫學了 5 年拉丁文。
  • So I can mostly decipher the Latin languages, at least on paper.
    所以拉丁語系的語言我大概都看得懂,至少紙面上可以。
  • But Welsh is a very different route.
    但威爾斯語是完全不同的語系。
  • So lots of double D’s and double L’s and Y’s and no vowel sounds that you can.
    裡面有一堆雙 D、雙 L 和 Y,幾乎沒有你熟悉的母音發音。
  • So it’s a much harder language to learn.
    所以它是一種難學很多的語言。
  • But I do, I have set myself a goal at some point in my life, before I leave this planet, to at least get some competence in the language.
    但我給自己設了個目標,在離開這個世界之前,至少要把威爾斯語學到有一點程度。
  • So thank you for that.
    謝謝你問到這個話題。
  • So look, I grew up in a family where it was just making ends meet and I didn’t know, not only did nobody from my family ever go to university, but I didn’t know anybody that had ever gone to university.
    我生長的家庭就是勉強度日,不只家裡沒人上過大學,我甚至不認識任何一個上過大學的人
  • Complete anathema to me.
    這對當時的我來說完全是陌生的世界。

學術道路與好奇心

  • So I was lucky enough to to sit an exam at the age of 11 and got into a decent school and then I found that I had a there was a inside of me was a pulse an energy around curiosity of learning things in my teenage years while other people were off supporting Manchester City.
    我很幸運,11 歲時考上一間還不錯的學校,然後發現自己內心有一股對學習事物的好奇心與能量,十幾歲時別人都跑去支持曼城足球隊,我卻在讀書
  • I was reading Freud and Jung and some philosophy and I really thought that I’d end up being a clinical psychologist.
    我那時讀的是佛洛伊德、榮格還有一些哲學,當時真的以為自己最後會成為臨床心理學家。(Ernest:我讀了亞森·羅蘋,當時也真的以為自己長大之後會去偷點東西 XDD)
  • That was always the where I was leading.
    那一直是我原本打算走的方向。

從心理學轉向實證主義

  • I love the idea of what makes people tick and you know how do you understand human behavior in a scientific way.
    我很著迷於人為什麼會這樣運作、如何用科學的方式理解人類行為。
  • So that was where I was heading and I went off to study uh psychology undergrad.
    所以我就朝這個方向去讀了心理學大學部。
  • I thought it was a precursor to clinical psychology.
    我以為那是前進到臨床心理學的必經之路。
  • And I got to in my second or third year and I started to realize that there wasn’t very little real empirical justification for a lot of the theories that we were understanding of Freud and Jung and I rejected it wholeheartedly and became a raided empiricist with a view that this is goes back to Skinner and Thorndike and these people and it was if it can’t be measured it doesn’t exist.
    到了大二大三,我開始發現我們在讀的佛洛伊德和榮格那些理論,其實幾乎沒有真正的實證基礎,於是我全盤否定,變成一個徹底的實證主義者。這可以追溯到 Skinner 與 Thorndike 這些人,他們的觀點是:無法被衡量的事物,就不存在

擁抱應用數學與統計

  • So I was and I retreated into applied math and stats where I felt very comfortable because you have an answer and that the answer is quod erat demonstrandum where you can use QED and it’s that you can come up with an answer and you can reverse engineer the equations.
    所以我退回應用數學與統計的懷抱,那裡我覺得很舒服,因為你會有一個答案,那答案就是「quod erat demonstrandum(QED,所欲證得)」,你可以得到答案,然後逆向拆解方程式
  • So it was so back to the 20s.
    回頭來講我 20 多歲的那段。

好奇心與探索的驅動力

  • So what was driving me was I felt like I’d been in a dark long tunnel without much without the exposures that I want that I would have really loved to have had.
    那時驅動我的,是一種「我過去一直在一個又長又黑的隧道裡,缺少我真正想要的那些接觸和刺激」的感受
  • And as I went to university and as I started to really engage with the world, I just found it absolutely fantastic and amazing that there were all these things to explore.
    當我上了大學、開始真正跟世界互動之後,我覺得一切都太神奇了,有這麼多東西可以去探索
  • And I think it’s even now as I sit here in my middle 60s, that energy around curiosity and learning is still what drives me the most.
    我覺得即便到了現在,我坐在這裡已經 60 多歲了,那股好奇心與學習的能量仍然是最驅動我的東西
  • So that’s that was what it was.
    就是這樣

超越財務自由的動機

  • And I think clearly getting some level of financial freedom was important, but I never started off as a businessman.
    顯然,達到某種程度的財務自由很重要,但我一開始並不是個生意人。
  • And I I never there there wasn’t ever the FT or the Economist or the Wall Street Journal in the house.
    我家從來沒有金融時報(FT)、經濟學人(The Economist)或華爾街日報(WSJ)這些報章。
  • And I grew up my father was a a military man and a Daily Mail reader, if you know what that means.
    我父親是軍人,每天讀的是 Daily Mail,你懂那代表什麼。
  • And I would tantalize him and annoy him when I got into my teens by bringing home the Guardian and starting to talk about different type of politics.
    我十幾歲時會故意帶 The Guardian(衛報)回家惹他,開始跟他聊不一樣的政治立場。
  • So it’s that it’s that insatiable appetite to to learn and be part of learning that really drives me.
    所以真正驅動我的,是那種對學習、以及參與學習過程的無止盡渴望

第一份工作

  • » What was your first job?
    » 你第一份工作是什麼?

最早的顧問業生涯

  • The first real job was actually coming out of business school.
    我第一份真正的工作其實是從商學院畢業後開始的。
  • I never really worked in the UK for long.
    我從來沒有在英國長時間工作過。
  • I went straight through from undergrad to the MBA and I was hired when I was at Watered by a BCG spin-off called SPA, Strategic Planning Associates.
    我從大學部直接讀到 MBA,在 Watered 時期被一家從 BCG 獨立出來的公司 SPA(Strategic Planning Associates)錄取
  • And SPA basically became Oliver Wyman » and I had offers to go to other consulting firms in the UK, but spa said, “You can work in London or work in Washington.” [snorts] I thought, “Wow, I’ll go to work in Washington for a couple of years.
    SPA 後來基本上就變成了 Oliver Wyman。當時我也有其他英國顧問公司的 offer,但 SPA 跟我說:「你可以到倫敦上班,也可以到華盛頓特區上班。」我心想,哇,我要去華盛頓工作個幾年
  • it’d be great to work in America and then I’ll go home again.
    去美國工作應該很棒,然後我再回家就好。
  • And of course, here I am now 40 years later, still thinking I’m going to go home again one day, but we’ll see about that.
    結果當然啦,我現在都過了 40 年還在這裡,還是想著有一天要回家,但一切再看吧。
  • But no, it’s that was my first real exposure to business.
    不過,那就是我第一次真正接觸到商業世界。
  • And I did consulting candidly because I didn’t know what else to do and I didn’t feel I was equipped to actually go and do anything other than uh try to leverage my kind of research and analytical skills.
    老實說,我當時會選顧問業,是因為不知道還能做什麼,也覺得自己除了運用研究與分析能力之外,沒有資格做別的事。
  • So consulting was a way for me to kick the can down the road until I was able to perhaps learn the pragmatically some of the basics of business.
    所以顧問業對我而言,就是一個拖時間的辦法,讓我有機會在實務上慢慢學會商業的基本功
  • I could I had learned how to do them academically, but never in practice.
    我在學術上已經學過怎麼做,但從來沒在實務上做過。
  • I was I mean green would have been a massive overstatement.
    要說我「菜」其實都還太客氣了。
  • Naive was probably a better way of describing it.
    用「天真」來形容可能更貼切。

Capital One 起源與 DNA

Capital One 文化與創辦人的影響

  • » It’s so interesting because you mentioned that realization you had about being more empirical and wanting to measure things, right?
    » 很有趣,你剛提到那個關於變得更實證導向、想要衡量一切的體悟,對吧?
  • I’ve interviewed and met so many people who have come out of Capital One and when we talk about what is special, what was special back then, what’s still special about Capital One is being very numbers driven, measuring everything, they say that the culture is very in many ways the personality of the founders.
    我訪談與認識過非常多 Capital One 出身的人,我們聊到 Capital One 有什麼特別之處時,不管是當年還是現在,那個特別的地方就是高度數字導向、什麼都要衡量,大家說 Capital One 的文化在很多方面就是創辦人個性的延伸
  • That’s what it’s sounding to me like that capital one the culture is a representation of how you think of also how how rich parotics thinks.
    聽起來就是這樣,Capital One 的文化是你和 Richard Fairbank 兩人思考方式的投射

在 SPA 創立銀行實務

  • » Yeah.
    » 對。
  • In also in oh so many ways.
    而且在非常多方面都是這樣。
  • Look so so rich and I started the banking practice at SPA when we were there.
    我和 Rich 在 SPA 的時候,就開始在那裡建立銀行業務團隊。
  • So we’re talking now 1985-86 and this is when specialists were starting to emerge in consulting.
    我們講的是 1985、86 年那段時間,那時顧問業才開始出現專精某個領域的專家
  • Before that it was just people who had gone to good business schools but we we started to learn about banking and I jokingly say that in those days I didn’t know the difference between a letter of credit and a line of credit and I used to get assets and liabilities mixed up and I still do but we were going to school in a very first principles way on how banking works and where money is made and I referenced this often a book by a McKinsey partner called Lowell Bryan and the book was called
    在那之前,顧問業就是一群好商學院畢業的人而已。我們開始學銀行這一行,我常開玩笑說那時候我連信用狀(letter of credit)和信用額度(line of credit)都分不清楚,資產和負債常常搞混,其實到現在也還是,但我們是用第一性原理(first principles)去自學銀行怎麼運作、錢從哪裡來。我常引用 McKinsey 合夥人 Lowell Bryan 寫的一本書
  • breaking up the bank.
    那本書叫《Breaking Up the Bank》。
  • What he basically did, and this is part of what we did as consultants, was take all of the businesses that are in banking, break them into their constituent parts, allocate not only overhead to them, which is a process that would often be done, but then allocate economic capital, not regulatory capital, economic capital.
    他做的事(也是我們當顧問時在做的事),是把銀行裡的每一塊業務全部拆開,不只分配間接成本(overhead,這是常見做法),還要分配經濟資本(不是法規資本,是經濟資本)
  • How much economic capital would you need, and then look at where the shareholder value accretion is occurring.
    每一項業務需要多少經濟資本,然後看哪裡才是真正在替股東創造價值

銀行業分析與無擔保信貸洞察

  • And what we found time after time, we worked for Chase and Citi, we worked for Wells Fargo, I think, and Chemical Bank, a whole bunch of the the mainstream banks, is that time and time again, you would find that economic rents above the cost of capital were being made in unsecured credit.
    我們一次又一次發現,我們服務過 Chase、Citi,好像還做過 Wells Fargo 和 Chemical Bank,一堆主流銀行,每次都會看到超過資本成本的經濟租金,都是出現在無擔保信貸(unsecured credit)這塊。
  • And unsecured credit was growing.
    而且無擔保信貸正在成長。
  • » And unsecured credit was going through a renaissance where on the one hand, you had Fair Isaac who was starting to collect 300 variables on every consumer.
    » 無擔保信貸當時正在經歷一次復興,一方面 Fair Isaac 開始為每個消費者收集 300 個變數
  • And that data was very predictive in terms of actuarily who will pay back and who won’t and the bits in between.
    這些資料對於精算上誰會還錢、誰不會還錢、以及中間地帶的那些人,非常具有預測力
  • And relational databases were emerging.
    同時關聯式資料庫也正在興起。
  • So you could now amass large data sets and then attack that data with us on a batch basis with SAS and SPSS type packages.
    所以你可以累積大量資料集,然後用 SAS、SPSS 這類批次運算軟體去分析那些資料。
  • So yes, I think so much of the root of what became Capital One in its DNA was go went back to those SPA days and the training that I had prior to coming into consulting.
    所以是的,我覺得後來 Capital One 的 DNA,有非常多都可以追溯到當年 SPA 的那段日子,以及我進入顧問業之前所受的訓練

對單位經濟學與假說檢定的狂熱

  • In my view, this fanatical focus on unit economics comes out of our background in understanding actuarial analysis and when I was at SPA, we did work for several insurance companies talking to actuaries about how they did what they did.
    我認為這種對單位經濟學(unit economics)的狂熱聚焦,來自於我們對精算分析的理解背景。我在 SPA 時曾服務過幾家保險公司,跟精算師聊他們是怎麼做事的
  • So I spend a dollar today and then I will get these returns back and then I use an appropriate discount rate and I can come up with a net present value of the customer which to me is the holy grail of lingua franka of how do you evaluate different ideas not LTV to CAC not other ratios that people use which is shorthand NPV is the real McCoy and that’s how you should do so on the one hand it was that the second thing that we applied was the scientific methodology of developing hypothesis
    我今天花 1 美元,未來會收回這些報酬,用合適的折現率去計算,就能得到客戶的淨現值(NPV)。對我而言,這是評估各種想法時的聖杯與共通語言,不是 LTV/CAC,也不是其他人用的簡化比率。NPV 才是真貨,應該這樣做。這是第一件事。第二件事是我們運用了科學方法論來發展假說。
  • through observation and through past hypothe hypothesis and then testing those hypotheses out in classic Carl Popper language you would look to try to disprove the hypothesis.
    透過觀察與過去的假說推論出新假說,然後驗證這些假說。用 Karl Popper 經典的話來說,你是在嘗試去否證那個假說。
  • Today all too often and clearly in a world of advanced AI a lot of people just throw a lot of spaghetti against the wall and see what sticks.
    今天太多人(尤其在這個 AI 先進的年代)都是把一堆義大利麵丟到牆上,看哪些黏得住
  • We were very hypothesis driven.
    我們則是高度假說驅動的
  • So a combination of this fanatical focus on unit economics and then real AB testing you know where we did thousands and thousands of tests in real time.
    所以就是對單位經濟學的狂熱聚焦、加上真正的 A/B 測試,我們當時做過成千上萬次即時測試。
  • I think I once described Capital One as a giant experimental laboratory agar jelly in real time.
    我記得我曾形容 Capital One 是一個巨大的、即時的實驗室培養皿
  • So any conventional wisdom you would test to see where it worked and where it didn’t work and what would what were the when the idea when the conventional wisdom would run out of gas and where it would start to break down.
    任何既定常識都要拿來測試,看哪裡有用、哪裡沒用,以及那個常識在什麼時候會失效、會從哪裡開始崩潰。

關鍵突破:風險基準定價與優惠利率

  • So the learning that came from that was just massive and that led to breakthroughs in terms of risk based pricing » which if you and I went to the same to the insurance company to get insurance on our car we would get different prices right you’re younger than I am therefore more risky you drive around in that beautiful red Maserati that I see outside now as I look out of the window and I’m driving around in an SUV we would get different pricing and we understand that but incredible credit
    從這過程中學到的東西非常龐大,並帶出了幾個突破,其中之一是風險基準定價(risk-based pricing)。你我若去同一家保險公司買汽車保險,會拿到不同的價格,對吧?你比我年輕,所以風險較高;你開我現在從窗外看到的那台漂亮紅色 Maserati,我開的是休旅車,我們會拿到不一樣的保費。這點大家都能理解,但信用卡卻不是這樣
  • cards at that time 1980 everybody got the same price $20 fee 19.8 8 annual percentage rate.
    那個年代,1980 年代,信用卡大家拿到的都是一樣的價格:20 美元年費、19.8% 的年利率。
  • So risk-based pricing was one breakthrough.
    所以風險基準定價就是第一個突破
  • The second one I think that was really powerful was the ability to put together teaser rates.
    第二個我認為非常強大的突破,是設計出優惠利率(teaser rates)
  • I’ll give you a lower rate for a period of time and balance transfer apparatus so I could move your balances across.
    我給你一段時間的低利率,同時搭配餘額代償機制,這樣我就可以把你的餘額搬過來
  • And that led to us being able to attract positively selective customers on a giant scale.
    這讓我們能夠大規模吸引到「正向被篩選」的優質客戶。
  • And the third one is really for opening up the near-prime and subprime space.
    第三個是我們打開了次優級(near-prime)和次級(subprime)信用市場
  • Half of America today can’t get access to a credit card from the mainstream banks and they couldn’t in 1988 either.
    今天有一半的美國人拿不到主流銀行的信用卡,1988 年時也是一樣。
  • » So those three big breakthroughs allowed us to be able to scale then at Signet Bank that led to the spin-off of Capital One.
    » 所以這三個重大突破,讓我們能夠在 Signet Bank 裡擴張規模,最後促成 Capital One 的分拆獨立。

Capital One 的 DNA 與秘密配方

  • But the DNA it was very much I think that the if I would add to back to the DNA that is Capital One and now that Capital One diaspora spread all over the planet.
    回到 Capital One 的 DNA,而現在 Capital One 培養出來的人已經擴散到全世界。
  • I’m very proud of that of the people that came out of that grist mill is that it’s a focus.
    我很以那些從這座「磨坊」裡訓練出來的人為傲。那個 DNA 就是一種專注。
  • It’s that relentless focus on getting the an analytics right and being insatiably curious and then figuring out how to mobilize those insights with technology with product with scaling.
    是一種毫不放鬆地把分析做到位、永遠保持好奇,然後想辦法把那些洞察透過技術、產品、規模化動員起來。
  • BCG and McKinsey and Oliver Wyman and Bain would go and tell AmEx and Citi and Chase and BofA how to do what Capital One did.
    BCG、McKinsey、Oliver Wyman 和 Bain 會跑去跟 AmEx、Citi、Chase 和 Bank of America 講 Capital One 是怎麼做的
  • But very few of them were able to do it.
    但他們當中很少人做得到。
  • Not because they didn’t have lots of clever people.
    不是因為那些銀行沒有聰明人
  • They comes down to the culture and the people that you hire and the way you manage those people.
    關鍵在於文化,在於你雇用什麼人、怎麼管理那些人
  • That is where the secret sources the the old adage that culture eats strategy for breakfast.
    這就是秘密配方所在,老話說的:「文化把策略當早餐吃掉。」

文化的建構與體現

文化的重要性

  • » Yeah.
    » 對。(Ernest:也太重要,自成一段!)

建構並體現公司文化

  • » And when it comes to culture, what have you learned about how to build it?
    » 那關於文化,你學到什麼樣的建構方法?
  • I mean, you have to be super intentional.
    我是說,你必須非常有意識地去打造它
  • You have to be very intentional because if cultures will form whether or not you like it or not and cultures will be uh driven by what you say in part but much more what you do.
    你必須非常刻意,因為不管你喜不喜歡,文化都會自然形成。文化會被你說的話影響一部分,但更多是被你做的事影響
  • So being very clear about what your culture is and what your culture is not.
    所以要很清楚文化是什麼,以及不是什麼
  • I’ve seen so many cultural statements over the years Miguel that is just so motherhood and apple pie and they’re so obvious that they are inactionable.
    Miguel,這些年我看過太多企業文化宣言,全都是老生常談,講得太理所當然,反而讓人無從執行。
  • So being really clear and one of one things I try to work with is in in our with us young CEOs who are building culture for the first time is say what it is and saying what it is not and then give vignettes and examples that bring it to life and then when you look at that and you stare at it say to yourself can I am I going to embody that because if you say that the culture is XYZ and then you don’t live up to it it causes dissonance within the organization the organization will never it
    所以要非常清楚。我跟第一次在打造公司文化的年輕 CEO 合作時,其中一件會做的事,就是要他們明確講文化是什麼、不是什麼,然後給出具體的小故事與例子讓它變得鮮活。接著盯著那份宣言,問自己:我能實踐嗎?我會體現它嗎?因為你說文化是 XYZ,結果自己做不到,組織內部就會產生不協調。
  • never will really adhere and certainly won’t scale » and that’s a real challenge.
    這個組織就永遠不會真的落實這個文化,也絕對無法規模化。這真的很難。

創辦人的文化角色與避免脫節

  • So, so back to your earlier point in a sense the culture of an organization is a manifestation a projection of the human beings that and that’s a big it’s a big weight on your shoulder to be the embodiment of the culture cuz you’re constantly looking at yourself and what you do every day.
    所以回到你前面提的點,組織的文化某種程度上就是人的展現、是人的投射,這對你肩上是很大的重擔,因為你要成為文化的體現,每天都在檢視自己、檢視自己做的每一件事
  • Am I living up to that?
    我做到了嗎?
  • Am I real?
    我是真的嗎?
  • you do 360s on yourself and those things.
    你要對自己做 360 度的評估,諸如此類。
  • But often if you if you become a founder, a co-founder of something and it scales massively, very quickly you can become isolated and very quickly you can become detached from your humble, scrappy trying to stay alive roots.
    但如果你是一家公司的創辦人或共同創辦人,而且規模快速放大,你很快就會變得孤立,很快就會與那個謙卑、掙扎求存的起點脫節。

Fintech 的拆解與再聚合

Fintech 的拆解與再聚合

  • I want to switch gears a little bit.
    我想稍微換個話題。
  • Talk about a topic that I know you enjoy discussing and that is the first the unbundling and then the rebundling financial services specifically in fintech.
    我知道你喜歡聊一個主題,就是金融服務的拆解(unbundling)與再聚合(rebundling),特別是在 fintech 領域裡
  • I mean let’s take Nubank as an example but this is happening all over.
    我是說,我們就以 Nubank 為例,但其實這種現象到處都在發生。
  • They started with a credit card only after seven years they expanded to other products.
    他們一開始只做信用卡,過了七年才擴展到其他產品。
  • Now they’re borderline a super app, right?
    他們現在幾乎就是一款超級 App 了,對吧?
  • They do basically anything you would want a financial services company to do plus more.
    基本上,只要是你期望金融服務公司做的事情,他們都有做,甚至還做得更多。
  • What is it’s it feels like many fintech companies have started exactly that way unbundling the big gorilla but then they all become the gorilla.
    感覺很多 fintech 公司都是這樣起步的:先拆解那隻大猩猩,但最後自己也變成了大猩猩。
  • How do you think about this?
    你怎麼看這件事?

銀行業的整合趨勢

  • We did a lot of consulting work for the banks pre Capital One in [snorts] the SPA days and it was pretty clear that many acquisitions were justified at the altar of we’re going to be able to cross several credits and almost universally it never manifested and so many of the M&A deals that are done within banking are much more about how much of the revenue can I hold and how much cost can I take out that’s how it’s justified and so many uh with a very fragmented banking system in America with
    在 Capital One 之前,我們 SPA 時期做過很多銀行顧問案。那時候很清楚,很多併購案被拿出來說是為了能做好幾種交叉銷售,但幾乎沒有一個真正做到。很多銀行業的 M&A 案最後是以「能維持多少營收、能砍掉多少成本」作為正當理由。美國銀行體系非常分散
  • 5,000 banks, there’s still a huge amount of consolidation yet to come where the endgame in classic Michael Porter ways is that you end up with five or six players all with a comparative advantage owning 80% market share.
    五千家銀行,還有大量整合等著發生。用 Michael Porter 的經典說法,終局會是五六家具有比較優勢的玩家,合計握有八成市場。
  • That’s where we are headed.
    這就是我們正在前進的方向。
  • It’ll take a generation or two to get there in America.
    在美國可能要一代到兩代人才會走到那裡
  • Australia and the UK and France uh have already got there.
    澳洲、英國、法國已經走到那裡了。
  • they don’t have the legacy of state uh bank uh structures.
    他們沒有美國那種州立銀行體系的歷史遺產。

消費者行為:分散 vs. 慣性

  • So I my my starting assumption is that left to their own devices consumers will unbundle will fragment will cherry-pick different products from different financial providers that give them the best service and best pricing and that should be the base that should be the base assumption.
    所以我的起始假設是:如果放任消費者自己選,他們會自然而然拆解、分散、從不同的金融業者中挑出服務最好、價格最好的產品。這應該是基本假設
  • Banks constantly confuse loyalty and inertia.
    銀行一直搞混忠誠度與慣性這兩件事
  • Very different.
    這兩件事很不一樣。
  • You can have lots of stickiness, particularly in a non-open banking world, where people can’t be bothered or it’s too difficult to switch and particularly to bring your historic data over to a new provider.
    你可以有很高的黏著度,特別是在非開放銀行的環境裡,客戶懶得換,或轉換太難,尤其是要把歷史資料搬到新業者那邊。
  • So, they stick around and people assume incumbents assume that’s because they’re dearly loved.
    所以他們就留下來,既有業者以為這是被深愛的證據。
  • But yet, they’ll have a net promoter score that’s 12.
    然而他們的 NPS 其實只有 12。

Nubank 的成功與 NPS

  • You mentioned Nubank.
    你剛提到 Nubank。
  • The public data on Nubank that they talked through is that their net promoter scores are in the 90s, certainly in Mexico.
    Nubank 公開揭露過的資料顯示他們的 NPS 在 90 幾分,特別是在墨西哥。
  • I don’t know how many of our listeners are thinking that their own net promoter scores are, but I know how herculanly difficult it is to get to a net promoter score that starts with an eight, let alone a nine.
    我不曉得有多少聽眾正在想自己的 NPS 是多少,但我知道要讓 NPS 開頭是 8 已經是非常艱難的事,更別說 9 開頭了。
  • These are incredible net promoter scores.
    這種 NPS 真的不可思議。
  • So null hypothesis is that people will fragment and will break apart and unbundle.
    所以我的虛無假設是:人們會分散、會拆開、會 unbundle

金融服務再聚合的挑戰

  • Now then, how do you get bundling to work?
    那麼,要怎麼讓再聚合(bundling)起作用?
  • And it’s true that Nubank and entities like Commission Lane here in the US have started with lending.
    確實,Nubank 以及美國像 Commission Lane 這類公司,都是從借貸起家。
  • Lending is much harder to start with than debit, which would be Chime, Albert, Current, Monzo, even Revolut who have got a different slightly different twist on that.
    從借貸起家比從簽帳金融卡起家困難得多。簽帳卡那邊是 Chime、Albert、Current、Monzo,甚至 Revolut(雖然 Revolut 切入方式略不同)。
  • But yeah, so it’s much easier to do that because the feedback loops much faster and you don’t have this hanging liability of am I going to make money on this customer?
    所以做簽帳卡容易很多,因為回饋迴圈快得多,也不會有那種「這個客戶到底會不會讓我賺錢」懸而未決的負擔。
  • Any fool can lend money.
    任何笨蛋都能把錢借出去
  • The challenge is getting people to pay back.
    難的是讓人還錢
  • And you won’t know that for a long time.
    而你要很久以後才會知道結果。
  • And in a way the the me the huristic by which you figure out lending is that by you lend people to the wrong you lend money to the wrong people and then you make sure you don’t get any more of them and you weed them out.
    某種程度上,搞懂借貸這一行的經驗法則就是:你借錢給錯的人,然後確保不再找到那種客戶,把他們剔除
  • And that process that iteration that learning loop takes not months or quarters can take years.
    這個過程、這個迭代、這個學習迴圈,不是幾個月或幾季的事,可能要好幾年。
  • So cracking that code is really hard.
    所以要破解這個密碼真的很難。
  • But as David would say from Nubank, look in the end most of the money is in lending and doing that right is really important.
    但就像 Nubank 的 David 會說的:最終大部分的錢還是在借貸這一塊,把它做對非常重要

再聚合成功的問題

  • Okay.
    好。
  • So how do you get what’s the story on rebundling?
    那再聚合的劇本長什麼樣子?
  • Now there’s not that many entities that I can point to that have successfully rebundled.
    其實目前我能指出來、真的成功再聚合的公司並不多。

Nubank 作為再聚合的成功故事

  • There’s a lot of talk.
    大家談論很多。
  • Nubank being the poster child of amazing success in an environment where the Brazilian mainstream incumbents did not take them seriously where the service levels were massively different.
    Nubank 就是那個招牌成功案例,他們所處的環境是巴西主流既有業者根本不把他們當一回事、而服務水準又差距巨大。
  • People did not need to walk into bank branches in Brazil that were basically like Fort Knox and Delhi Deled talks about some of his own experiences there.
    人們不需要走進那種像諾克斯堡(Fort Knox)一樣戒備森嚴的巴西銀行分行,Delhi Deled 也談過他在那邊的親身經驗。
  • People can be serviced digitally.
    人們可以透過數位管道被服務。
  • People can be originated digitally and they are very happy with that.
    人們可以被數位方式「拉進來」成為客戶,而且他們很滿意。
  • They all the mindset that exists with incumbents that says I need to be able to see you face to face and drag you into my bank branch is rapidly declining.
    既有業者那種「我要面對面見到你、把你拉進我的分行」的思維,正在快速式微。
  • And maybe it’s people who are my age or older that are um still seeking that.
    可能只有我這個年紀或更老的人還會追求那種方式。
  • When you see the ascension of CLA and Nubank and Credit Karma and Revolut, it’s Chime, it’s pretty clear that’s not where that’s a thing of the past.
    當你看到 CLA、Nubank、Credit Karma、Revolut、Chime 的崛起,很清楚那種實體銀行的思維已經是過去式。

匯款服務的競爭

  • And a company like the Mitti where QED is on the board competing against the Western unions of this world.
    還有像 Mitti 這種我們 QED 坐在董事會上的公司,正在與 Western Union 這類對手競爭。
  • So what does it take to re to to bundle?
    那麼,要怎麼把東西重新 bundle 起來?

成功再聚合的必要條件

  • Well, you have to have uh a proposition that makes sense uh for the second product where you understand the unit economics a priori and all the customer has to do is press on the button and get it.
    首先,你得為第二個產品提出一個說得通的訴求,事先就已經搞懂單位經濟學,而客戶要做的只是按一個按鈕就能拿到
  • I sometimes I when you’re roaming around the web and somebody you see a popup ad with a company that you know already and they know you already and you say okay I’m going to apply for this product and then they ask you what your name is.
    有時候你在網路上逛,看到一家你已經認識、而且它也認識你的公司跳出廣告,你想說:好,我要申請這個產品,結果它問你叫什麼名字。
  • They already know what your name is and then you go okay I’m not going to bother.
    他們明明就知道你的名字,這時候你會覺得算了,不想浪費時間。
  • So you have to make it seamless and frictionless and and pre or prequalified that the customer can get that product and that it’s a product that’s compelling to them.
    所以你必須做到無縫、無摩擦、而且事先資格審查完畢,讓客戶能直接拿到那個產品,而且這產品對他們真的有吸引力。
  • That is really crucial.
    這一點真的很關鍵。
  • So you earn the permission to rebundle based on doing a really great job for your customers.
    你是因為把客戶服務得夠好,才換到「重新 bundle」的資格
  • It’s not something that’s a given.
    這不是一開始就給你的權利

借貸與簽帳金融卡的產品策略

  • So have done a really solid job of it in the US.
    在美國,有些公司做得相當扎實。
  • I watch them doing a good job and many others are trying.
    我看著他們把這件事做好,很多其他公司也在嘗試。
  • It’s easier to sell lending on top of debit than to sell debit on top of lending.
    把借貸產品加到已有簽帳金融卡客戶身上,比在借貸客戶身上賣簽帳卡容易。
  • It’s easier to sell lending products because the consumer would actually like to have your money, particularly in near-prime and subprime spaces where the appetite to to [snorts] take on more debt is in general pretty high.
    賣借貸產品比較容易,因為消費者真的想要你的錢,尤其在次優級(near-prime)與次級(subprime)市場,借更多錢的意願普遍很高
  • And there it’s a question of how do you make sure you lend money to the right people.
    問題就變成:你怎麼確保把錢借給對的人

Fintech 的未來篇章

對 Fintech 未來的投資聚焦

  • When you think of the next iteration of fintech, what are you where are you spending your time?
    當你思考 fintech 的下一個世代時,你會把時間花在哪裡?
  • When you’re think because I mean this is what you do, right?
    因為這就是你在做的事,對吧?
  • Your team here, you invest in the future of the industry.
    你在這裡的團隊,就是在投資這個產業的未來。
  • That’s also what I do.
    我也是在做這件事。
  • I’m sure you have takes on what what’s coming.
    你一定對即將發生的事有自己的看法。

判斷 Fintech 旅程的階段

  • It’s really interesting that the a year and a half ago we did a fundraise into a pretty austere miserable maelin environment and one of the questions we were getting from it was where are we in this fintech journey?
    很有趣,大約一年半前我們在一個相當嚴峻、慘澹的環境下做募資,其中一個一直被問到的問題是:我們現在在 fintech 這段旅程的哪裡?
  • Are we in chapter two just at the beginning of a series of revolutions or are we in chapter eight and the lowhanging fruit has already been taken down now it’s advantage incumbents and we work with our friends at BCG to do a study and with the we just re revitalized refresh that study but basically that was attempting to answer that question where are we and I point to two pieces of data that allowed me to be able to sleep at night miguel now I do have a dog in the race so I I’m looking for
    我們是才剛進入一連串革命的第二章?還是已經到第八章、低處的果實都被採完、剩下都是既有業者的主場?我們和 BCG 的朋友合作做了一份研究,最近還把它更新了一次。這份研究基本上是想回答我們現在在哪裡的問題。Miguel,我可以指出兩個讓我能安心睡覺的資料點。我當然自己在賽道裡,所以我在找佐證的證據
  • confirming evidence to some extent.
    某種程度上我是在找驗證性的證據。
  • But two things really struck me.
    但有兩件事讓我特別震撼。

市場規模與 Fintech 滲透率

  • One, the size of financial services worldwide is about $14 trillion on a worldwide economy that’s about $105 trillion.
    第一,全球金融服務的規模大約是 14 兆美元,而全球經濟總量約 105 兆美元
  • So somewhere around 15% is financial services.
    所以大概有 15% 是金融服務
  • Some geography is more.
    有些地區更高。
  • India for example, some a bit less.
    印度等一些地方比較低。
  • [snorts] And where it’s less is because it hasn’t evolved yet.
    低的地方是因為還沒發展起來。
  • So about 20% of the world is financial services, insurance and banking.
    所以全球大概有 20% 是金融服務、保險和銀行業
  • When we add up all of the revenues from all of the fintechs, okay, you get to between two and 3% penetration, i.e. 97% of financial service revenues are not fintech.
    當你把所有 fintech 公司的營收加總起來,你會得到大約 2% 到 3% 的滲透率,也就是說 97% 的金融服務營收仍然不是 fintech
  • So that would suggest to me that it’s hard to believe that this thing has run its course.
    這告訴我,很難相信這趟旅程已經走完了。

用 NPS 衡量進度

  • One, two, I touched on net promoter scores earlier as a measure of product market fit.
    第二點,我剛才提過 NPS(net promoter scores) 作為產品市場契合度的衡量指標
  • And yes, the people can criticize the methodology and I’m inclined to watch net promoter scores through time with a constant methodology with a constant company as a as the the best way to see if you’re making progress but also just by virtue of measuring it.
    是的,方法論可以被批評,但我傾向用固定方法、在同一家公司身上長期追蹤 NPS,這是看進度最好的方式,光是去衡量這件事本身就有價值
  • I mean somebody once dr may have said what what gets measured gets done right and so many if you look at the net promoter scores that are published by the incumbents often they’re five and 10 and 15 whereas you look at the net promoter scores of the fintechs and their 70 80s and 90s that’s a huge difference now part of it is because people rate digital distribution higher than branch-based distribution that accounts for some of it but not all of it and these are the incumbents that show
    有人說過「有被衡量的事才會被做到」。如果你去看既有銀行公布的 NPS,常常是 5、10、15 分;但看 fintech 的 NPS,常常是 70、80、90 分。這差距巨大。當然有一部分是因為人們對數位通路評價比分行通路高,這可以解釋其中一部分,但無法全部解釋。而且這些是既有業者願意揭露 NPS 的那些公司。
  • their net promoter scores.
    他們願意公開 NPS。
  • Watch out for entities that don’t one don’t measure it or even worse measure it but don’t talk about it and very few of the banks will talk about their net promoter scores or their journey.
    要留意那些根本不量 NPS 的公司,更糟的是有量但不說。幾乎沒有銀行願意公開談自己的 NPS 或改善軌跡。

Fintech 的未來篇章

  • So we saw there back to the where are what chapter are we in I’m firmly believe we’re in chapter 2 now then you say okay so what do you think the future chapters are going to be?
    所以回到我們在哪一章的問題,我堅信我們正處於第二章。那你會問,那之後的篇章會是什麼?
  • Well, I think I point to a number of issues that would be that would be another number of opportunities.
    好,我會指出幾個重要主題,也就是幾個重大的機會。

地理擴張與普惠金融機會

  • Uh, one is I think that the geographic expansion of inclusion uh across the developing world is massive.
    第一,我認為發展中國家的普惠金融地理擴張(geographic expansion of inclusion)是一個巨大的機會
  • When we invested in Nubank or seven, eight years ago, we didn’t fully internalize how big an opportunity Brazil would be and then coming out of Brazil, how big an opportunity Mexico would be and how financial services has taken hold there and how the regulatory climate particularly in Brazil partly mumbled on India is so progressive and so supportive of allowing financial service companies to enter and be able to [snorts] get traction.
    當我們 7、8 年前投資 Nubank 時,其實沒有完全意識到巴西會是多大的機會,走出巴西後更沒想到墨西哥的機會有多大,也沒預期到金融服務在那邊的扎根程度,還有那邊的監管環境(特別是巴西,部分也呼應印度)有多進步、多支持金融服務公司進入市場並做出成績。
  • That speaks to a regulatory body that is yes focused on the fidelity of the system and indeed focusing on making sure that products are good uh as they face off to consumers but also focused on inclusion.
    這反映出一個監管機構,是的,他們關注整個系統的可靠性,也確保面對消費者的產品是好的,但同時也把普惠(inclusion)放在心上。
  • How do we get h half or 70 or 80% of our population to have products in their hands that help them learn, help them grow, give them flexibility, give them power in the hegemonic relationship with incumbents and at the same time actually we can track it and tax it is on every everybody’s mind.
    怎樣讓一半、甚至七八成的人口拿到能幫他們學習、成長、獲得彈性、在與既有業者霸權關係中取得更多力量的產品?同時政府也能追蹤、也能課到稅,這是大家都在想的問題。
  • So we see that we look at Nigeria with its huge population and its educational system.
    所以我們看到奈及利亞,看到它龐大的人口和它的教育體系。
  • We look at India where we’ve made several investments that have gone really that have gone blisteringly well with an economy that’s on a very different cycle to that of the west.
    我們看印度,我們投了幾個案子表現都非常漂亮,那邊的經濟週期與西方完全不同。
  • High GDP growth, positive regulatory climate and a talent quality of talent and depth of talent that’s unrecognizable anywhere else in the world.
    高 GDP 成長、正向的監管氛圍,還有一種全世界其他地方都難以想像的人才品質與深度。
  • I think that’s really exciting.
    我覺得這真的令人興奮。

國際投資聚焦

  • And then now into the Middle East where we are investing half of QED’s investment are done overseas under the leadership of Bill Salufo.
    接下來是中東,我們也在投了。QED 約有一半的投資是在海外,由 Bill Salufo 領軍
  • Frank Rotman focuses on the early stage uh domestically.
    Frank Rotman 則聚焦美國國內的早期階段投資。
  • I think that’s really exciting.
    我覺得這真的令人興奮。

即時支付與財富管理

  • I think that the the opportunities to uh be able to uh move to real-time payments is incredibly powerful.
    我認為移往即時支付(real-time payments)所帶來的機會非常強大
  • We have not yet seen major mass market wealth management businesses emerge.
    我們還沒看到真正大眾市場規模的財富管理業務出現。

AI 作為全面催化劑

AI 作為 Fintech 催化劑

  • We’ve seen stock trading, but we haven’t seen mass market wealth management.
    我們看過股票交易的普及,但還沒看到大眾市場的財富管理普及。
  • That will come.
    這個終究會發生。
  • And then on top of all that, not necessarily as a a third chapter, but more of a galvanizer across the board is leveraging AI to be able to improve the economics.
    在這些之上,不一定算是第三章,而是全面性的催化劑,就是運用 AI 來改善經濟模型。

用 AI 提升效率與效能

  • Where how does that work?
    這是怎麼運作的?
  • Yeah, I don’t I can’t profess, Miguel, to say my here I can judge a different AI algorithm over a different over one versus the other.
    Miguel,我老實說,我沒有能力判斷一個 AI 演算法比另一個好在哪裡
  • I can’t judge that.
    我判斷不出來。
  • And I don’t think that’s where the leverage is to be really honest with you.
    說真的,我也不覺得槓桿點在那裡
  • I think it’s very clear that big tech is going to end up developing the best algorithms.
    我很清楚最終會是大型科技公司發展出最強的演算法。
  • They’ve got the scientists and they’ve got the data and they then moving at a geometric rate.
    他們有科學家、有資料,而且以幾何級數的速度在往前推。
  • But you can see how uh uh companies can use AI to uh make uh uh customer contact be much more efficient and effective.
    但你可以看到,企業可以運用 AI 讓客戶接觸(customer contact)變得更有效率、更有成效。

AI 在客服與生產力上的應用

  • And we’re seeing that work in real time.
    而且我們已經即時看到這件事在發生。
  • I went through an example with one of our portfolio companies where they basically took all the human text, plugged it into an off-the-shelf AI machine and within 5 weeks they were coming back with betas where this thing where the AI was answering questions and you can have a human in the loop so people can talk to human if they need to and you can have humans deal with difficult questions and the AI will learn.
    我陪我們投資組合中的一間公司走過一輪,他們基本上是把所有人類客服對話的文本,丟進一個現成的 AI 系統,5 週內就做出 Beta 版,由 AI 回答問題,並保留 human-in-the-loop 的設計,有需要的客戶可以轉真人,真人也可以負責處理棘手的問題,AI 會持續學習
  • One dramatic change and productivity gain that’s coming.
    這是一個即將到來的、戲劇性的變化與生產力提升。
  • In the days of Capital One, I used to glibly say we sell the right product to the right customer at the right time at the right price targeted.
    Capital One 那個年代,我常簡潔地說:我們在對的時間、用對的價格、把對的產品賣給對的客戶,而且是精準投放

個人化行銷與降低 CAC

  • And there was some truth in that because we were doing direct marketing by and large, direct mail.
    那句話某種程度上是真的,因為我們當時主要做直效行銷(direct marketing),特別是直郵。
  • But you know what?
    但你知道嗎?
  • We could didn’t have 5,000 variations, 50,000 variations of text that we had in our letter.
    我們當時沒辦法同時擁有 5,000 或 50,000 個版本的信件文案
  • And now you can target the individual pitch to to N=1.
    而現在你可以把每一個訴求客製到 N=1 的程度。
  • And that means that product that t CAC will go down cost to acquire and all things being equal economics will will be better.
    這意味著客戶取得成本(CAC)會下降,在其他條件不變的情況下,經濟模型會更好。
  • The third category is in writing code where we’re seeing open open source coding support systems.
    第三類是寫程式。我們看到開源的程式輔助系統。

AI 對寫程式與創投的影響

  • 5 years ago if you if you were a coder coming out of the top schools you were demanding huge salaries and they were massively in need.
    5 年前,如果你是頂尖學校畢業的程式設計師,你要開超高薪水,而且市場上極度缺人
  • Now we’re seeing these engines that support writing code where 80% of the code could be written immediately and then you can have a human being look over it and make it better.
    現在我們看到這些輔助寫程式的引擎,可以立刻產出 80% 的程式碼,然後讓人來檢視、做得更好
  • So, we’re seeing that as a productivity game which opens up all kinds of universes.
    我們把它視為一場生產力遊戲,打開了各種可能的宇宙。
  • But I I really believe that venture is is on the frontier edge of seeing the third chapter start to to occur in real time.
    我真的相信創投業正站在前線,即時看見第三章開始發生。
  • And I’m I have no doubt that we’re uh very early on in this book.
    而且我毫不懷疑,我們現在還在這本書的非常早期。
  • And I just hope that I stay around long enough to be able to see the the epilogue.
    我只希望自己能活得夠久,看得到這本書的結尾。

創投的營運者思維與團隊

創投投資早期的錯誤

  • Nigel, we have heard a lot about some of the great companies you’ve backed at QED, [snorts] but I’m sure I mean you’ve been doing VC for about 15 years, right?
    Nigel,我們聽過很多你在 QED 投過的好公司,但你做創投也大約 15 年了,對吧?
  • I’m sure at the beginning you you were green in the space, right?
    我相信你剛開始的時候在這個領域也是菜鳥,對吧?
  • You were coming from a leadership position, traditional banking, but then you started investing as a venture capital.
    你是從傳統銀行業的領導職務轉過來開始做創投。
  • maybe tell us about some of the mistakes early on what you’ve learned that is important for venture capital investing.
    或許可以跟我們分享一下,早期犯過的錯誤,以及你學到哪些對創投投資很重要的東西。

創投裡的營運者思維

  • » Yeah.
    » 好。
  • Well, look, you you um you’re quite right and I I don’t say this as much now because I don’t feel it as much, but certainly in the early days, I would say uh constantly that I’m I’m an operator masquerading as an investor.
    你說得沒錯。我現在比較少說這句話了,因為感覺淡了,但早期我經常說:我是一個「偽裝成投資人的營運者」(operator masquerading as an investor)
  • when Frank and I and the and Caribou Honig began this journey managing our own money post capital one when the new when the the handle of fintech didn’t even exist we were applying just frameworks huristics from capital one days to early stage companies and at that time we found credit karma for example which was a big breakthrough but yeah so I think we are we are not your orthodox VC by any means and I still think like and act like an [clears throat] operator.
    當我與 Frank(Rotman)、Caribou Honig 一起從 Capital One 出來開始管自己的錢時,連 fintech 這個詞都還不存在。我們把 Capital One 時期的那套框架和經驗法則,套用到早期公司。那時我們找到像 Credit Karma 這樣的公司,是個大突破。所以我們絕對不是你熟悉的那種正統創投,我到現在思考與行為還是像個營運者
  • And I just sometimes if you show me a transcript of a board meeting, I can tell you where people are in the cap table.
    有時候你只要給我看一場董事會的逐字稿,我就能告訴你桌上每個人在股權結構表上的位置。
  • So, I’m all about helping young, talented, capable people who are half my age and twice as smart entrepreneurs build companies.
    我做的事就是幫那些比我年輕一半、比我聰明兩倍、有才華、有能力的年輕創業者打造公司
  • If we can help them build companies and change the probability of success all just by a little bit, [snorts] then that’s our job.
    如果我們能幫他們把公司做起來、把成功機率再提高那麼一點點,這就是我們的工作。
  • And if that h if we do that well, there are plenty of spoils to go around.
    只要我們把這件事做好,戰利品自然會夠分。
  • So that’s how we think about it.
    這就是我們的思維方式。

理解新創成功的機率

  • What have I learned?
    我學到了什麼?
  • If I look back over the years, I think that it would be obvious to say the odds of success of any young talented entrepreneur that sits opposite you when they pitch you is small.
    回頭看這些年,可以很直白地說:任何一個坐在你面前 pitch 的年輕有才華創業者,成功的機率都很低。
  • Is it 1 in 10?
    是十分之一嗎?
  • Is it one in 20?
    二十分之一?
  • Is it one in five?
    五分之一?
  • Who knows?
    誰知道。
  • And it depends on where they are in their journey.
    也看他們處於創業旅程的哪個階段。
  • Have they done it before, etc.
    有沒有做過第二次,等等。
  • But it’s low odds.
    但成功率本質上就是低

成功創業家的特質:韌性

  • Now, they don’t believe that cuz if they believe that, they wouldn’t be sitting there.
    他們自己不相信成功率低,因為如果相信,他們就不會坐在那裡了。
  • They go do something else.
    早就去做別的事了。
  • And they’ve got to be possessed.
    他們必須是被某種東西「附身」的人
  • So, you want to you look for people who are possessed.
    所以你要找的是這種被某件事附身的人。
  • And I think I have my own demons on my own shoulder.
    我承認我肩上也有自己的惡魔
  • I’m looking for people that not just brilliant, not just obsessed with making a difference, not just obsessed with the product, but have the ability to when it fails, when it doesn’t work, to think in terms of decision trees to dust themselves off and go at it again.
    我找的人不只聰明、不只執著於做出影響、不只執著於產品,而且在事情失敗、方案不成立時,有能力用決策樹的方式思考,拍拍灰塵再來一次
  • That is really important.
    這非常重要。
  • So you’re looking for some notion of tenacity and candidly people who have gone to great high schools and then cruised into IV league schools and all ended up with distinctions and then went to Goldman Sachs.
    你要找的是某種韌性。老實說,那些一路讀頂尖高中、順利進入常春藤盟校、拿到榮譽畢業、然後去 Goldman Sachs 的人。
  • These are now the elite of our world.
    他們現在是我們這個世界的菁英。
  • Many of them have never seen or touched failure.
    其中很多人從沒見過、碰過失敗。
  • So you’re looking for people that can power through that that they have some kind of energizer bunny in them that will take them to the next level.
    你找的是能撐過這些考驗的人,他們體內有一個 Energizer 兔子,會把他們帶到下一個層次
  • That’s one.
    這是第一點。

建立團隊與共同創辦人動態

  • Two, you want people that can build team around them and that can find people where enough of what they are, what their superpowers are and look to augment their superpowers with skills and competences that create a gestalt of capability beyond what they are.
    第二,你要找能在自己周圍組起團隊的人,這個人清楚自己的超能力是什麼,並去尋找能補強自己、結合起來產生超過個人加總能力的夥伴
  • And I love finding two people in co-founder arrangements.
    我特別喜歡看到兩人共同創辦的組合。
  • one who’s more strategy and extroverted and more passionate about a vision of solving a problem and then somebody who’s more technical and analytical who can build the capability behind the person who steps out in front.
    一位比較偏策略、比較外向、對解決問題的願景有熱情;另一位比較偏技術與分析,能在前面那位上台時,把背後的能力支撐起來
  • That is usually a really powerful combination.
    這通常是非常強的組合。
  • And then you’re looking to see if they can get along and not only get along in their existing framework, but can they get along 6 months from now, two years from now.
    接著你要看他們能不能相處,不只是現在這個階段能相處,而是半年後、兩年後還能不能相處
  • How long do they have the flexibility in their own personality to be able to grow together?
    他們個性上的彈性,能不能支撐他們一起成長?
  • And if I look at Rich Fairbank and I grew up in strategy consulting and then at Signet Bank and then at Capital One.
    回頭看我與 Rich Fairbank,我們是在策略顧問業、然後 Signet Bank、接著 Capital One 一路成長的。

長久的專業夥伴關係

  • If you the total number of years was something like 18 years we worked together.
    我們一起工作的總時間大約 18 年。
  • We went through very different stages in our career and our evolution from when I was in my basically my middle 20s up until in my middle 40s.
    我們一起經歷了職涯非常不同的階段,從我 20 幾歲中段一路到 40 幾歲中段。
  • And then Frank Rotman and I have have worked together since he came out of grad school.
    而我跟 Frank Rotman 則是從他研究所畢業後就開始合作。
  • So he and I think I’ve worked together for 32 years.
    我跟他大概已經合作了 32 年。
  • So you’re looking for uh relationships that can uh stand the test at different stages.
    所以你要找的是能在不同階段通過考驗的合作關係。
  • That I think is really powerful.
    我認為這非常強大。
  • I look for people that listen.
    我找的人會傾聽。
  • We’ve made 200 odd investments now over 17 years and there very seldom do you see a business that is truly magnificently unique.
    我們在 17 年間做了 200 多筆投資,很少看到一個生意是真正宏偉獨特的
  • We’ve seen parallels, we’ve seen analoges, we’ve seen versions, and it may be a unique combination in a different geo, but we’ve seen these.
    我們看過平行案例、類比案例、不同版本,可能是在不同地理市場的獨特組合,但這些我們都看過
  • So you’re looking for people that are listening to QED when we say ah we’ve seen that before and that didn’t work because of this and we saw that and that did work now how do you combine that with this that are listening and absorbing if [snorts] they are thinking so linearly that they’re going yeah just give me the money that is a pretty big red flag and it maybe it’s a process of self- selection I want the people that would say you know what I think these QED guys are going to uh challenge
    所以你要找的是會聽 QED 講話的人,當我們說「這個我們以前看過,因為什麼原因沒成功;那個我們看過,的確成功了,那你打算怎麼把這個和那個組合起來」時,會認真聽、會吸收的人。如果他們線性思考到只想說「好啦,把錢給我就對了」,那就是一個滿大的紅旗。也許這是一個自我篩選的過程,我要找的是會說「你知道嗎,我覺得這群 QED 的人會在很多面向挑戰我」的人
  • me in ways that others won’t because of their experience and expertise And because it’s their model, venture is not stockpicking.
    因為他們的經驗與專業會以別人無法複製的方式挑戰我,也因為他們的模式不同。創投不是選股
  • It’s not here Miguel, here’s a bunch of money.
    不是說 Miguel,給你一堆錢。
  • We really love you.
    我們真的很喜歡你。
  • We love your idea.
    我們喜歡你的想法。
  • Here’s a hundred units of money.
    這裡有一百個單位的錢。
  • Will you come back please and with three or 400 and we’ll be all be happy.
    請你回來時帶三、四百個單位,我們就都滿意。
  • Bring me back a,000.
    甚至給我帶 1,000 個回來。
  • Venture is not that way.
    創投不是那樣運作的。
  • It’s hands-on and it’s helping make the building the recipe and then helping cook the meal.
    創投是動手的,是幫忙一起打造食譜、然後一起把菜煮出來
  • And I want people that are willing to share that journey in a way that’s productive and cap and uh beneficial to both entities.
    我要的是願意一起走這段旅程、而且以建設性、對雙方都有益的方式前進的人
  • So you’re looking for that.
    所以你是在找這種人。

董事會運作與 Ghostbusters 效應

有效的董事會與董事會會議

  • » You mentioned that you can look at the scrap the transcript of a board meeting and kind of know the cap table.
    » 你剛提到你可以看一場董事會的逐字稿,就大概知道股權結構表長什麼樣。
  • What have you learned about great boards and board meetings?
    關於什麼是好的董事會、什麼是好的董事會會議,你學到什麼?
  • » The great board meetings are I mean there’s some hygiene things that are important.
    » 好的董事會會議有一些基本衛生條件要注意。
  • I have a 2 by two box that I have with my portfolio companies.
    我跟我投資組合公司之間有一個 2x2 的格子
  • What I ask the CEO on top of the often seven 70page deck that’s sent out lines and boxes and graphs is a one pager that says what’s going really well, what’s not going well, what are you really what’s keeping you up at night, which well, and what decisions do we have to make today?
    我會要求 CEO 在那份動輒 70 頁、滿是線條、方塊和圖表的簡報之外,再交一頁紙,寫:什麼事進展得很好?什麼事進展不好?真正讓你晚上睡不著的是什麼?以及我們今天必須做什麼決定?
  • And a a good CEO can do that off the top of their head.
    一位好的 CEO 可以即席回答。
  • If that takes a CEO two days to write down and it’s just bullet points and I don’t care about whether or not it’s in Dylan Thomas prose.
    如果某個 CEO 要花兩天才寫得出來(我不在乎他寫得像不像 Dylan Thomas 那種詩意文筆,我只要條列式就好)。
  • If you can’t do that as a CEO, you’re not on top of your business.
    如果你身為 CEO 做不到這件事,那你就不是真的掌握你的公司
  • You should carry that around with you in your head all the time.
    這四個答案應該隨時在你腦中。
  • So [snorts] that one, make sure you get the material out in advance.
    所以第一點,確保資料提前發送。
  • When if there’s things that are controversial, I would love you to talk to the to some of the board members in advance and know which of the board members are going to have an issue.
    如果有些事情具爭議性,我希望你事先跟幾位董事單獨談過,知道哪些董事會有異議
  • So Miguel, I think I’m we’re going to I’m going to want to talk about this pivot that I’m going to make.
    比如 Miguel,我想跟你聊我打算做的這個 pivot。
  • And I know that you’re going to you’re going to find this really interesting or controversial.
    我知道你會覺得這件事很有意思、或是很有爭議。
  • Let’s have a conversation about that.
    我們先私下聊一聊。
  • Let’s get let’s frame that in advance to the extent so that it’s not a surprise when you go into the boardroom when you can have all kinds of nonsequitus that can occur in a boardroom if people are surprised.
    先把話題框起來,盡量讓大家進到會議室時不會被嚇到。因為如果有人被嚇到,會議室會冒出各種脫序情況。
  • So take the surprise out of it and then be willing in the boardroom to have really constructive conversation and not to be a box ticking exercise and you have real conversations.
    所以把驚喜消除掉,接著願意在董事會裡進行真正建設性的對話,而不是打勾式的流程,要有真正的交流
  • The and I I often say to the to to my CEOs, what is it that you really want to get out of today?
    我常跟我的 CEO 說:你今天真正想從這場會議裡帶走什麼?
  • Which should be in that fourth box.
    這件事應該寫在第四格。
  • What decisions do we have to make today?
    我們今天必須做什麼決定?
  • But what’s important to you for us to help you drive your business over the next two to two to two to three months?
    未來兩三個月,哪些事情最重要、需要我們幫你推動業務?
  • And I think that the good boards are good with people who’ve got different perspectives from different experiences and are willing to authentically put them on the table and offer counsel and advice.
    我認為好的董事會,是由不同背景、不同觀點的人組成,而且願意把看法真誠地擺上桌,給出諮詢與建議。
  • One of the dangers that occurs sadly is as companies become later stage board meetings become less and less pivotal.
    一個遺憾的風險是,隨著公司進入後期階段,董事會變得越來越不具關鍵性。
  • They become more and more readouts and management is like got this board meeting in two weeks.
    會議越來越像單純的宣讀,管理層想的是:兩週後要開董事會,嗯。
  • I’m just going to write the deck that that is not controversial, that is not where the key issues are cuz I just want to keep the board out of the way so I can run my business.
    「我就寫一份不具爭議、不碰核心議題的簡報,把董事會擋在我的業務之外,讓我好好經營公司。」
  • And that in increasingly occurs and it’s partly for a number of reasons.
    這種狀況越來越多,原因有幾個。
  • One, the founders don’t really trust the board process or the board management.
    第一,創辦人其實不太信任董事會流程或董事會管理
  • And candidly, a lot of the people that are in the board room as companies become more and more mature add less value.
    老實說,隨著公司越成熟,很多董事會裡的人貢獻的價值越少
  • » [snorts] » I mean I do I’m being facitious now but you will hear advice like I think you should really focus on increasing your revenue and decreasing your cost and it’s not terribly actionable and because you’ve got very clever people around the boardroom candidly who haven’t ever really run a business before and so that’s I mean I’m being facitious because but there’s a it’s really important that management and the CEO gets the best out of their board and board members and that
    » 我現在是帶點反諷地講,但你真的會聽到那種建議:「我覺得你應該專心增加營收、降低成本。」這幾乎沒什麼可執行的,因為坐在會議桌邊的聰明人,其實從沒真正經營過一間公司。我故意講得誇張一點,但重點是,管理層和 CEO 真的要讓董事會與董事們發揮最大價值
  • requires as an authentic, engaged, intentional coming to terms with what are the key issues and and how to help navigate them and genuinely for the CEO to look for help and assistance in that process.
    這需要真誠、投入、有意識地去面對核心議題,弄清楚怎麼幫忙領航,CEO 也要真心尋求幫助

創投裡的 Ghostbusters 效應

  • I call it the Ghostbusters effect and I want QED u my partners and my friends at QED.
    我稱之為 Ghostbusters 效應,我希望 QED 的合夥人與我在 QED 的朋友們
  • I want them to be the the call.
    我希望他們是那一通電話的對象
  • I want the founders to call them when they’re in a pickle.
    我希望創辦人遇到困境時打給他們。
  • I just won this deal or I’ve beat my budget or my revenue soaring.
    不是那種「我剛贏到一筆案子」、「我超出預算目標」、「我的營收飆升」的時刻。
  • I’ve got this term sheet.
    或是「我拿到一份 term sheet」。
  • Founders are beautifully communicate when that happens.
    創辦人遇到這種好事時很愛溝通
  • But when they’re staring at a fork in the road or they’ve got a crisis, be it a people crisis, a compliance crisis, a funding c who do they call?
    但他們面臨岔路、面臨危機時(人事危機、合規危機、資金危機),他們會打給誰?
  • And we aim to be the best advice you can get.
    我們的目標是成為你能獲得的最佳建議來源
  • So I want my partners to be the ones that get the call because candidly as operators I think with the best intentions we can help founders navigate those ups and downs.
    所以我希望我的合夥人就是那個被打電話的人,因為身為營運者(operators),以最好的初心,我們能幫創辦人走過起伏。

日常節奏與自我訓練

創投的日常生活

  • » Nigel, two more questions before we run out of time.
    » Nigel,時間快不夠了,還有兩個問題想請教你。
  • How does your typical day look like?
    你一般的一天長什麼樣子?
  • » The only thing I know about [laughter] my day is that the way it starts is the way I planned it to be is not how it ends.
    » 我對我每一天唯一確定的事,就是計劃好的開頭不會是結尾的樣子
  • If you’ve got if you’ve got 150 50 active companies every day one of them will have a crisis and every day one of them will have a huge opportunity and being called into that really suits I think the sort of add that’s in my nature.
    當你手上有 150 家活躍公司,每一天都會有一家碰到危機、每一天也會有一家碰到巨大機會,被拉進這種節奏其實很適合我這種天性帶點 ADD 的人。
  • So I think that happens but I think that that these are long days in venture.
    所以這種事天天發生。我認為創投的一天非常漫長。
  • It’s really hard and it’s there’s an intensity about this that doesn’t exist in running a public company.
    真的很辛苦,這裡面有一種強度,是經營上市公司時沒有的。
  • this time of the year in the middle of October, I’d be planning for next year’s numbers and I would know that 87% of next year’s numbers are already in the bag and all I need to do is to get the 13% and put a bit on top of that and I’m going to be home and dry.
    在這個時節,10 月中旬,我會在規劃明年的數字,而我會知道明年 87% 的數字已經到手,剩下的 13% 搞定再加一點點,就大功告成。
  • These companies are fighting for oxygen all the time and are on a knife edge and that means you have huge volatility and with that huge stress.
    但這些新創公司是時時刻刻在搶氧氣、走在刀鋒上,這意味著巨大的波動性,伴隨著巨大的壓力。
  • We have companies that look like they were rocket ships today and tomorrow they’re down at the they’re in the dungeons and vice versa.
    我們有公司今天看起來像火箭,明天就跌進地牢;反過來也是
  • And we have companies that go from rags to riches to rags again or it’s a it’s a role.
    我們看過從貧到富又回到貧的公司,這就像是一場戲。
  • So that’s so deal that this a very unstructured environment.
    所以這是一個非常非結構化的環境。

日常節奏與生態系管理

  • What what do I do?
    我都在做什麼?
  • I [snorts] I get up in the morning and I usually hit the emails for an hour.
    我早上起床,通常會花一小時處理 email
  • I see what crises are going on and talk about the crisis.
    看看有什麼危機在發生,談談那些危機
  • I try and get an hour in the gym.
    我會盡量擠出一小時去健身房
  • I come to work and I sit in meetings that are short and sharp as best I can where I get to really get lots of nourishment and energy from with my co-mates at QED.
    然後進辦公室,盡可能開短而精準的會議,從 QED 的同事們身上吸收大量養分與能量
  • I’ve got board meetings all the time.
    我一天到晚在開董事會。
  • I sit on a number of boards and and I spend my time looking after the ecosystem that is QED.
    我身兼多個董事會席位,時間都花在照顧 QED 這整個生態系。
  • I try to keep I try to look after myself as best I can because I’m getting old here.
    我盡可能照顧自己,因為我年紀漸長。
  • So, I have to look after myself physically so I can keep up with people of your age.
    我必須照顧自己的身體,才跟得上你這個年紀的人。
  • But there’s nothing there’s nothing more fun in the world.
    但沒有什麼比這更有趣的事了。

把自行車當做訓練

  • » And so the rumor that I heard that you bike four hours a day.
    » 我聽說你一天騎 4 小時自行車。
  • Is that true?
    是真的嗎?
  • » No, that’s impossible.
    » 不,那不可能。
  • But I do have a secret that I’ll let you in on, and that is many years back, I heard of a a mountain biker that climbed a million feet a year.
    但我有個秘密可以跟你分享。很多年前,我聽說有個登山車車手一年爬升一百萬英尺。
  • So, I went through the mathematics of this and if you got a million feet divided by 365 days a year, you [snorts] have to you have to climb a little more than 3,000 ft a day.
    我算了一下,一百萬英尺除以一年 365 天,每天要爬超過 3,000 英尺。
  • Now, it’s really hard to climb 3,000 ft a day when you live in Alexandria here.
    住在 Alexandria 這裡,一天要爬 3,000 英尺是很困難的。
  • So most of my biking is simulation on a machine where some somebody where I can use software to pretend that I’m climbing up Alpe d’Huez or Mont Ventoux or the Stelvio Pass.
    所以我大部分的騎車是用機器模擬,用軟體假裝自己在爬 Alpe d’Huez、Mont Ventoux 或 Stelvio Pass。
  • [snorts] And what I do is I set out seven years ago to do a million feet a year.
    我在七年前給自己訂了一年爬升一百萬英尺的目標。
  • And I [snorts] do that.
    而且我真的做到了。
  • So, if I’m pushing you 250 watts at a 7% slope and I need to get to to over 3,000 ft a day, it takes about an hour.
    如果我在 7% 坡度上輸出 250 瓦,每天爬超過 3,000 英尺,大約要騎一小時。
  • So, I on average I will I’ll cycle an hour a day.
    所以平均我一天騎一小時。
  • So, nowhere near 4 hours a day.
    離一天 4 小時差很遠。
  • » There’s just not enough hours in the day.
    » 一天根本沒那麼多小時。
  • And I talk I I often quit with with Frank Rotman, my co-founder and dear friend.
    我常跟我的共同創辦人兼摯友 Frank Rotman 在這件事上抱怨。
  • He has the luxury of sleeping half as many hours as I do.
    他有奢侈的條件,只睡我一半的時間就夠了。
  • And that was a real competitive advantage in life.
    這在人生中是真正的競爭優勢。
  • But I still need I need my seven hours of sleep.
    而我還是需要我的 7 小時睡眠。
  • » Love it.
    » 太棒了。
  • But the cycling millionaire getting to [snorts] that million a year.
    但那個「自行車百萬英尺俱樂部」,每年爬一百萬英尺。
  • » Million feet.
    » 百萬英尺。
  • I’d love to hear how many of your listeners want to take that on.
    我很好奇你有多少聽眾願意挑戰看看。
  • I can show them how to do it.
    我可以教他們怎麼做。

社會影響與結語

Fintech 的社會影響與未來願景

  • » All right, let’s let’s get some answers.
    » 好,我們進入結尾。
  • Nigel, amazing.
    Nigel,太精彩了。
  • Thank you for this.
    謝謝你。
  • I learned a lot.
    我學到很多。
  • I’m sure everyone else will as well.
    我相信大家也會。
  • Fascinating stuff.
    真的很有意思。
  • And it [snorts] it really feels like you’re just getting started.
    感覺你好像才剛開始。
  • It’s a phrase that uh Matt Oppenheimer uses at Remitly and we’re just getting started.
    這是 Remitly 的 Matt Oppenheimer 的口頭禪:我們才剛開始。
  • Look, I I’ve been incredibly blessed in so many ways in life and I want there’s so many things that I want to do and so many things that I want to achieve that I haven’t had chance yet.
    說真的,我人生在很多方面都很幸運,我還有很多想做、想達成卻還沒機會去做的事
  • [snorts] I think that the aspirations of where I can take where we can take QED and I’ll leave you with one final thought and this is something that there’s an itch I still haven’t entirely scratched.
    對於我、以及我們能把 QED 帶到哪裡,我還有很多期待。留你最後一個想法,有個搔不到的癢我還沒完全抓到。
  • I [snorts] think fintech is a force for for good in our society.
    我認為 fintech 是社會中一股向善的力量
  • It levels the playing field, empowers consumers and small businesses.
    它拉平了競爭場域,賦予消費者與小企業力量
  • It takes away the friction.
    它消除摩擦
  • Uh it’s much more efficient and it and it shakes up the incumbents to improve their game which candidly many of them don’t take us as seriously as they might.
    它效率高得多,也在搖晃既有業者,迫使他們把自己的水準拉高(老實講,很多既有業者還沒有把我們當回事)
  • I would like to believe that before too long uh QED can impact the lives of a billion people around the world.
    我希望在不久的將來,QED 能影響全世界 10 億人的生活。
  • I’ve got I was I’ve got Cler and I’ve got Credit Karma and I’ve got Nubank and I’ve got one card and I’ve got Clear Score and I can add up these companies Remitly and the math is that I can get now over 400 » million.
    我手上有 Cler、有 Credit Karma、有 Nubank、有 OneCard、有 Clear Score,再把 Remitly 加上去,算一算現在可以影響超過 4 億人。
  • I’ve got that leaves I’ve got 5 to 600 to go.
    還差 5 到 6 億。
  • I can only get there I believe by India, Nigeria, Indonesia, huge countries that are now really embracing fintech maybe and bit Brazil and and Mexico perhaps.
    我相信要達到這個目標,只能靠印度、奈及利亞、印尼這些正在擁抱 fintech 的龐大國家,再加上巴西和墨西哥也許能補一點。
  • So that is really important to me.
    這對我而言非常重要。
  • So am I just getting started?
    所以我是不是才剛開始?
  • Yes, cuz I’ve got a long way to go and fintech [music] can add so much value to our world.
    是的,因為我還有很長的路要走,而 fintech 能為這個世界帶來非常多的價值。

結語與行動呼籲

  • » It’s a lot of people.
    » 那是非常多人。
  • I love it.
    我喜歡這個願景。
  • » Thank you so much.
    » 非常感謝。
  • It was amazing.
    真的很精彩。
  • » Thank you, man.
    » 謝謝你。
  • Thank you.
    謝謝。
  • Thank you.
    謝謝。
  • Thanks for tuning in.
    謝謝收聽。
  • I hope you enjoyed this great episode with Nigel Morris from QED.
    希望你喜歡這集與 QED 的 Nigel Morris 的精彩對話。
  • If you want more interviews, make sure to subscribe, follow, and leave a review on Apple Podcast, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your shows.
    如果想聽更多訪談,請在 Apple Podcast、Spotify、YouTube 或你收聽節目的平台上訂閱、追蹤並留評論。
  • It helps and truly means a lot.
    這對我們真的很有幫助、意義重大。
  • And if you have any suggestions or thoughts, just drop me a line on LinkedIn.
    如果有任何建議或想法,可以在 LinkedIn 上留言給我。
  • Signing off.
    就先聊到這裡。
  • Till next week, I’m your host, Miguel Armaza.
    下週再見,我是你的主持人 Miguel Armaza。